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ABSTRACT 
The end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War affected the Middle East 
prodoundly. The role of regional countries changed when the end of the superpower 
competition transformed frozen animosities into new conflict areas. In this context, 
Turkey extremely involved in regional politics. 
During the 1989-2000 period Turkey's policy toward the Middle East in general 
centered on security issues while Turkey encouraged regional cooperation 
simultaneously. PKK terrorism and the prospect of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq have 
been the forefront issues in Ankara's agenda. 
Ankara followed an active policy in the region to counter the regional threats to 
Turkey, to recover its declining image in the West, and to improve its economy through 
regional opportunities. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Contrary to popular belief, Turkey's policy toward the Middle East has not 
changed in principle but has become more assertive than ever because of the changes the 
Cold War and the Gulf War created in the region. Turkey emerged as a relatively stronger 
country in the region while its neighbors were marginalized, owing to either war or to the 
absence of a superpower patron. However, this change in the international system and in 
the regional power structure transformed frozen animosities between Turkey and its 
neighbors into new conflict areas. As a result, Turkey's policy toward the Middle East 
has become mostly security-centered while Turkey also simultaneously encouraged 
cooperation with its neighbors. 
Turkey's relations with Iraq and the developments in northern Iraq occupied 
much of its Middle Eastern politics. For decision makers in Ankara dealing with the 
conjunction of numerous developments in northern Iraq, the Western approach to that 
area, and the present Iraqi regime's stance toward Turkish northern Iraq policies is a 
complex and prime policy to formulate. First of all, the emergence of a Kurdish state in 
northern Iraq is a serious threat to Turkey. Such a development would inspire Turkey's 
Kurdish population and would risk national unity and territorial integrity of Turkey. 
Developments in or about northern Iraq also affect Ankara's relations with all its Middle 
Eastern neighbors and with the West. Hence, Turkish foreign policy toward northern Iraq 
must be and has been a very cautious balance between its commitment to the West and to 
its own national interests. 
Behind the water problem between Syria and Turkey are their projects on the 
Euphrates river, which are crucial to solve these two countries' domestic problems— 
ethnic and economic. While Turkey has control of the water, Syria tried to counter 
Turkey's advantage by resorting to PKK terrorism. The Southeast Anatolian Project 
(GAP, a Turkish acronym) aims to elevate the prosperity of the economically 
underdeveloped and Kurdish populated east and southeast areas of Turkey. Syria, to buy 
the loyalty of the Sunni majority of its population, pursues economically inefficient but 
XI 
politically lifesaving agricultural projects. A comparison, based on scientific data, of 
water potential and water demand of the riparian countries of the Euphrates River reveals 
that Syria overdemands water from the Euphrates while Turkey uses less water than it is 
supposed to use. Since the domestic stability of Syria depended on its water policy, Syria 
tried to dictate Turkey on water by resorting to PKK terrorism. Syria was the largest 
outside supporter of the PKK. The PKK cost Turkey 20,000 to 30,000 lives and $85 
billion, more than Turkey's foreign debts. This situation led to great frustration in Turkey 
forcing Turkish political and military leaders to eliminate the PKK and its patron Syria. 
Turkey, by threatening to use force, convinced Syria to abandon its support for the PKK 
and to extradite the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan. The October 1998 agreement satisfied 
Turkey, but Ankara is still wary about Syrian observance of the agreement. 
Turkey's "strategic cooperation" with Israel in 1996 changed the balances in the 
Middle East in favor of Turkey and Israel. The driving force behind the two important 
military agreements, "Military Training Agreement" and "Military Defense Industry 
Agreement," was Turkey's need to stop its isolation in the region and to recover its 
declining image in the West. Turkey's regional concerns were increasing and the West's 
attitude toward Turkey's concerns were not satisfactory. In addition, Israel and Syria 
were about to reach a peace agreement, which, if finalized, would free Syria to pressure 
Turkey more by deploying its forces from south to north. Thus, Ankara had to secure a 
cooperation with Israel to ease its global and regional concerns before Israel and Syria 
reached a peace agreement. Turkey achieved its objectives from the cooperation: Syria 
was marginalized and Turkey streghtened its position with the West by cooperating with 
Israel. Subsequently, the confidence Turkey acquired with this cooperation revealed itself 
in Turkey's S-300 missile crisis with Greece, in its October 1998 crisis with Syria, and in 
its August 1999 dispute with Iran. In all these disputes, Turkey was able to eliminate the 
sources of threats to its national security. 
Turkish-Iranian relations in the post-Cold War era were initially strained due to 
their regional rivalry and ideological differences. The opposing regimes of Iran and 
Turkey have been the source of their skeptism about each other's policies. The revisionist 
xii 
aspect of the Iranian Islamic regime has concerned Turkey since this aspect justified 
Iranian support for PICK and Islamic terrorism aimed at Turkey. Turkey presenting a 
secular regime compatible with Muslim society was a challenge to Iran at its door. Iran 
also suspected that the US, the main enemy of Iranian regime, would further encircle Iran 
by supporting the "Turkish Model" in the newly dependent Central Asian states. Thus, 
Iran used its terrorism card to contain Turkey's policies in northern Iraq, Central Asia, 
and the Caucasus. 
However, the initial conflict gave way to cooperation when Iran and Turkey 
realized that pursuing policies based on religious and ethnic kinship would benefit neither 
side. Their mutual geographic advantages enticed Iran and Turkey to cooperate rather 
than to confront each other. In short, though ideological differences between Turkey and 
Iran create a rift, the pragmatism deriving from mutual regional interests refrained Iran 
and Turkey from serious confrontation in the post-Cold War environment. 
The chapters of this thesis will discuss Turkey-Middle East relations in the post- 
Cold War era along the above lines. The author invites any comments pertaining to this 
thesis and the issues addressed in it. All comments should be forwarded to the author at 
E-mail account: hasanyilmaz28@hotmail.com 
xin 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
As Turkey undergoes the most profound economic, social, and 
political crisis of the republican period, Ankara also finds itself involved 
in the affairs of the Middle East with unprecedented intensity.1 
The demise of the Soviet Empire left the United States as the only major power 
with leverage on Middle Eastern developments. The 1991 Gulf War changed the balance 
of power among the regional nations eliminating Iraq as a regional power for some time 
to come. The peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians that followed the Gulf War 
brought further changes to the political landscape of the Middle East. 
In general, the end of the Cold War had the following repercussions on the 
region:2 
The US emergence as the single power whose authority and preferences must be 
contended with, 
An end to raising strategic rents by manipulating the superpower competition, 
The prevalence of liberal capitalism and the free market after the Soviet collapse 
and the necessity of rentier states to adapt to the competitive market rules of the 
emerging order, (In this context, Turkey stands as the only Middle Eastern 
country in the ten big emerging markets.) 
Without the Cold War and the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict the fact that 
many Middle Eastern states were superficially constructed and masquerading as 
1
 Soli Ozel, "Of Not Being a Lone Wolf: Geography, Domestic Plays, and Turkish Foreign Policy in the 
Middle East," in Geoffry Kemp and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), Powder Keg in the Middle East: The 
Struggle for Gulf Security (Washington: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1995), p. 
164. 
2
 Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey and the Middle East: A Geopolitical Exploration" in Henri J. Barkey (ed.), 
Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 
1996) pp. 26-29. 
1 
"states" became visible. Corollary to this were domestic challenges to the 
legitimacy of these regimes. 
What then President George Bush called "the new world order" or "the new 
Middle East" has yet to materialize—Iraq's Saddam Hussein still remains in power, and 
the Arab-Israel peace process has changed little except for the mutual recognition of the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (the PLO) and Israel—the new power structure of the 
region has had significant bearings on Turkish Middle East policy decisions. As a result 
of the changes in the international system, in the region, and in Turkey, Turkey emerged 
as a prominent actor in the Middle East during the 1990s. These developments and 
Turkey's involvement in them strongly influenced its perception of its national interests 
in the region. 
During the Cold War, protecting the Western interests and preventing the Soviet 
influence in the region were the primary issues forming Ankara's foreign policy. Yet, in 
the post-Cold War era, especially after the Gulf War, Turkey found itself drawn into the 
center of Middle East politics by its internal ethnic and religious identity debates. On the 
one hand, the tone of Turkey's Kurdish ethnic problem increased because of the power 
vacuum in northern Iraq. This provided new sanctuaries for the terrorist organization, the 
Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkeren-i Kurdistan or the PKK),3 and raised the 
prospect of a Kurdish state. On the other hand, polarization in domestic politics deepened 
because of the electoral victory of the Islamic Refah Party and its anti-Western and pro- 
Islamic policies. Coupled with this situation, the Islamic Republic of Iran resorted to 
subversive means bringing "irtica" (reactionism) fears back to the agenda of the secularist 
Turkish regime. As a result, the Middle East became Turkey's number one security 
problem with enormous domestic repercussions, to which Ankara has shaped its relations 
with the region as heavily "security centered." 
3 The PKK was declared a terrorist organization by such countries as Turkey, the United States, Syria, and 
Iran. 
The factors that impelled Ankara to become involved in Middle East politics in 
the post-Cold War era follow:4 
• The domestic PKK problem and its connections to northern Iraq, Syria and Iran, 
• Tehran's challenges to Turkey's secular regime, 
• The increasing significance of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (the GAP) for 
Syria and Iraq and their access to fresh water, 
• Turkey's need to bolster its economic position in order to obtain the membership 
of the European Union (the EU) and, to that end, the economic importance of the 
Middle East as an immediate area of opportunities for Turkey (Turkey is unique 
in the Middle East in terms of having inexpensive agricultural, food and water 
sources.), 
• Challenges to the Gulf Cooperation Council (the GCC) regimes from Iran, Iraq, 
and the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the possibility of Ankara playing the role 
of an intermediary role. 
If the ensuring external and domestic security is the forefront issue for Turkey's 
Middle Eastern agenda, enhancing regional cooperation that would create 
interdependence is the second. Indeed, these factors are components of each other in that 
a cooperative interdependence between the regional countries would automatically curb 
attempts of hostile actions and lessen their security concerns. 
Turkey has as many opportunities as threats in the region. The region is a 
potential market for inexpensive Turkish agricultural and industrial products. If the 
mutual mistrust, which compels the regional regimes to be economically self-sufficient 
and to seek distant economic partners instead of establishing trade with the neighbors of 
these regimes, can be removed, Turkey will have a highly promising export market and 
4
 Barkey, p. 25-26. 
will attract Arab petro-dollars for internal investment.5 Also, Turkish investors have 
interests in the regional construction and tourism sectors. Moreover, proximity to 
inexpensive oil and natural gas reserves is a principal benefit for Turkey's energy hungry 
industrialization. Nevertheless, turning these opportunities into benefits is not as easy as 
it might appear. 
Today we are observing two major tendencies among the nations of the world: 
globalization and regionalization. On the one hand, due to technological changes and 
liberal policies, the world is becoming one single unit. On the other hand, more and more 
countries are uniting to create regional mechanisms, as observed in Asia, Europe, and 
North America.Unfortunately, the Middle East appears to have missed both of these 
tendencies. Conflict, turmoil, border disputes, economic imbalances, religious differences 
and the existence of terrorism in the region are blocking the countries of the Middle East 
from integrating themselves into the global system as well as from establishing regional 
cooperation mechanisms. 
In this sense, the parameters of the regional politics compel Turkey to follow a 
fine line between restraint and cooperation. First, the traditional and mutual mistrust 
among the regional regimes stemming from their aspirations for regional hegemony and 
historical animosities forces them to be economically self-sufficient and not to depend on 
one another. This accurately portrays the case of Turkey and Syria. For example, Syria, 
instead of developing inefficient agricultural programs on non-arable land, could benefit 
from the inexpensive and immediate agricultural products of Turkey's GAP project. But 
Syrian misgivings about Ankara's regional intentions prevent it from such a move. 
Mutual distrust is also the cause of regional arms proliferation, which drains 
scarce sources which otherwise could be used in more positive regional and domestic 
economic and social development. Traditional enmities between Iraq and Israel, Iraq and 
5
 "Turkey seeks to boost trade with the United Arab Emirates (the UAE)," Turkish Daily News, 4 April 
2001. UAE Minister of Finance Sheikh Hamdan said the UAE could consider investing in Turkish markets. 
"Turks Sign $80 Million Contract in UAE, Kuwait," Directorate General of Press and Information, Office 
of the Prime Minister, Turkish Press Review, 13 April 2001. 
Iran, Syria and Israel, Syria and Iraq, and Turkey and Syria have resulted in high levels of 
arms procurement. This has continued to the extent that many posses Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) or the capability of acquiring them. In this context, it is not 
surprising that Turkey has an estimated $150 billion arms modernization and 
procurement program to the year 2030. 
Second, how long the rents of regional rentier states can last is crucial. These 
rentier states perceive any threat to their regimes as the number one national security 
threat, and allocate sources for military spending and patronage (buying loyalty) in order 
to perpetuate their regime. Yet, maintaining the status quo is more costly than ever for the 
elites of these regimes in the face of new post-Cold War challenges, such as political 
instability and Islamic fundamentalism. As long as these personalized regimes, in which 
"the elite, the regime and the state overlap to the point that they are almost 
indistinguishable,"6 can fund this cost by oil revenues or foreign aid, they are unlikely to 
engage in regional economic cooperation that would provide the source to meet this cost. 
In the scarcity of the resources, the elites of rentier states can maintain the status 
quo by allowing the emergence of state controlled quasi-pluralism. Egypt and Jordan, and 
recently Iran, are examples of this phenomenon in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the 
existence of some sort of pluralism and the scarcity of resources compel these states to 
diversify their economy and embark on regional cooperation to achieve it. "Declining 
rents induces the idea of sharing the, so-called, common regional gains from trade 
through the sale of more diversified foreign trade schemes instead of petroleum (or 
rent)."7 Since such countries are inclined to engage in cooperative economic relations, 
such as free trade area "negotiations" and free trade "agreements," we can call them 
6
 Murfah Joueati, "Water Politics as High Politics: the Case of Turkey and Syria," in Henri J. Barkey (ed.), 
p. 131. Iran stands as an exception in this case because of the democracy-like power distribution in its 
constitution. 
7
 Sema Kalaycioglu, "Regional Economic Cooperation in the Middle East," Perceptions, Journal of 
International Affairs, 1:3 (September-November 1996), p. 12. 
"like-minded" 8 countries. The ongoing economic cooperation between Egypt, Jordan, 
Turkey, and Israel, and recently between Turkey and Iran are the tangible examples of 
this "like-minded-ness" of Egypt, Jordan, and Iran. 
Turkey is in a dilemma. Its area of opportunities and area of threats in the region 
overlap. For instance, altough Syria offers an immediate market for Turkish exports, the 
water dispute, its irredentist claim to the Turkish province of Hatay, its past support of 
the PKK, and its general anti-Western political tone have weakened the chances of any 
cooperation between Turkey and Syria. Likewise, Turkey wants normalized relations 
with Iraq for economic (i.e. oil pipeline revenues, exports) and security reasons (i.e. 
prospect of a Kurdish state), but Iraq's perception of Turkey after Turkey joined the 1991 
anti-Saddam alliance and the water problem diminish the hopes for the same rate of trade 
between these two countries as in the past. Also, relations between Turkey and Iran could 
not flourish until the end of the 1990s. The ideological conflict between the two, rivalry 
for influence over both Central Asia and northern Iraq, and Iranian support for anti- 
Turkish and anti-secular terrorist groups impeded cooperative attempts of mutual 
interests. Fortunately, now, Turkey and Iran have started to realize common projects, 
such as natural gas pipelines and railroad transportation between Europe and Central 
Asia, putting their ideological differences aside. Yet, this does not mean problems 
between Turkey and Iran are resolved. The ideological differences and Iran's inclination 
to subversive actions (not because of President Khatemi himself, but the institutions, 
which he is unable to control owing to the power distribution within Iranian political 
structure) will continue to support Turkish suspicions in Turkish-Iranian relations. 
However, it should not be forgotten that the post-Cold War and post-Gulf War 
environment and resulting developments have placed Turkey in a far better position 
compared to its neighbors in this high-level power politics. Turkey is more assertive than 
ever in regional politics with its geopolitical, military and economic advantages. There 
are five major considerations to examine to understand Turkey's position. 
8
 Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey in Search of Security in the Middle East: The Economic Dimension," 
Perceptions Journal of International Affairs, 3:4 (March-May 1996), p. 7. 
First, while these autocratic countries were left without a patron following the 
demise of the Soviet Union, Turkey still enjoys US support. The strengthening of ties 
with the West was the main motivating force behind Turkey's participation in the Second 
Gulf War.9 Turkish President Ozal, apprehensive that the demise of the Soviet threat and 
East-West rivalries would undermine Turkey's geo-strategic role, saw the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait as an opportunity to demonstrate his country's geo-strategic importance to the 
West and managed to maneuver Turkey into a key role in the allied coalition. Since the 
Gulf War, despite their incompatible approaches to the Baghdad regime and the Kurdish 
question, Turkey has remained an important US ally, especially on its Iraqi policy by 
allowing the use of the Incirlik Air Base to impose and to patrol the no-fly zone above the 
36th parallel.10 Turkey's significance increased even more after its "strategic 
cooperation" with Israel. In response, Turkey enjoys its ally's support in its fight against 
Kurdish separatism with less human rights criticism on its regional policies. The US 
backing of Turkey creates a significant regional imbalance before all other factors. 
A second consideration to understand: Turkey's new posture involves the strength 
of the Turkish Armed Forces, which serve as a source of profound deterrence over 
Turkey's neighbors. Turkey possesses an experienced, mobile, and modern military as a 
result of its 15-year conventional and unconventional operations against the PKK in 
southeastern Turkey and in northern Iraq. In addition, Turkey plans to spend over $30 
billion on arms in the next eight years and up to $150 billion by 2030.n This posture 
provides Turkey with a greater preparedness to deter any aggression. Except for their 
WMD, Syria, Iraq, and Iran have no equivalent armed forces to counter such deterrence 
and instead they resort to subversive terrorism. However, Turkey has established security 
agreements with Syria and Iran, resulting in the expulsion of PKK leader, Abdullah 
Ocalan, from Syria and the end of Iranian support for the remaining PKK and Islamic 
" Sabri Sayari, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-Regionalism,' 
Journal of International Affairs, 54:1 (Fall 2000), p. 171. 
*" The conflict in their approaches will be discussed in Chapter Three, Turkey-Iraq Relations. 
1
 * Umit Ergunsoy, "Turkish Budget Anticipates Arms-Buying Program," Defense News (October 26- 
November 1), p. 32. 
terrorist groups in Turkey. Therefore, Syria and Iran's potential for using subversive 
means to counter Turkey has greatly diminished. 
A third issue that has improved Turkey's regional stance is Turkey's "strategic 
cooperation" with Israel in the mid-1990s. Combined with Turkey's military strength this 
cooperation proved to be a breakthrough, which silenced Iran, Iraq, and Syria as well as 
angering them. Such cooperation between two democratic, economically and militarily 
strong, pro-Western, and non-Arab states deepened the imbalance between Turkey and its 
neighbors. This situation has silenced their conventional and subversive threats, yet has 
increased their frustration and criticism. Though Iran, Iraq, and Syria attempted to 
counter this "alliance" by forming counter alliances in response, the means at their 
disposal have made it impossible for them to match the scale. Also, the US backing of 
and contributions to Turkish-Israeli strategic cooperation has been important in pacifying 
Turkey's neighbors. 
A fourth and equally important factor that has raised Turkey's political status is 
that Turkey is capable of using its control over the Euphrates water as leverage in its 
relations with Syria and Iraq (though Turkey officially repudiated such claims). When the 
Ataturk Dam was filled in 1990, those two countries were deprived of water for one 
month. Later Turkey compensated for the reduction of water flow by increasing the flow 
of water. This incident illustrated how seriously Turkey could affect these downstream 
riparian countries when necessary. The GAP project, consisting of a series of 22 dams, 19 
hydroelectric plants, and a network of irrigation canals to harness the waters of the Tigris 
and Euphrates, could be a grave concern for these countries when it is completed by the 
year 2010, for Turkey will not have the flexibility on the flow of Euphrates water that it 
has now.12 
Finally, Turkey's emergence as a regional economic power following the Cold 
War has had a nurturing affect on what is listed above. Major reforms undertaken in 1980 
12
 Frederick M. Lorenz and Edward J. Erickson, The Euphrates Triangle: Security Implications of the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), p. 37. 
8 
moved Turkey from statism toward private initiative and export orientation.13 Turkey has 
averaged more than five percent real growth per annum in the 1990s.14 The structural 
changes in Turkey's economy in the past two decades are likely to sustain long-term 
economic performance. Entrepreneurial success and growing prosperity still distinguishes 
Turkey from its neighbors and imbues the Turkish elite with a sense of genuine 
accomplishment and self-confidence in the region despite several crises it has undergone 
in the last decade, which can be named as "cleaning up the last pieces of a statist 
economy." 
The economic crises Turkey has been expriencing does not suggest the Turkish 
economy is really in a desperate situation. For example, that Turkey had only $5 billion 
in its treasury in the 1994 economic crisis and had $25 billion in the March 2001 
economic crisis highlights this ironic reality. In addition, The World Bank lists Turkey as 
the 17th largest economy in the world, and Turkey is very likely to overcome the current 
economic crisis with its dynamic economic structure.15 The new economic reform 
package recently declared and supported fully by the coalition partners, the World Bank, 
the IMF, the US and European states, and the sustaining initiative sprit of Turkish firms 
attending a chain of international fairs at the time of the crisis16 indicate Turkey's 
likelihood of sustaining its long-term economic development. Hence, compared to other 
states in the Middle East, which are mostly rentier and do not have a proper economic 
structure for a market economy, Turkey is in a far better position with its dynamic market 
13
 Bela Balassa, "Outward Orientation and Exchange Rate Policy in Developing Countries: The Turkish 
Experience," The Middle East Journal, 37:3 (Summer 1983), pp. 429-447. 
14
 Alan Makovsky, "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy," SAIS Review, Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy (www.washintoninstitute.org), (Winter-Spring 1999), p. 4. 
15
 "Foreign Minister Cem Met with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice," Milliyet, 30 March 
2001. 
16
 See the news about the support of Turkish coalition partners, the World Bank, the US; the IMF's 
support and additional funding of the program; Germany's support and its Finance Minister's call for 
investment in Turkey, the Turkish investors' nonstop participation in the economic fairs throughout the 
world during the crisis at 'Turkish Press View, 17 April 2001," Directorate of Press and Information, 
Office of the Prime Minister, www.byegm.gov.trA!'AYINLARIMIZ/chr/ing2001/04/01x04xl7.HTM# 3. 
economy supported by vast human and material resources. Thus, it would be legitimate to 
claim that Turkey is a regional economic power in the Middle East. 
In short, the reasons for Turkey's greater assertiveness are various and 
overlapping: relative prosperity and a better economic infrastructure, a better equipped 
and more experienced military, the decline of power in the neighboring states, and a 
greater sense of policy independence marked by the end of the Cold War. 
What Turkey foremost wants to achieve is stability in the region, which would 
generate a cooperative environment, if not through friendly means, by strong deterrence. 
It prefers stability in the region through powerful military coalitions rather than 
continuation of old animosities and individual confrontations in the region. Turkey's 
strategy is to ensure its security with the most convenient (less destructive) means and to 
contribute to the stability and "confidence building" in the region with all means possible 
in order to realize mutual benefits. While Turkish military authorities develop the 
military deterrence, the authorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempt to lessen the 
influence of traditional misgivings and search for cooperation with its neighbors through 
intense diplomatic efforts. 
For instance, Iran and Turkey possess mutual geographical opportunities, such as 
transportation between Central Asia and Europe, economic trade on goods, natural gas 
pipeline projects. Despite the dramatic ideological differences between the two countries, 
offers of cooperation over these mutually beneficial areas have developed successfully. 
Next, Turkey's insistence on sustaining diplomatic relations, reviving economical 
relations, and opposing the birth of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq are examples of 
Turkish diplomatic initiatives to normalize Turkish-Iraqi relations despite some US 
criticism. Furthermore, small-scale trade between Turkey and Syria, and their bordering 
cities,17 and Turkey's suggestions for more trade—as the outputs of GAP offers more— 
are other examples of Turkish Foreign Ministry's diplomatic efforts for cooperation. 
17
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Therefore, it can be said Turkey is pursuing a "constructive engagement" in the Middle 
East. 
From the above one might conclude that Turkish foreign policy toward the 
Middle East has changed, yet the reality is quite different. 
Turkey's foreign policy toward the region obviously changed in the mid-1960s 
because of its fears of international isolation and economic depression. Turkey, the "old 
faithful ally," felt alienated when President Johnson issued his infamous letter warning 
Turkey against any intervention in Cyprus and when the US Congress imposed an arms 
embargo on Turkey in the mid-1970s. Turkey continued its policy of neutrality, non- 
interference, and non-involvement in regional policies but this time its neutrality was 
more inclined to favor the Arab cause against the Zionists, and with small scale and 
limited involvement in regional politics, which Turkey's economic ties with Arab 
countries required. In other words, Turkey left its West dominated foreign policy and 
moved toward a "balanced" policy with western allies and regional neighbors. 
However, contrary to common belief, Turkey's "new foreign policy"18 did not 
change after the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the Kuwait-Gulf War. 
Naturally, the impact of regional developments on Turkey's domestic agenda determines 
the degree of Turkish involvement in regional politics. In the "new Turkish foreign policy 
era," trade relations necessitated political arrangements with the Middle East, whereas 
now, in the post-Cold War era, ethnic and Islamic considerations and possible economic 
incentives have driven Turkey into regional politics. For example, Turkey is assertive on 
crucial security concerns as illustrated in the expulsion of Ocalan and the PKK from 
Syria, and in the Turkish involvement in northern Iraq policies in order to curb the 
emergence of a Kurdish state and to contain Iran and Iraq in this authority vacuum. 
Turkey is also assertive in using regional opportunities to raise its economy to the EU 
standards, as revealed through Turkey's insistence on cooperating with Iran over 
economic opportunities in Central Asian states and its eagerness to normalize relations 
18
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with Iraq for its former export and pipeline revenues. In this sense, the intensity of 
security threats and economic interests has illustrated an unprecedented Turkish 
involvement in regional politics when combined with Turkey's assertive stance, which 
the factors listed above have generated. 
In fact, Turkey still preserves its neutrality in interstate conflicts, such as in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in the Iraq-Iran animosity, and in the Iran-Gulf states 
problems. Turkey's strategic cooperation with Israel was a move to compel Syria to 
abandon supporting the PKK. Other than that, one should not assume that Turkey is 
siding with Israel on its dispute with Syria. Even if one interpreted it that way, it would 
not be wrong to view that policy that Turkey's security concerns likely justified its 
decision. Neither Turkey nor Israel seems enthusiastic about bonding on the bases of 
having a common enemy. Therefore, they avoid taking sides in their disputes with other 
third-party countries 
Moreover, the West is still important to Turkey and it still attaches itself to 
western security systems and alliances, yet it also encourages regional economic 
opportunities. Its participation in the UN alliance against Saddam's regime and its 
persistence in capitalizing on regional economic opportunities, such as with Jordan, 
Egypt, Israel, and Iran, are no different than its previous security cooperation with the 
West to counter the former Soviet Union and Turkey's economic investments in Arab 
countries in the 1980s. Although Turkey is more involved than ever in regional politics, 
Middle Eastern political issues now occupy the Turkish foreign policy agenda less than 
the Western political or economic issues. Relations with the West are still a priority but 
"balanced" with attention to regional politics, which Turkish national interests require as 
they did in from 1964 to 1989. For instance, while Turkey supports the US-led UN 
inspection of weapons program and sanctions regime imposed on Baghdad, it has 
recently resumed its diplomatic relations with Iraq at the ambassador level—even though 
Washington does not like that move—to ensure Iraqi control over northern Iraq and to 
gain access to the Iraqi export market and to have some share of Iraqi contracts when the 
sanctions are removed. 
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Furthermore, Turkey no longer needs Arab support since the Arab world has not 
provided that support anyway. Religious rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states 
and the Turkish support of the Arab cause did not obtain the desired results for Turkish 
foreign policy. Religious brotherhood with the Arab world cannot be a crucial criterion 
for developing policies related to the national security of Turkey whenever an Arab 
nation or its interests are involved. Instead, Turkey now enjoys the support of the US, 
Israel and other countries in the Balkans, the Black Sea region, and the Caspian and 
Central Asia on international platforms with more pragmatic terms. This stance allows 
Turkey to pursue a balance policy between its relations with the West and its interest in 
the Middle East in "specific" rather than general regional issues, as exemplified above by 
the Iraqi case. 
Turkey breached its non-interference policy for a while when it committed its 
troops to the Operation Provide Comfort II, which aimed "to protect" Kurds in northern 
Iraq against Saddam's further assaults. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 688 allowed the use of the military for only "humanitarian" help to northern 
Iraqi Kurds. Thus, Turkey's policy of stipulating the use of NATO forces in non-NATO 
areas to a UNSCR, even only for deterrence, conflicted with its non-interference policy 
with the absence of such UNSC resolution.19 However, this does not indicate an 
intentional change in the principles of Turkish Foreign Policy. This is a responsive 
action, which Turkey had to take during an era of stormy changes in the international and 
regional system. 
The activist trend in Turkish foreign policy since the Gulf War 
includes both a wider scope for imaginative diplomatic relations and a 
greater preparedness to use or threaten to use force. Ankara is far from 
adventurist in its foreign policy. It continues to try to use diplomacy and 
multi-lateralism, as far as possible, to promote stability and prosperity. 
Most manifestations are in the realm of diplomatic initiative, not the use of 
force. Its activism is a measured activism. 
19
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This activism represents a trend resulting from structural factors in 
Turkey's domestic regional and international environment and, as such.20 
Therefore, Turkey's policy toward the Middle East has not changed in principle, 
but has become more assertive and active than ever because of the change from a bipolar 
to a unipolar international system and because of the influence of the Gulf War. 
Chapter Two provides a brief history of Turkey-Middle East relations and lists 
Turkey and the Middle Eastern states' perceptions of one another, which resulted from 
historical animosities. 
Chapter Three focuses on Turkey's Iraq policy and its domestic and foreign 
dimensions. The main argument is that the involvement in northern Iraqi policies is a 
must for Turkey and has not changed the principals of Turkey's traditional policy. 
Presently, the consolidation of Baghdad's power over Iraq, no matter what regime holds 
the power, is a prime national security issue for Ankara. Turkey's national interests in its 
relations with the West and with Iraq, and its domestic considerations with northern Iraq 
forces Ankara to follow a pragmatic and balanced policy toward all players of the game. 
In Chapter Four, Turkish-Syrian relations will be discussed. The discussion will 
revolve around hydro-politics and its implications. Here, the argument will be that 
convergence of prospective solutions of crucial domestic concerns, either ethnic or 
economic, of these two neighbors on the water supply of Euphrates has caused the so- 
called water problem in the Euphrates basin. While Turkey has control of the water, Syria 
has tried to counter this advantage by appealing to PKK terrorism. 
Chapter Five focuses on the Turkish-Israeli "strategic cooperation" discussing the 
factors that caused it and the implications of this cooperation in the region. Behind the 
emergence of close ties between the two states in the 1990s were Turkey's deep strategic 
concerns with its Middle Eastern security and the Western attitude toward these concerns 
20
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as the main motives. Israel's benefits were also significant but were responsive outcomes 
of Turkish calls for cooperation, which at one point enticed Israel to gain more political 
leverage reducing the importance of a deal with Syria to secondary. For the first time in 
its relations with the Middle East, Turkey is highly confident, strong, and assertive as a 
result of its cooperative relations with Israel. 
Chapter Six explores the Turkish-Iranian relationship. My contention will be that 
albeit ideological differences strain relations frequently, the pragmatism deriving from 
Turkey and Iran's identical foreign policy principles and their mutual economic 
considerations detour Turkey and Iran from a serious confrontation. Thus, both states 
seek reconciliation rather than confrontation in their dealings with each other. 
15 
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II.     PERCEPTIONS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A.       PERCEPTIONS 
Before analyzing the history of Turkish-Middle Eastern relations, mentioning 
some key historical and traditional perceptions of Turkey and the Middle East about one 
another is useful. The differences inherent from these perceptions form the contemporary 
Turkish-Middle Eastern relations. 
History, identity, and security dimensions play important roles in Turkey's 
relationship with the Middle East.21 The collapse of the Ottoman Empire left a legacy of 
territorial grievances, historic resentments, political tensions and mutual suspicions that 
neither Turks, Arabs, or Persians have so far overcome. Turks, Arabs, and Iranians differ 
on a broad variety of international issues. Their differences revolve around their pro- 
Western and anti-Western political characters. 
Since its foundation, Turkey has consistently aspired to be a part of the West. The 
military and civilian founders of the Turkish Republic envisioned a Western identity for 
this new country. Turkey has identified itself with Western security institutions and has 
eschewed any kind of membership in Third World "anti-imperialist fronts" or nonaligned 
groupings. Even in the post-Cold War era, Turkey has persisted in its pro-Western 
orientation. Its participation in the UN alliance against Iraq was no less representative 
than its participation in the Korean War, to join the Western-led security institution, 
NATO. Turkey has generally set itself sharply apart from the hostile anti-Western 
character of Arab politics. 
21
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A summary of cultural, historical, political, and social differences between 
Turkey, the Arab world, and Iran follows (note that Turkish-Iranian differences began 
after Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979):22 
• Turkey has had a long history of rule in the region while Persians and Arabs have 
generally been ruled by either Turks or Western imperialist states over the last 
millennium. This has had an important psychological impact on Arabs' and 
Persians' sense of "victimization" in history. 
• The Arab rebellion during World War I angered Turks. 
• Following Ataturk's transformation of Turkey in 1923, Western Europe ceased to 
threat Turkey. Yet, most Arab states and Iran continued to languish under 
colonialism, imperialism, and even Western armed intervention. 
• Turkey's alliance with the West conflicted with the interests of most of its Arab 
neighbors, who see Ankara as the servant of Western interests. 
• The Russian threat of Czarist and Bolshevik impelled Turkey to turn to the West 
for security. The Arabs felt little threat. Indeed, armed attack on the Arab states 
came consistently and solely from the West (except intra-Arab disputes). 
• The creation of Western supported Israel posed a direct threat to the Arab states 
resulting in territorial losses and military defeats. Turkey sees no threat from 
Israel; on the contrary, both are US-supported strategic allies. 
• Turkey has had no "natural" allies in terms of ethnic or cultural values, while 
Arab nations have enjoyed such alliances. For example, the Arab world supports 
Syria regarding its water and border disputes with Turkey. In turn, Turkey has 
appealed to pro-Western, Northern Tier type security alliances, which would also 
redefine the identity of the Middle East often associated with an Arab one. 
22
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• The secularist political structure of Turkey has rejected its Islamic heritage of the 
Ottoman Empire, whereas the Arab world and Iran powerfully symbolizes it. 
B.       HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Despite its geographical position, Turkey decided to isolate itself from the 
developments in the Middle East and to adopt a very cautious hands-off policy toward the 
region historically. Strict adherence to the following principles have been the 
predominant feature of Turkey's relations with the Middle East: 
• Non-interference and non-involvement in the domestic and interstate conflicts of 
regional countries, and 
• The development of bilateral political and economic relations with as many states 
in the region as possible. 
In short, Turkey's policy toward the Middle East has been historically largely reactive, 
politically non-interventionist and characterized by a very cautious and pragmatic 
approach. 
Turkish Middle Eastern political history can be analyzed in four phases:?3 
• First, a more neutral and self-determined Ataturk24 era (1923-38); 
• Second, a cautious but Western alliance dominated period (1938-1960s); 
• Third, a period of rapprochement with the Arab world because of the resentment 
against the US and expected economic benefits from the oil rich Arab world 
(1960s-1980s); and 
• Lastly, the activist post Cold-War era, which will be the main focus of this thesis. 
23
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1.        The Ataturk Era 
Turkish foreign policy stands on well-established principles from the Kemalist 
legacy. " Peace at home and peace abroad"25 is the keystone of Turkish foreign policy. 
This principle is better understood in Ataturk's own words: "It is quite natural and 
therefore simple to explain the fact that a country which is in the midst of fundamental 
reforms and development should sincerely desire peace and tranquility both at home and 
in the world."26 
Ataturk's peculiar dislike for military alliances and pacts stemmed from his 
conviction that every alliance provoked a counter-alliance by causing suspicion and 
insecurity among other countries, which would be against both Turkey's principles and 
interests.27 Hence, Turkish foreign policy orientation during the Ataturk era was 
neutrality due to the needed peace for reforming a war-torn country. Two basic foreign 
policy aims prevailed in this period: Creating a strong, modern state which could defend 
its territorial integrity and political independence, without external assistance, against 
aggression; and to make Turkey a full, equal member of the Western European 
community of nations.28 
For the Middle East, Turkey's main policy was one of non-involvement in the 
region's affairs. Ankara illustrated this stance in the 1937 Sadabat Pact, formed among 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq (then a pro-Western kingdom) and Afghanistan, whose main principles 
were non-interference in each others' affairs and cooperation on the unnamed "Kurdish" 
issue.29 However, this distanced stance from the Middle East should not be interpreted as 
25
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total abandonment of the Middle East. For example, Ataturk's strategy to incorporate a 
then French-mandated Hatay (Alexandretta) province30 in northern Syria to Turkey 
demonstrated that Turkey was interested in the Middle East as far as its national interests 
allowed. Ataturk sent a strong message to France that he could use force to determine the 
fate of Hatay in favor of Turkey. That Turkey did not recognize Morocco's independence 
movement in exchange of French and Spanish support for Turkey in the Turkish-British 
dispute over Mosul, a then British-mandated oil-rich province in northern Iraq, is another 
example. Thus, given the priority of the relations with the West, the core of Turkey's 
Middle East policy was neutrality, non-involvement and prudence, but not total 
avoidance of the Middle East in this era. 
2.        The Western Dominated Era 
In the second phase, from World War II to the 1960s, Turkish foreign policy 
again carried on its basic principles: "preservation of national integrity, modernization 
along Western standards, and non-involvement in domestic issues of neighboring 
countries that could endanger peace and stability."31 But with one difference: No more 
could Turkish security stand alone in the face of rising communism. The "without 
external assistance" position had to be abandoned during and after WWII. During the 
war, virtually no relation existed between Turkey and the Middle East since Turkey had 
to turn to the West, namely Great Britain and the US for security reasons. 
Turkey's recognition of Israel in 1949 was an outcome of its desire to be with the 
West despite much domestic and regional criticism.32 Participating in the Korean War 
together with the US troops, Turkey was accepted as a new member of the newly 
established Western  security alliance, NATO,  against Soviet communism.     Later, 
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Turkey's foreign policy decisions were aligned mostly with the West, especially with the 
United States. Turkey's withdrawal of its ambassador from Israel during the Suez Crisis 
yet informing Tel Aviv that it would remain friendly, its voting against Algerian 
independence in the UN General Assembly in 1955, and its negative vote again for an 
Afro-Asian proposal for Algerian self determination are examples of Turkey's Western 
preference at the expense of Arab alienation.33 
In the years that followed, Turkey became a member of the pro-Western Baghdad 
Pact and later the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), further alienating Turkey from 
the Middle East.34 Yet, given the fact Turkey shared borders with the Soviet Union, 
which voiced claims on the Straits and Eastern Anatolia, and the two socialist Arab 
countries of Syria and Iraq (after the Monarch was toppled with a bloody coup by 
General Qasim in 1958), during this second phase, Turkey had no option but to adopt 
pro-Western policies to gain NATO and Western support against possible threats from 
the Soviet bloc. 
3. The New Turkish Foreign Policy 
In the 1960s, a shift occured in Turkish foreign policy from a one-sided, pro- 
Western stance to a multilateral stance. This shift was due to the US's indifferent 
approach toward some of Turkey's main security issues.35 Turkey became more 
independent in its foreign policy interacting more with regional countries to counter 
declining US support for Turkey. This third phase is called "The New Turkish Foreign 
Policy" because of this shift.36 
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In the early sixties, with the 1960 military coup, there was no significant change 
in Turkey's Middle East policy, as revealed in Ankara's reaction to Syria's breakaway 
from the United Arab Republic. Turkey became the second state after Jordan to recognize 
the new regime, satisfied to see a rift between the region's two most anti-Western states 
that could otherwise affect regional balances in favor of the Soviet bloc.37 Ankara's 
suspicion regarding the reliability of its Western allies surfaced when the US withdrew its 
missile systems from Turkey after the Cuban Missile Crisis and when President Johnson 
sent his famous letter to Ankara in 1964. In his letter, Johnson warned Turkey to halt 
preparations to intervene in the "communal fighting" on Cyprus, even though Turkey 
had—and still has—the guarantor right to intervene on behalf of Turkish Cypriots.38 It 
appeared to Ankara that the US was ignoring Turkish security and even exposing it to the 
growing Soviet threat.39 Thus, carrying on its non-interference, neutrality policies, 
Ankara sought rapprochement with the Arab states for international support regarding the 
Cyprus issue and for Arab aid to Turkey's deteriorating economic conditions. 
Nevertheless, Turkey's pre-1960 policies proved to be obstacles during this 
rapprochement. Regarding Cyprus Turkey was left isolated at the UN. Understanding the 
fallacy of placing too much emphasis on the "faithful ally," Ankara reduced the US 
influence in Turkish foreign policies and continued with this rapprochement. Ankara 
refused to allow the use of NATO bases for non-NATO purposes during the 1967 and 
1973 Arab-Israel Wars, and leaned toward the Arabs. In doing this, Turkey calculated 
each plus and each minus—the effects of the oil crisis on its economy. In other words, 
pragmatism, one of the main principles of the Kemalist foreign policy, prevailed.40 
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The twin crisis of the late 1970s—the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 
Iranian revolution—brought Turkey closer to NATO and the US, while at the same time 
it began to enjoy trade relations with the Arab countries as a result of its rapprochement. 
The second Cold War the Soviet Union initiated impelled Ankara to cooperate with the 
US on security issues. It was after this increasing Soviet threat that the Grand National 
Assembly (GNA) permitted the use of the Incirlik Air Base during the 1983 Lebanon 
crisis. 
At the same time, Turkish construction companies launched an investment wave 
in the Arab Middle East, especially in the Gulf States. Turkish contractors during this 
period enjoyed extraordinary success in Arab countries, such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, 
when the domestic market was weak, Turkey was able to obtain $3.5 billion worth of 
contracts by January 1981. By the end of 1982, the value of Turkey's contracts in Libya, 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq totaled $10 billion.41 By the end of 1984, the value had risen to 
$14.74 billion.42 By 1983, approximately 150,000 Turkish workers were employed in the 
Middle East. They had sent some $500 million in currency earnings in 1981 alone. In 
addition, Turkey's export to the Middle East doubled between 1979 and 1981.43 
This economic rise of Turkey coupled with the fundamental economic reforms of 
the early 1980s rendered more bilateral relations between Turkey and Middle Eastern 
countries. Turkey gained much more freedom in its relations with the Middle East 
especially in trade while preserving its attachment to Western security pledges regarding 
the region through NATO. 
The eruption of the First Persian Gulf War (or Iran-Iraq war), which lasted eight 
years, increased trade between Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Turkey preserved its neutrality 
41
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while enjoying economic gains resulting from the war. Iran, which was suffering from an 
American trade embargo, became Turkey's foremost export market in 1983-84, but at the 
same time Turkey allowed Iraq to pump oil through the double pipeline over its territory 
to the Yumurtalik terminal on the Mediterranean. "Racked by war both Iran and Iraq 
needed Turkey as an overland economic lifeline and transportation link to the West as 
well as a source of products."44 
In the late 1980s Turkey's relations with Syria deteriorated because of the 
simmering conflict about the use of water resources of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, 
which become more acute as the GAP, with its huge dam on the Euphrates, neared 
completion. Syria tried to pressure Turkey by supporting the PKK; the implied bargain 
being that Damascus would cut off its support to the PKK if it received guarantees 
concerning the water supply. In a protocol of 1987, Turkey guaranteed the passage of at 
least 500 cubic meters of water per second into Syria provided Syria initiated effective 
measures against the PKK, which eventually occurred with the relocation of the PKK 
headquarters from Damascus to the Syrian-controlled Beeka Valley in Lebanon.45 
After the Iranian war, Saddam Hussein's administration, bitter at what it 
perceived to be price gouging and Turkey's reluctance to extend credit to Baghdad, 
sharply curtailed Iraq's purchases from Turkey.46 As a result, on the eve of the second 
Gulf War, Turkish exports had decreased to a trickle. In addition, Turkey faced a refugee 
problem during the 1987-88 period on its borders when Saddam's forces employed 
chemical weapons in assaults on Kurds, who had helped Iran by rebelling against Saddam 
during the Iran-Iraq War. 
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Through a 1985 agreement with Saddam, Turkey was able to make several air 
raids against the PKK, establishing a new pattern of involvement in northern Iraqi 
Kurdish affairs that has since continued and increased. Furthermore, Turkey followed a 
tough line against the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. Upon the loss of government authority 
in northern Iraq, a Kurdish threat of cutting Iraq's oil pipeline to the Mediterranean and 
most importantly the PKK's establishing bases in the area became forefront issues that 
Turkey had to consider in its relations with Iraq in the late 1980s. Among all these 
considerations, Saddam complained about Turkey's water regime. This complaint did not 
result in any action since he was at the time busy recovering from the First Gulf War and 
preparing for yet another venture. 
In the early 1980s, Turkey was highly suspicious about the Iranian Islamic 
regime. Turkey, Iran, and Israel, of course, had enjoyed close relations as the pro- 
Western Middle Eastern states. Important to note is that, until the Iranian revolution, 
there was a regional security cooperation between the three. The Trident, a secret 
trilateral security agreement between the intelligent services of Israel (Mossad), Turkey 
(MIT), and Iran (SAVAK), provided the base to cope with mutual threats and to maintain 
the regional power of the US against possible Soviet penetration.47 
After the Iranian Revolution, Tehran declared Turkey's founder Ataturk as an 
enemy of Islam. Tehran flirted with Turkey's quasi-Shi'ite Alevi population, lent moral 
and financial support to Turkey's own Sunni fundamentalist groups, and played the 
Kurdish card in northern Iraq, which threatened the Iraqi pipeline and thereby Turkish 
economy.48 Ankara, on the other hand, felt it was important to treat Iran's revolutionary 
stance with as much tolerance as possible because of its considerations of Soviet inroad 
attempts into Iran, which had begun in the early 1980s. Yet, the war with Iraq compelled 
Iran to exercise more pragmatic tendencies in its relations with Turkey. An outcome of 
this stance was the 1985 Economic Cooperation Organization between Turkey, Iran, and 
47
 Spyridon Mimikos, Strategic Implications of Expanded Turkish-Israeli Military Relations, Master's 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1999, pp. 50-52. 
48
 Fuller, p. 65. 
26 
Pakistan. However, the demise of the Soviet Union and outbreak of the Second Gulf War 
doomed this stance bringing new considerations to the decision-making processes of both 
countries. 
4.        The Gulf War and Afterward 
"As Turkey undergoes the most profound economic, social, and political crisis of 
the republican period, Ankara also finds itself involved in the affairs of the Middle East 
with unprecedented intensity."49 The demise of the Soviet Empire left the United States 
as the only major power with leverage in the Middle Eastern developments. The Gulf 
War in 1991 changed the balance of power among the regional nations eliminating Iraq 
as a regional power for some time to come. The peace talks between Israel and the 
Palestinians that began in the aftermath of the Gulf War brought further changes to the 
political landscape of the Middle East. These developments and Turkey's involvement in 
them strongly influenced Ankara's perception of its national interests in the region. The 
era that US President Bush called "the new world order" or "the new Middle East" has 
yet to materialize, yet the changing power structure in the region has significantly altered 
Turkey's policy toward the Middle East. 
For almost a decade prior to the developments listed above, Prime Minister 
Turgut Ozal had favored a more active approach to the regional political affairs, using 
Turkey's emerging economic potential as a catalyst for forging a new cooperative 
regional environment.50 He attempted to gain leverage over relations with the West by 
trying to be a prominent factor or a regional power in the Middle East. The strengthening 
of ties with the West was the primary motivation behind Turkey's participation in the 
Second Gulf War. Ozal, apprehensive that the demise of the Soviet threat and East-West 
49
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rivalries would undermine Turkey's geo-strategic role in the eyes of the West (especially 
in NATO and EC), saw the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as an opportunity to demonstrate his 
country's geo-strategic importance to the West and managed to maneuver Turkey into 
becoming a central player in the allied coalition. 
Turkish participation in the coalition was a way to emphasize 
Turkey's status as a Western stronghold in the Middle East and even to 
force Turkish entry into the EC, very much in the way Menderes had 
secured Turkey's membership in NATO by sending Turkish troops to 
Korea.51 
UN Security Council Resolution 661, which prescribed a complete embargo on 
Iraq, was applied in August 1990 with the closure of Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline and 
with the suspension of all commercial links with Iraq and "occupied Kuwait" on the 
Turkish side. The participation in the Gulf War, despite much opposition from the public 
and even from the military leadership, did not change Ozal's stance, and he managed to 
pass an extended war powers bill on January 17, 1991. In addition, he opened the second 
front by enabling US fighter aircrafts to fly sorties against Iraq from the Incirlik Air Base 
and by deploying Turkish troops to the Turkish-Iraqi border.52 
If the traditional western alliance was the first motive behind Ozal's strategy, 
Turkey's own security consideration was the second. Iraq's position as a war prone 
country, as seen in its assault on Iran, the invasion of Kuwait, assaults on its Kurdish 
population and its fast WMD and Nuclear-Biologic-Chemical (NBC) weapons 
procurement posed a threat to Turkish national security and interests. It was more 
desirable to see a democratic Iraq that would have many mutual economic and strategic 
interests by cooperating with Turkey and the West. Thus, Ozal sacrificed short-term 
economic benefits (losses from the sanctions) for possible long-term economic and 
political gains. 
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However, what was expected—"a quick war and a decisive allied victory, 
followed by the replacement of Saddam's regime with a democratic system in Iraq"53— 
did not happen. According to 1995 figures, Turkey's losses amounted to $30 billion.54 
Turkey received in compensation only $1 billion in oil from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
and $2 billion in upgrades of its military through Western assistance, especially from the 
United States.55 
In addition, Turkey has had to deal with other domestic and international 
repercussions of the Gulf War—the PKK and the prospect of the establishment of a 
Kurdish state in northern Iraq. 
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III.    TURKEY AND IRAQ 
Of the three Middle Eastern neighbors, it is Iraq with which 
Ankara has the best potential for balanced relations. Iraq is dependent on 
Turkey for access to Europe, the trade relationship, the common desire to 
subdue Kurdish ethnic consciousness, and even the similarity in regime 
types as far as the approach to religion is concerned.56 
Turkey's geostrategic and economic interests point to a gradual, if 
reluctant, normalization of relations with Iraq, even while Saddam is in 
power. Were he to be replaced, this process would be speeded up.57 
Although much may have changed on the ground since these assessments were 
made, the fact remains that these statements are still correct. 
There are few countries where the Gulf War and its aftermath have left greater 
policy dilemmas than Turkey. Before the war, relations between Turkey and Iraq, while 
not warm, were pragmatic and cooperative on most issues of concern to both countries, 
despite their highly different regimes and foreign policy orientations. Economic ties were 
strong, based on shipments of oil through a pipeline from northern Iraq to Turkey's 
Yumurtalik Port on the Mediterranean shore, expanded to carry out more oil in the 1980s. 
Oil provided Turkey with rental revenue of $1.2 billion a year.58 For Iraq this oil pipeline 
provided an outlet to the Mediterranean that allowed Iraq to bypass Syria, whose frequent 
disruptions of the Iraqi pipeline through its territory had finally caused Iraq to seek a 
replacement. During the Iran-Iraq War inexpensive Turkish goods appeared increasingly 
attractive as the war drained both Iran's and Iraq's precious foreign exchange resources. 
By 1985, Turkish exports to Iraq had reached $961 million or 12 percent of all Turkish 
exports.59   Water  problems,   based   on   Turkey's   progressive   construction   of  the 
56
 Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), p. 
58. 
57
 Phebe Marr, "Turkey and Iraq," in Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri J. 
Barkey (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 67. 
58
 The Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), Iraq, lsl Quarter, 1994. (London: EIU, 1994), p. 12. 
59
 Henri J. Barkey, "The Silent Victor: Turkey's Role in the Iran-Iraq War," in The Iran-Iraq War: 
Strategic and Political Implications, ed. Efraim Karsh (London:Macmillian, 1989), pp. 133-153. 
31 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) have been serious but not sufficient to disrupt 
relations. Besides, most of the blame for the diminution of the water flow into the 
Euphrates in these periodic crises has been accorded to Syria, with whom Iraq had 
extremely discordant relations. On the key issue of importance to both countries—the 
Kurds—there was positive cooperation particularly during the Iran-Iraq war, when the 
Turkish government was allowed to help police the frontier by carrying out its hot pursuit 
of the PKK across the Iraqi borders. And while Turkey maintained diplomatic relations 
with both Iran and Iraq during the war, even providing Iran with a commercial outlet to 
the West, Turkey saw Iraq's Pyrrhic victory in its interests, like the US, that is, in 
containing the spread of Iran's revolutionary impulse. 
Turkey had high expectations from the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. The 
devastation on combatants meant that massive reconstruction projects would be up for 
bids, and Turkish construction companies, which after 1980 had proven themselves in 
Middle Eastern markets, had the likelihood of winning many. This was not to be, Saddam 
Hussein, feeling the pinch of his extravagant wartime spending, decided to compensate 
for his losses with another misadventure, invading Kuwait. 
Although early signs of tension between the two countries appeared during the 
first months of 1990,60 the relationship was dramatically changed by Saddam Hussein's 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and subsequently by Turkey's support of the Gulf 
War coalition. For the first time an Arab country was bombed from Turkish soil.61 The 
Kurdish rebellion and subsequent flood of Kurdish refugees on the Turkish border, the 
successful coalition resettlement effort, and Operation Provide Comfort, the 
groundbreaking experiment in protecting the nascent local Kurdish regime in northern 
Iraq, all served to heightened the tension. The UN sanctions, particularly the closure of 
the Kerkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline in August 1990, ruptured the already declining 
60
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economic cooperation between Turkey and Iraq. Diplomatic relations with Baghdad were 
broken, although they have been revived first partially by the return of a Turkish charge 
de affairs who held ambassadorial rank and finally, in early 2001, fully revived by raising 
Turkish representation in Baghdad to ambassadorial level. 
Turkey's relations with Iraq and its policies toward the developments in northern 
Iraq occupies much of its Middle Eastern politics. For decision makers in Ankara dealing 
with the conjunction of numerous developments in northern Iraq, the Western approach 
to that area, and the present Iraqi regime's stance toward Turkish northern Iraq policies is 
a complex and prime policy to formulate. Developments in or about northern Iraq affect 
Ankara's relations with all its Middle Eastern neighbors as well as with the West. Hence, 
the Turkish foreign policy toward northern Iraq must be and has been a very cautious 
balance between its commitment to the Western circle and to its own national interests 
based on its geographic location. 
Having assessed the Turkish-Iraqi relations before the Gulf War, we can now 
explore the factors that determine Turkish foreign policy toward Iraq in the post-Gulf 
War era. The main argument will be that Turkey's national interests in its relations with 
the West and with Iraq, and its domestic considerations with northern Iraq impels Ankara 
to follow a pragmatic and balanced policy toward all players of the game, not taking sides 
in the post-Gulf War conflict without the following legitimate bases: 
• United Nations Security Council Resolutions [UNSC] in its support of US and 
UK operations against Iraq; 
• Economic and domestic considerations in normalizing relations with Baghdad; 
• Domestic security considerations in Turkey's military incursions to northern Iraq 
and in Turkey's close contact with the northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders. 
In analyzing the factors that have shaped Turkish policy toward Iraq in the post- 
Gulf War era, the following sections of this chapter will focus on four points: 
• The misperceptions on Turkey's post-Gulf War Iraqi policy, 
33 
• Turkish concerns about and benefits from the US policy toward northern Iraq and 
Baghdad, and 
• Turkey's policy toward northern Iraqi Kurds and Turkish military incursions into 
northern Iraq. 
• Ankara's insistence on normalizing relations with Baghdad. 
The first section will address the misperceptions about post-Gulf War Turkish 
policy toward Iraq. Here, the contention will be that, contrary to popular belief, the 
principles of "the new Turkish foreign policy"—dating from the mid-1960s—continued 
in the post-Gulf War Turkey-Iraq and Turkey-US relations. 
Turkish concerns and benefits with the US policy toward northern Iraq and 
Baghdad will be be discussed in the second section. The argument of this section will be 
that careful calculation of the dynamics in northern Iraqi politics impels Ankara to extend 
the mandate of "the Poised Hammer" 62 forces of the US and the UK in Adana. Ankara 
has extended the mandate despite the Turkish concerns of the US's northern Iraq policy 
that could result in the establishement of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Ankara's 
decision implies that Turkey's benefits from the US northern Iraq policy outweighs the 
risks taken by approving the policy. 
The third section will analyze Turkey's policy toward the Northern Iraqi Kurds 
and Turkish military incursions in northern Iraq. That Turkey binds northern Iraqi 
Kurdish leaders to adopt policies in compliance with Turkish national interests in the 
region will be the initial concept to be addressed in this section. Turkey does so by 
having two important leverages: a) the area's dependence on Turkey as the only trade 
route after Saddam Hussein imposed a de facto embargo on the Kurdish area from the 
south and b) the presence of the Poised Hammer that was established to protect northern 
Iraqi Kurds. Regarding the Turkish military incursions in northern Iraq, I contend that the 
authority vacuum in northern Iraq and the rivalry between the two northern Iraqi Kurdish 
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leaders forced Turkey to depend increasingly on its own forces to terminate the PKK 
existence in northern Iraq. 
Finally, the last section argues that Turkey's adherence to preserving Iraq's 
national and territorial integrity and its major economic considerations have been 
significant elements in shaping Ankara's desire to establish normal relations with 
Baghdad, no matter what its regime may be. 
A.       MISPERCEPTIONS 
Many suggested that Turkey's exclusive cooperation with the West against Iraq 
during the Kuwait crisis, a policy pursued under the "single-handed" leadership of the 
Turkish President Turgut Ozal and representing a fundamental alteration of Turkey's 
traditional "balanced" regional policy, continued after the crisis.63 Almost all arguments 
stressed that with the decision of July 1991 to allow the deployment of a Western 
multinational force on Turkish territory (Operation Provide Comfort or OPC), which also 
included a small Turkish unit, Turkey became an instrument of US foreign policy in the 
Persian Gulf and was interfering in the internal affairs of a neighbor.64 Washington, these 
critics believed, secretly desired the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq 
through which it hoped to strengthen its ability to direct and to control all the 
developments in the volatile oil region of the Persian Gulf. The "Poised Hammer" was 
intended, Turkish critics argued, as a means of achieving this objective. By providing 
such a force with a base to operate in Turkey not only would foreign countries be able to 
6
^ "Poised Hammer" is used by Turkish media, academia, and politics to refer to "Operation Provide 
Comfort" (OPC) before 1996 and "Operation Northern Watch" (ONW) replacing the former in 1996. 
63
 Prof. Fahir Armaoglu in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Western European Series (FBIS), 8 
July 1991, p. 40. 
64
 Mahmut Bali Aykan, 'Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq, 1991-95," Middle Eastern Studies, 32:4 
(London, October 1996), p. 344. 
35 
monopolize Turkey's long-term relations with Iraq and other Arab countries but they 
would also inspire hope in the separatist elements in Turkey.65 
Certain foreign observers of Turkey's foreign policy, on the other hand, seemed 
essentially opposed to this argument. These foreign observers claimed to have detected in 
Turkey's regional policy "the beginnings of a change" in Turkey's behavior—hitherto 
represented by close cooperation with the West—on its southern and eastern borders.66 
According to supporters of this view, this change in Turkey's regional behavior became 
distinctive when it began holding meetings with Syria and Iran in November 1992 in 
order to convey its irritation with the West over the perceived possibility of Iraq's 
territorial integrity and political unity being damaged by the UN economic embargo 
against that country. 
Contrary to popular belief, Turkish foreign policy during the Kuwait crisis was 
not, in fact, a deviation from Turkey's traditional foreign policy of maintaining a balance 
between the requirements of Turkey's membership in the Western alliance and those 
requirements of preserving friendly relations with its neighbors.First of all, though 
Turkish-Iraqi relations had been notable for cooperation and political propriety before the 
Kuwait crisis, by the late 1980s the two countries were moving toward a collision.67 
From an Iraqi viewpoint, Turkey represented a dangerous dependency regarding 
oil and water. About 96 percent of Iraq's income was from oil exports and when the Gulf 
route was closed to oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War, almost 100 percent of Iraq's 
oil—80 million tons annually—was exported through the pipeline that reaches Turkey's 
Mediterranean port of Yumurtalik (thus reducing transportation time from forty-five days 
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to two). This dependency explains, for instance, Iraqi silence in the face of Turkey's 
damming of the Euphrates, which, although begun in the early 1980s, only drew 
Baghdad's protests in 1988, when its war with Iran was at an end. Furthermore, Turkey 
was a principal import gateway (almost the only one in emergencies) through which Iraq 
shipped in 75 percent of its foodstuffs.68 Thus, at the root of this re-emerging uneasiness 
seemed to be a feeling in Iraq that during the war it had become over-reliant upon Turkey 
and now wished to reassert its independence. 
During the war with Iran (1980-1988), Iraq permitted the Turkish army to 
operate against the PKK in northern Iraq. However, after the war, Baghdad felt free to 
deal with the Kurdish rebellion, and its treatment was harsh, notably the Halabjah 
incident, in September 1988, in which chemical weapons were employed. As a result, 
Turkey had to accommodate 50-60,000 Kurdish refugees along its southeastern borders. 
More important, Saddam Hussein provided enclaves for the PKK to pressure Ankara on 
the issues of water sharing and debt canceling during the period from 1988 to 1990.69 
Hence, Hussein's Kurdish policy was also a contributing element to the collision course. 
Iraq's debt to Turkey was yet a further cause for conflict, albeit insufficient in 
itself to draw the two states into confrontation. But when compounded with other 
elements, this debt helped further exacerbate bilateral relations. Iraq owed Turkey $2.5 
billion, of which it had repaid only $600 million by August 1990, when it ceased 
payments. Baghdad made the resumption of payment contingent upon the resolution of 
the conflict between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria over the waters of the Tigris and 
Euphrates.70 
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Furthermore, there was growing unease in Turkey at the qualitative improvements 
in Iraqi weapons. Turkey, along with all of Iraq's neighbors, had increasingly become 
alarmed at the stockpiling, use (chemical weapons against Iran and Kurds), and the 
increasing threat of use of non-conventional weapons by Iraq. The development of 
longer-range missiles in Iraq raised the prospect that it might be able to hit targets in 
Turkey with non-conventional payloads. The development of such weapons on its 
borders sharpened Turkey's perception of the Iraqi threat. 
Turkey responded to the events enumerated here, and to the profusion of Iraqi- 
Turkish conflicts, actual and potential, by increasing its defense budget. In 1989, the 
allotment stood at $1.7 billion. In 1990, even before the Gulf crisis erupted, the budget 
was doubled to $3.4 billion, rising in 1991 to $4.8 billion, or 12.5 percent of the overall 
national budget. The figures show that Turkey was continually strengthening its military 
in preparation for a possible showdown with Baghdad. (Compare this to the fact that the 
estimated defense budget for 1995 was only $3.9 billion. Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf 
war was the reason for this Turkish defense budget reduction.)71 
Thus, Iraq's pre-Gulf War posture as an aggressive regional player with 
hegemonic aspirations had already started to occupy the agenda of Turkish national 
security planners. Saddam Hussein's belligerent attitude against the visiting Turkish 
Prime Minister, Yildirim Akbulut, only three months before invading Kuwait, saying, 
"NATO is disintegrating. Your friend, the US is loosing power... Nobody listens to the 
US anymore. She cannot help you"72 epitomized the collision course of the relationship 
between Turkey and Iraq given Turkey's insistence on staying within the Western camp. 
Therefore, Ankara's decision to be in the anti-Saddam camp in the Kuwait crisis, to some 
extent, was an unsurprising consequence of Turkey's pre-Gulf War concerns about the 
threat Saddam's regime posed. 
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Additional evidence that Turkey was not drifting from its traditional policy was 
clear when Iraq's occupation of Kuwait threatened a specific regional common interest, 
that is, protecting the regional status quo. This was why all the Western and other states 
had the political will to coordinate their policies within the framework of the United 
Nations. Turkey, too, did not wish to see a regional Arab superpower, especially along its 
borders, which would "call the shots" in regional politics, especially in the disputes 
between Turkey and Arab countries. Thus, during the Kuwait crisis Turkey did not 
cooperate only with the West, but actually cooperated with a United Nations alliance of 
which the West, particularly the United States, given its capability and readiness to head 
the anti-Iraq international coalition, acted as the jointly accepted leader. Turkey's 
traditional Persian Gulf Security policy had not excluded such a regional role for Turkey 
under the international circumstances described above; on the contrary, it had foreseen 
73 one. 
A third factor demonstrated that Turkey's traditional foreign policy was firm: the 
following four points, all historical evidence, belied the allegation that Turkey has been 
an instrument of US foreign policy in the aftermath of the Gulf War: 
• In the first place, the wartime consensus between Turkey and the United 
States over the policies to be pursued toward a Saddam Hussein-led Iraq collapsed 
with the liberation of Kuwait.74 President Ozal had calculated that the allied 
onslaught on Iraq would dislodge Hussein's regime. Therefore, it was paramount 
for Turkey to be at the "post-war settlement table" and not just as a spectator.75 
Yet, there was not to be a "post-war settlement table." President Bush's 
unwillingness to extend the conflict and challenge Iraqi helicopters raining death 
on Kurdish and Shia rebels ended any hope that Saddam Hussein would be 
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quickly overthrown. President Bush was reluctant to make such an attempt, not 
because he did not want to see Saddam Hussein overthrown but because he 
believed that repercussions of such a move—dismemberment of Iraq "after" the 
overthrow of Hussein—might be devastating for the region whose stability is 
significant for the global economy. In contrast to the US's alleged enthusiasm for 
keeping the US presence in Iraq so that an independent Kurdish state could be 
established under its control, the Bush Administration had already decided in 
favor of a quick US withdrawal from Iraq even before the outbreak of armed 
hostilities between Iraq and the international coalition forces. In accordance with 
this decision, the US pursued a policy of non-involvement in the ensuing fighting 
between Saddam Hussein and his domestic Kurdish opponents after the liberation 
of Kuwait. This lasted until the outbreak of the Kurdish refugee crisis in March- 
April 1991. Bush was then persuaded to attempt a policy reversal owing to the 
insistent arguments of the Turks, British and French in favor of establishing "safe 
havens" for the Kurds in northern Iraq, under UN military protection, if 
necessary, to repel Saddam Hussein's army. 
• Second, it appears evident that President Ozal's efforts to call upon the 
help of the US in setting up "safe havens" in northern Iraq had nothing to do with 
his personal relationship with President Bush but with the following aspects of the 
severe Kurdish refugee crisis, which was harming the Turkish state. By 8 April 
1991, there were reports that 250,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees had already crossed 
into Turkey. The Turks were spending $1.5 million a day for these people without 
receiving sufficient help from the West. Not only was the outflow straining 
Turkey's resources, but these refugees were Kurds, whose presence in the 
primarily Kurdish-inhabited southeastern provinces threatened to further polarize 
the situation there. Turkey's domestic, economic, and social order was being upset 
by the presence of these refugees. Turkish statesmen, and particularly the military, 
were irritated by the fact that among these refugees unknown numbers of 
terrorists belonging to the PKK had been able to cross into Turkey without 
difficulty. 
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• Finally, the allied forces moving in the wake of the refugee crisis were 
stationed only along the Turkish-Iraqi border. In most of Iraqi Kurdish populated 
areas (Sulleymaniyah, Kerkuk, Irbil) there was no allied presence. By the time the 
allied forces began withdrawing from northern Iraq on 12 July 1991, they had 
successfully moved tens of thousands of refugees from mountain camps along the 
Turkish-Iraqi border, thereby satisfiying urgent Turkish needs: removal of the 
fears of the creation of a permanent, Gaza-type refugee implantation, of the 
linkage of the two Kurdish communities, and of the economic burden of caring 
for so many people.76 This fact suggests that the allied forces, despite their 
alleged intentions of keeping the region under their control, were determined to 
keep their involvement in northern Iraq quite limited. It also appears to confirm 
the view that the coalition forces had arrived in the region primarily for the sake 
of Turkey, not for the Kurds."77 
Fourth, though it is true that President Ozal's certain novel methods with respect 
to northern Iraq reflected important deviations from Turkey's traditional ways, the final 
aims envisioned were traditional. In March 1991, for example, Jalal Talabani and a 
representative of Masud Barzani, the leaders of the rebellious Kurdish groups fighting 
against the Saddam Hussein regime in northern Iraq, were invited to visit Ankara 
secretly, signaling a change in Turkey's previous policy of not contacting the Kurds of 
northern Iraq. This policy was not considered to be in accordance with the principle of 
non-interference governing Turkey's relations with her neighbors. Ozal's personal 
initiative to amend the Turkish law that severely restricting the use of the Kurdish 
language, part and parcel of his plans to grant ethnic, cultural and social rights to 
Turkey's Kurdish citizens, was also untraditional. These initiatives of Ozal produced 
much domestic controversy in Turkey. 
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However, the ultimate objectives to be achieved through these novel methods 
were all traditional: contributing to stability in the region, preventing the establishment of 
a Kurdish state in northern Iraq and promoting Turkey's political unity. The invitations 
extended to the Iraqi Kurdish leaders to visit Ankara appears to have been motivated by 
the following considerations:78 
• To obtain first-hand information about the developments in northern Iraq; 
• To exert some influence over the developments there by inducing the 
Kurds not to attempt to establish an independent Kurdish state; 
• To isolate the PKK among other Kurdish groups with the aim of 
neutralizing its operations from its bases in northern Iraq. 
As for the amendment of the Turkish law circumscribing the Kurdish language in 
January 1991, only days before the outbreak of the Gulf War, this move, although 
limited, was expected to save Turkey not only a striking contradiction between its foreign 
policy (protectorship of the northern Iraqi Kurds) and its domestic policy, but also to 
strengthen Turkey's internal unity, as well as improving Turkey's image in the eyes of the 
Western states, which were critical of Turkey's human rights record.79 
Insistence on the overthrow of Saddam Hussein abandoned, Ankara has 
perpetuated the policies of military cooperation with Western states and of contact with 
the northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders to maintain stability in northern Iraq up to the present. 
B.        TURKEY'S   CONCERNS  ABOUT  AND  BENEFITS  FROM  THE  US 
POLICY TOWARD IRAQ 
ONW is a sword that cuts both ways. On the one hand, it 
undermines the Turkish position in Iraq and encourages Kurdish 
aspirations for autonomy. On the other hand, it is the one card Ankara 
possesses that binds Washington to its priorities and needs because ONW 
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(with its southern equivalent) has come to represent the primary leg on 
which US Iraq policy is based.80 
One of the most important factors affecting future Turkish-Iraqi relations is 
Turkey's ties to the United States. The Kurdish question aside, the United States and 
Turkey share a basic approach to Iraq. They both adhere to the principle of Iraq's 
territorial unity and fear, perhaps for different reasons, the consequences of the instability 
that would ensue if Iraq were to break up. Also, they see in Saddam a potential regional 
hegemon likely to disrupt the established order with the zeal to acquire large quantities of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Moreover, for both, a humbled and somehow 
weakened Iraq serves as a balance to Iranian regional aspirations. 
1.        Concerns: 
But with Ozal's demise, differences between American and Turkish interests 
became more pronounced. Ankara's unease with the OPC (ONW), with the economic 
sanctions on Iraq, and with Washington's different approach to northern Iraqi Kurds and 
to the Iraqi anti-Saddam opposition grew with time. 
Neither the Turkish decision favoring the deployment of the force in question 
(Operation Provide Comfort [OPC] II, later Operation Northern Watch [ONW]) nor the 
subsequent extensions of the mandate of this force at six month intervals have been easy 
decisions for Ankara to make. Utmost caution has been shown by the Turkish 
government to keep the mission and activity of this force in accordance with the 
principles of Turkey's traditional foreign policy. 
One of the reasons for the Turks' uneasiness about the Poised Hammer force had 
ultimately to do with the collapse of the international consensus over the policies to be 
pursued toward Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War. From the beginning of the 
deployment of the Poised Hammer both the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Chief of 
the General Staffs Office have been concerned about the possibility that the Western 
states—particularly the United States—could be tempted to use this force to intervene in 
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any other crisis in the Middle East, whether or not it involved Iraq.81 This concern 
reflects Turkey's reluctance to appear to be siding with the West in the region in violation 
of its traditional foreign policy. The possibility of creating such an appearance was real 
enough when one considers the general reluctance in the UNSC to approve UN 
intervention in Iraq during the Iraqi refugee crisis of March-April 1991. 
UNSCR 688 of 5 April 1991 envisaged relief action for the Kurdish refugees and 
the dispatch of a UN fact-finding mission to the affected area. It fell short of military 
intervention to deter Saddam Hussein. Now, however, with that mission successfully 
completed, despite its limited, disputable, but necessary military intervention tolerated by 
international community, the existence of the Poised Hammer force on Turkish soil still 
continues. UNSC members particularly worry that given the enthusiasm of the United 
States to see Saddam Hussein removed from power, the force will remain in the region 
indefinitely until Hussein is overthrown through a domestic revolt, or even, worse still, 
that it will be used by the United States to strike at Iraq in order to bring about that 
desired result. 
Turkey cannot help sharing the same concerns. The openly declared goal of 
Poised Hammer was not to topple Saddam Hussein, or to interfere in Iraq's internal 
affairs. Rather, the allies were technically only seeking to ensure Iraqi compliance with 
UN resolutions, acting in line with the authority granted by UNSCR 688. It was hoped 
that Iraq would reach an agreement with Kurds on autonomy as stipulated by the Iraqi 
constitution.82 The Turks expected that this force would guarantee the continued security 
of the activities undertaken by the UN affiliated bodies in order to provide for the 
humanitarian needs of the regional population, while at the same time, protecting Iraq's 
territorial integrity. 
However, Ankara became very suspicious of the West's overall intentions 
concerning both post-Gulf War order in Iraq, the region and the world situation in 
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general. It was clear that Iraq had been violating the UN Resolutions on various fronts 
since the cease-fire of March 1991. What appeared uncertain, however, were the viability 
and the international legitimacy of the ways in which the allied powers, led by the United 
States, preferred to cope with these Iraqi challenges. The allied powers responded to Iraqi 
violations by using force against that country in the forms of air strikes and other military 
actions and by establishing an air exclusion zone in southern Iraq, south of the 32nd 
parallel. Rather than being a part of a long-term strategy developed by the UNSC, these 
Western responses came case-by-case after the challenges occurred.83 
• Establishing a "southern no-fly fone" (August 1992-present) 
• Responding to inspection and no-fly zone standoffs (December 1992- 
January 1993) 
• Deterring an invasion of Kuwait (1994) 
• Punishing the Iraqi thrust into northern Iraq when Barzani invited Iraqi 
troops against Talabani-Iranian military coalition in northern Iraq(1996) 
• Halting the defiance of UNSCOM (1997-1998) 
• Forcing compliance with UNSCOM (Operation Desert Fox, December 
1998) 
Furthermore, these responses came "in the absence of specific authorizations by 
the UNSC."84 Apart from increasingly revealing the breakdown of the international 
consensus in the United Nations, the way the Western allies dealt with the challenges of 
Iraq also seemed to legitimize to those challenges. Hussein will continue challenging the 
West to increase the support for his regime at home and abroad as long as the US and the 
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UK continue their militarized actions. Thus, it was not surprising to see Turkish Prime 
Minister Ecevit, as the premier of a Western country, which, unlike the US and UK, has 
to live with the neighbor Iraq, accusing Washington of having no policy except growing 
militarization toward Baghdad.85 The ensuing deepening rift between Washington and 
Baghdad since Operation Desert Fox in 1998, which ended the UN arms inspection 
program in Iraq, has not been all to the pleasure of Turkey's political leadership, which 
feared negative repercussions in Turkish-Iraqi relations. 
The international community criticized the US and the UK actions on the grounds 
that they were disproportionate, causing casualties and destruction, and escalating the 
tension in the region. A double standard in the enforcing UNSC resolutions the case of 
Israel and the case of Iraq—has questioned the legitimacy of US-led Western actions in 
the region in the eyes of Muslim populated regional states. Turkish leaders felt that the 
UN injustice in these cases increased regional instability, thus posing a threat to 
Turkey's national security. They were also aware that it strengthened the hands of the 
Islamic radicals, both in Turkey and in the Islamic world at large, who were maintaining 
that having gained victory against communism the US was now interested in destroying 
Islamic unity. These radicals portrayed the US attitude toward Iraq as part of such an 
overall Western policy. 
Another reason for the Turkish uneasiness in consenting to the deployment of the 
Poised Hammer force in Turkey and later in extending its mandate was the Turks' 
concern over the possibility that it might be impossible for Turkey to exercise full control 
over the activities of this force and over Western policies in general. Parliamentary 
debates on the renewal of OPC accordingly became more contentious. OPC was accused 
of all kinds of mischief, from dropping ammunition for the PKK to stopping and picking 
up wounded PKK fighters. The underlying concern was the particular sensitivity of the 
85
 Turkish Daily News, 31 January 1999. 
46 
Turkish Armed Forces about the possibility that the force might, even unintentionally, 
extend help to the Kurdish separatists and that supplies might accidentally reach them. 86 
Former President Evren crystallized this concern when he suggested that "a force 
that is protecting the Kurds of northern Iraq today, one day can turn around and say that it 
is protecting those in the southeast."87 It is precisely this fear that terrified the Turkish 
establishment even though it knew fully well that the United States had no such intention. 
In fact, while supporting the right to have a life free of Saddam Hussein's repression, 
Washington provided complete support—certainly at the rhetorical level—for Ankara's 
struggle against the PKK. 
Turkish leaders however, did not leave any room for suspicion and took some 
initiatives to control the facilities of the force and to balance US northern Iraqi policy in 
general. The aims were, first, not to upset Turkey's good neighborly relations with Iraq, 
second, to remove any possibility that the force intentionally or unintentionally would 
help the PKK, and third to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. 
Limitations were imposed on the activities of the force since 1991 when the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry announced that: "The force may not use Turkish territory and 
airspace against Iraq without the Turkish government's permission."88 In the same vein, 
the Turkish Armed Forces demanded that Turkish officers supervise coalition forces' 
helicopter, cargo, and AW ACS flights from the Incirlik Air Base and that the Poised 
Hammer Force and Turkish officers should jointly assess the films and photographs taken 
by the reconnaissance aircrafts.89 
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A means the Ankara government resorted to in order to counter the US northern 
Iraqi policy was to hold regular tripartite meetings with Syria and Iran beginning in 
November 1992 to discuss the situation in Iraq. Ankara declared that these meetings did 
not target Western policies, rather it expected to bring some balance to Turkey's relations 
with the US and Europe.90 The endeavor came to an end after five meetings in February 
1994 because of growing differences among the three countries,91 yet the communiques 
of these meetings stressed that Iraq's territorial integrity must ultimately be preserved and 
its political unity be secured ultimately for the sake of regional peace and stability. Also, 
that the communiques did not provide a specific remedy to the existing situation in 
northern Iraq implied the three states advocated normalizing relations with the Saddam 
Hussein regime.92 
Still another balancing means Ankara resorted to was gradually developing 
diplomatic contact with Iraq in an effort to normalize relations between the two countries. 
Turkey acted quickly to upgrade diplomatic representation in Baghdad immediately after 
the cessation of armed conflicts. In 1991, Ankara occasionally sent a diplomat to 
Baghdad to gain first-hand information concerning the developments there. In March 
1993, Turkey's embassy resumed its functions in Baghdad under the direction of a charge 
d' affairs. With this move, Turkey became the first NATO country to restore diplomatic 
relations with Iraq.93 In late 1998, when the "Washington Agreement," was signed by the 
Kurdish leaders under the sponsorship of the US (which did not inform or invite Turkey), 
Ankara announced that relations with Baghdad would be upgraded to the ambassadorial 
level. In late 2000, Ankara reiterated this policy when the (so-called) Armenian genocide 
bill was introduced in the US Congress, sending its ambassador to Baghdad in early 
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2001.94 Moderation, however has always accompanied Ankara's stance: Turkey 
informed Iraqis that this process would be contingent on their making greater efforts to 
comply with the UN decisions.95 This Turkish posture revealed the fact that Turkey 
wanted to base its relations both with Washington and Baghdad on legitimate grounds— 
indisputable economic losses and security threats, and the UN resolutions it strictly 
observes—so that it can both criticize and cooperate with Iraq and the US when 
necessary. 
Turkey's current dilemma is that while it is participating in the UN 
embargo against Iraq, in order to cooperate with US and UN policies, it is 
actually working against its own interests.96 
US insistence on sustaining economic sanctions on Iraq, in order to curb Saddam 
Hussein from acquiring sources to redevelop its WMD facilities, has been against the 
interests of all of Iraq's trade partners, especially Turkey. Turkey has been hard hit by the 
embargo. Iraq was not only a major trading partner, but also a conduit for getting Turkish 
agricultural products into the Middle East. Turkey's loss from the economic sanctions by 
the year 2001 is estimated at $35-40 billion.97 The figure culminates each year as the 
sanctions imposed by the UN continue to be enforced under US and UK military 
supervision. Turkey's economic and political efforts to raise the prosperity of its 
Southeast Anatolia region so that it can integrate its Kurdish citizens into the rest of the 
society have been hampered by the continuing sanctions, which so far have restricted 
border trade, an important source of income for the inhabitants of the region, and the oil 
flow through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline. 
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Before Turkey's participation in the Gulf War, the US had promised President 
Ozal that Turkey would receive substantial economic aid and extensive military 
equipment, while enjoying greater access to the US market for textile products in 
exchange for fulfilling the requirements of the economic sanctions: shutting down the 
Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline and closing the border gate. This promise was partially 
fulfilled.98 Turkey has received some compensation from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 
which each supplied $1 billion of oil at the intervention of the US, and from its Western 
allies, which upgraded Turkey's military arsenal at a cost of around $2 billion." 
Nevertheless, these aids are trickles when compared to Turkey's loss since the beginning 
of the economic embargo on Iraq. It is unfair that Turkey still suffers from the sanctions 
though it has been the US policy's center-of-gravity toward Iraq. Since the Arab world 
was alienated by the US either through a stumbling Arab-Israeli peace process or through 
Saddam's provocations and manipulations of the ONW flights and air strikes to gain the 
hearts of Arabs, Turkey has become the primary leg of Washington's northern Iraq policy 
by extending the mandate of ONW every six month. "Saddam Hussein is seen as a figure 
who resisted the West. With the hostility all across the Arab world toward Israel and the 
US, the political climate is very conducive to being exploited by Saddam."100 
Although the UNSC oil-for-food resolutions 986 and 1284, of which Ankara 
performed enormous diplomatic efforts in favor, eased Turkey's grievances about the 
sanctions to some degree, the fact that these resolutions helps northern Iraqi Kurds 
develop administrative institutions for a formidable Kurdish government from the 
revenues provided, still remains a problematic issue for Turkey. On one hand, for 
domestic and economic reasons Turkey needs the sanctions lifted. On the other hand it is 
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concerned  that  the  revenue  to  the  Iraqi   Kurds  would  enable  them  to  develop 
administrative structure for "self governing." 
Ankara accentuates the need for the opening of full economic relations with Iraq 
while urging dialogue as the best way to convince Iraq to conform to the UN resolutions 
concerning the proliferation of WMD. Ankara emphasizes this formula vehemently at a 
time when it is about to lose its share of the European market, which provides 60 percent 
of its export revenues, because of the EU's trend to accept East European countries to the 
union before Turkey101 and when the new US administration placed the task of 
overthrowing Saddam at the front of its foreign policy agenda and again raised Turkish 
fears of Iraq's dismemberment in a post-Saddam era. As Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail 
Cem said: 
The time came for the US and its allies to explore if there could be some 
adjustment of the sanctions. The sanctions had been in place for a decade, 
but had brought the US and its allies no closer to their goal of undermining 
the regime of Saddam Hussein. If anything, Hussein is more entrenched 
now than he was when the Persian Gulf War ended.102 
Turkey thus has a strong economic and political interest in seeing the UN sanctions lifted. 
Already the US and Britain have been under pressure from other members of the 
UNSC to ease the sanctions. One contention is that the borders are porous anyway; 
experts say illegal goods and oil flow overland from Jordan and Syria (through a 
pipeline) and by boats in the Persian Gulf. Another contention is that sanctions have 
inflicted the most damage on the Iraqi people and neighboring countries. As Cem points 
out: 
We are not getting Iraq's people to our side by these harsh sanctions. The 
reality for us is that Iraq is our neighbor and Iraq will remain our neighbor. 
We now have in Iraq a whole generation, which is underfed, which does 
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not have enough vitamins, which is growing up with hatred toward 
everyone—their environment, their parents, their leaders, their neighbors. 
This generation is going to govern Iraq in five years time and will create 
enormous danger for the whole region.103 
In addition, some permanent members of UNSC have interests in the removal of 
sanctions. For example, Russia constantly pressures the US in the UNSC to remove the 
sanctions, not that it sympathizes with the plight of Iraqi people but because of its own 
interests in gaining billions of dollars by developing Iraq's western oil fields. If the 
Russians eliminate the sanctions, the Iraqis will give them the keys to the Kurna oil field 
in western Iraq, one of the largest in the world with a potential of 200 million tons of 
oil.104 Thus, the Russian government has a lot to lose in Iraq, and little to lose in 
challenging Washington in the UN. 
In the case of Turkey, the oil smuggling trade is a significant income source for 
local truck drivers. This illegal oil trade has countinued to flout the sanctions since the 
opening of the Habur border gate in 1993, and even more after the UNSCR 1284, which 
allowed trade with the Kurdish area. However, "it is a smuggling regulated and taxed by 
the Turkish government and tolerated by the UN and the US."105 Although the trade is 
outside the sanctions system, it is indispensable for Turkey, and Ankara is sensitive not to 
allow the illegal trade to help Iraq acquire WMD. The West justifies turning a blind eye 
to this because the money helps the battered economy in this volatile region of Turkey 
and (Kurdish-populated) Iraq. In addition, the revenue does not go in the pocket of 
Saddam since the Iraqi side of the border and the trade is controlled by the KDP. The oil 
and diesel fuel were sold by Iraq to the KDP at a very low price, despite its opposition to 
Baghdad. Barzani, marks up the price, adds a tax and resells the oil to the truckers. 
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By 1999, the illegal trade accounted for a quarter of Turkey's diesel fuel 
consumption, and that was when the government stepped in to institutionalize the 
smuggling with new regulations.106 Truckers were limited to one trip every three months 
and were required to unload at the government depot and pay taxes instead of selling 
diesel fuel on the open market. The government profited two ways—by taxing the fuel 
and reselling it to the distributors at a higher price. However, custom inspections were 
toughened to make sure any Iraq-bound material complied with the sanctions. 
Since late 2000, international resolve to maintain stiff sanctions against Iraq has 
significantly slipped away as the Baghdad regime learned when it successfully resumed 
commercial air service through no-fly zones in the northern and southern parts of the 
country. Russia and France were the first major powers to break the ice on international 
flights when they sent aid flights to Baghdad in the fall of 2000, after obtaining UN 
permission for humanitarian flights. Soon after, Turkey joined the growing list of nations 
to challenge the flight ban. Though the two Turkish flights were cleared by the UN, in the 
future Turkey, like Egypt and Syria, might not feel the need to ask for UN approval. 
Furthermore, disappointed in its share of Iraqi contracts, Turkey has intensified its 
diplomatic efforts to convince the US to support lifting the UN ban on Turkey's tenders 
related to Turkey. ^07 
Seeing that the economic sanctions is not easy to sustain, the new US 
administration is now trying to develop "smart" sanctions108 that will allow more 
customer goods in Iraq and tighten the rein on Saddam Hussein's ability to buy weapons 
as he seems likely. Saddam Hussein has recently developed ties with India, who could 
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exchange for oil.109 Secretary of State Powell's recent visit to the Middle East, in this 
sense, was important. His message was clear: the US would agree to sanctions narrowly 
aimed at Hussein's capacity to build new weapons if Iraq's Arab neighbors, especially 
Syria, who is importing 100,000 barrels of Iraqi oil a day against UN embargoes, will 
clamp down on the revenues flowing directly to Hussein from his spiraling exports of 
smuggled oil.110 Likewise, Edward Walker Jr., Assistant Secretary of Near East Affairs, 
traveled to Ankara in March 2001 to assure Turkish officials that the administration is 
studying ways to reduce the impact of sanctions on Iraq's neighbor.1! ] 
Turkey's real concern is Washington's different approach to the Kurds in northern 
Iraq. Turkey pursues a policy in favor of consolidation of Iraqi regime's authority by 
encouraging Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq to engage in a dialogue with Hussein, 
whereas the US blocks Kurdish leaders' relations with Baghdad. The last US 
administration, especially former Secretary of State Albright, went so far as to promise a 
Kurdish federal entity within Iraq, which is unacceptable for Turkey, and alienated 
Turkish leaders by not consulting and informing them before and about the 1998 
Washington Agreement, where the promises were made to the Kurdish leaders.112 
Turkey's preferred solution was to facilitate a compromise between the Barzani and 
Talabani groups to establish a temporary administrative mechanism that would 
effectively deny the PKK a stronghold in northern Iraq. This would be pending the 
eventual restoration of the authority of the Baghdad government throughout Iraq and 
following its reconciliation with the northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders.113 Before the signing 
1(
^9 "Unusual Partners: India Turns to Iraq," Stratfor.com, 5 December 2000. Available [Online]: 
www.stratfor.com/home/giu/DAILY.asp 
110 "Powell Aims to Plug Iraqi Oil How," BBC News, 26 February 2001. "Powell Will Scale Back Rather 




 Douglas Frantz, "At Iraq's Backdoor, Turkey Flouts Sanctions," New York Times, 30 March 2001. 
1
 '2 Alan Makovsky, "Kurdish Agreements Signs New US Commitment," Policy Watch, no. 341 
(September 29, 1998). 
113
 Aykan, "Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq, 1991-95," p. 343-346. 
54 
of the Washington Agreement, Turkey felt itself to be in a position to promote such a 
modus vivendi between the two Kurdish groups with the backing of the United States. 
Yet, as it turned out, the US left Turkey largely out of the process. 
The agreement angered authorities in Ankara. First, it came to involve a specific 
promise by which the two Kurdish leaders, with US support, collaborated within the 
framework of a Kurdish federal administration toward the eventual establishment of a 
federated state in Iraq.114 Second, although both Kurdish leaders pledged to make a 
common effort to deny the PKK a safe haven from which it could attack Turkey, they 
also expressed in the agreement their determination to prevent any outside encroachments 
into northern Iraq. This suggested to the Turks that Turkish military's anti-PKK 
operations in northern Iraq would no longer be tolerated by the United States.115 
Turkey, in order to prove that the Washington Protocol did not bind Turkey, 
announced its own declaration in November 1998 concerning northern Iraq, deciding to 
retaliate by "upgrading" its diplomatic relations with Baghdad to a full ambassadorial 
level.116 This declaration appeared to be intended to replace the Washington Protocol, 
stating that the future of Iraq would be decided by the free will of the Iraqi people as a 
whole.117 At the same time, Ankara brought Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani to 
Turkey. Both emphasized that, although federation remained their aspiration for the 
future of Iraq, its realization depended on the free will of the people of Iraq as a whole 
and on the cooperation of the central authority in Baghdad.118 
This type of independent attempts by Washington have been a source of 
resentment for Turkish decision makers as well as for Iranian and Syrian statesmen 
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whose countries also have Kurdish populations great enough to cause trouble if inspired 
by the founding of an internationally recognized Kurdish entity in northern Iraq. That is 
why Turkey, Iran, and Syria began holding meetings in November 1992, when the 
Kurdish factions (the KDP and the PUK) held their first elections in northern Iraq, to 
convey their irritation over the possible dismemberment of Iraq. 
Since "the inhabitants of those parts of Turkey and Iraq were nothing more than 
feudal clans led by incompetents,"119 these inhabitants do not have the skills to form a 
self-governing institution. Furthermore, "the US officially does not have an overreaching 
government policy toward the Kurds."120 However, Ankara is still suspicious of the 
multinational desire to establish a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. This suspicion is not 
dispelled when the following factors are considered: 
• The US is encouraging northern Iraqi Kurds in separate dialogues. 
• The US and the UK are protecting Kurds in northern Iraq against Saddam 
Hussein's threat. 
• The Iraqi Kurdish leaders are gradually developing administrative structures and 
skills competing with one another to provide the best public services to their 
followers as they recieve revenues from the "oil-for-food" program. 
The Iraq Liberation Act passed by the US Congress in autumn 1998 was another 
irritation to Ankara. This legislation provided $97 million in aid for the Iraqi National 
Congress (INC), an umbrella organization of Iraqi exiled opposition groups, to topple 
Saddam Hussein and to replace him with a democratic government. Thus, the US 
government for the first time openly advocated overthrowing Iraq's regime. This, in turn, 
raised concerns in Turkey. Ankara, as mentioned earlier, did not favor any policy to 
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dispose Saddam Hussein that did not match the scope of the UNSC sanctions: namely, to 
force Hussein to relinguish his existing WMD and to prevent him from expanding his 
arsenal. "If your official policy is to remove the regime, you cannot expect the regime to 
comply with the UN resolutions."121 
Ankara, also, feared that the exiled INC, led by Dr. Ahmed Chalabi in London, 
had no popular base in Iraq and did not entice even the Kurdish leaders, who represented 
the largest local opposition to Saddam regime. Moreover, Ankara believed that the INC 
could not establish a functioning political organization capable of ruling after Saddam 
Hussein's regime. First, the INC is not in Iraq. Second, participating in such an 
opposition movement is an open invitation to provoke Saddam Hussein (Turkish political 
elites are sensitive to any development that will provoke Saddam Hussein to render 
another refugee crisis in Turkey's southern borders). Third, for the "democracy" INC 
favors, since none of the various ethnic groups in Iraq ever lived in a democratic system, 
their loyalty remains firmly attached to their cultural roots and the concept of democracy 
is not as appealing as might be imagined. Thus, the INC is likely to fail as other US 
attempts to oust Hussein failed.122 
Even though the INC seems likely to fail, the current US administration is 
adamant about removing Saddam from power and focusing a great amount of the US's 
efforts immediately and intently on achieving that goal. This situation greatly concerned 
Ankara.123 Ismail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister, seemed cool to the US ideas of 
more aggressive backing for Iraqi exiles seeking the overthrow of Hussein, saying "any 
opposition not rooted in its own country will not be significant."124 The George W. Bush 
administration is expected to take some serious steps toward accomplishing that goal, 
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considering their desire to stay in power four more years.125 Therefore, Turkey must 
develop a policy that will allow it to have a hand in the developments of the post-Saddam 
Hussein Iraq. However, 
As long as the opposition groups cannot convincingly prove they can 
replace the Iraqi regime, Ankara prefers Saddam to stay, which would, at 
least for the time being, foreclose a breakup of the regional political 
balance and give some security for the realization of Turkish national 
interests in developments in and around Iraq.126 
2.        Benefits: 
It appears that all these economic and political considerations have resulted in 
Turks' growing perceptions of themselves as the victims of the UN embargo against Iraq. 
However, the repeated the mandate of the Poised Hammer Force appears to be Turkish 
leaders' rational calculation of the benefits and the disadvantages, explained above, in 
keeping this force on Turkish soil. Ankara and Washington's mutual dependence 
convinced Turkish elites to favor extending the mandate of the force. The need to both 
contain Saddam Hussein regime and to protect the Kurdish enclave elevated the Poised 
Hammer to a critical component of Washington's policy. In effect, the US became 
dependent on the forces based on the Incirlik Air Base to sustain its anti-Saddam policy. 
The US did not just need Turkey for OPC/ONW, but also to put pressure on Hussein 
during the periods of acute tension between Baghdad and the international community. 
This in turn provided Ankara with significant bargaining chips. Thus, there seems to have 
been a consensus among Turkish civilian and military leaders to the effect that the 
benefits outweighed the disadvantages. 
The first benefit that Turkey received from the US's Iraqi policy involved higher 
security. In the eyes of Turkish leadership the function of the Poised Hammer Force is 
twofold: it could deter Saddam Hussein from initiating a military attack, as was likely to 
happen when Saddam deployed 200 SAM missiles and 20 divisions next to the 36 
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parallel in 1993; and if this deterrence fails, Turkey would not be left to stand alone to 
cope with the consequences, i.e., one million refugees on its border.127 Since the end of 
the Gulf War, the Iraqi army has been kept weakened, significant parts of it were 
annihilated and the country has been subjected to extensive intelligence surveillance. 
Turkey's continuing perception of Baghdad as a WMD threat became once more obvious 
in Ankara's request for Patriot anti-missile systems just after the December 1998 
Operation Desert Fox. Turkey's security concerns were taken into account by the 
American delivery of the Patriots in January 1999. In addition, Turkey, leaving war to 
others, has sustained the success of not having a war on its territory since its 
foundation.128 
The second benefit for Turkey involved the fact that OPC/ONW bought a certain 
degree of immunity from US criticism of its cross-border raids into Iraq as well as its 
alleged human rights violations. The criticism about these alleged human rights 
violations, brought to the table of the US Congress by anti-Turkish groups such as Greek 
and Armenian lobbies in the US, represents nothing more than the double standard of the 
US when its support for countries governed by kingdoms, monarchs, even by dictators is 
considered.129 The Turkish Armed Forces welcomed the extensions of the OPC/ONW 
because the constant allied military involvement in northern Iraq could help soften public 
international reactions, especially the American ones, to Turkish military incursions in 
northern Iraq to destroy the bases of the PKK. In addition, the Turkish defense industry's 
dependence on the US, (Turkey purchases around 75 percent of its arms from the US), 
also entices the Turkish military to favor the continuance of the Poised Hammer.130 
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The third way Turkey benefited from the US Iraqi policy was in gaining a 
bargaining chip, Turkey's ratification of six-month extensions, that enables Turkish 
authorities to extract concessions from the US regarding Iraq. For example, Turkish 
officials demanded the opening of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. Washington had to 
argue at the UNSC to mandate that Iraq export at least 50 percent of its oil through 
Turkey as part of the "oil-for-food" resolution, UNSCR 986. The US also sided with 
Ankara recently during discussions relating to UNSCR 1284, the latest iteration of 
UNSCR 986, to exclude Turkey's trade with Iraq through the Kurdish areas from the 
sanctions regime.131 In addition, regarding the status of northern Iraq, the West now at 
least says, "We do not want a Kurdish state established in northern Iraq."132 
Another benefit to Turkey was that Ankara also has used the approval of 
extending the mandate for the force and developing diplomatic relations with Iraq as 
political leverage against the US Congress. The last Armenian bill in late 2000 calling for 
the declaration of 24 April as the commemoration of the so-called Armenian genocide 
was withdrawn by the Speaker of the House when Turkey announced it would send its 
ambassador to Baghdad,133 would consider fully opening the pipeline134 and would open 
a second border gate135 to increase the volume of cross-border trade. (Ankara also used 
the influence of the pro-Israeli lobby in the US to curb the passage of the bill.) 
The existence of the Poised Hammer served as an important bargaining chip for 
Ankara in its contacts with both northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders, too. The presence of the 
force in Turkey is crucial for the Iraqi Kurds as an assurance against Saddam Hussein's 
attacks. Ankara uses this leverage to discourage the Kurdish leaders to establish an 
independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. In addition, although the 1998 Washington 
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agreement angered Ankara, it provided the basis that Ankara further binds Barzani and 
Talabani by stating, "a firm commitment of both group to deny sanctuary to the PKK 
throughout the Iraqi Kurdish region and to prevent the PKK from destabilizing and 
undermining the peace, or from violating the Turkish border."136 
Finally, Ankara so far has had Washington's support for its straightforward fight 
against PKK terrorism, and its significant regional projects such as the Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline project for Baku oil in the Caspian Sea. For example, the US State Department 
approved Turkey's plan to establish a three- to six-mile-wide "security zone" in northern 
Iraq as a buffer against PKK terrorists in September 1996137 and recently the new US 
administration announced its support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project.138 
In sum, mutual dependence between Turkey and the US has enabled each to make 
certain concessions to the other. The US was careful enough not to criticize Turkish 
cross-border operations, gave full support to the anti-PKK struggle, was somewhat 
subdued in its criticism of Turkish human rights violations, and supported Turkish 
demands for exceptions from the sanctions regime. In exchange, Turkey made the best of 
what it perceived as an unfavorable set of conditions in northern Iraq to satisfy US 
preferences. At the fundamental level, however, Turkish and American preferences are 
incompatible. While the US will accept nothing less than a new regime in Baghdad, 
Turkey is wary that a new regime will be weak and beholden to the northern Kurdish 
groups. 
136
 Harun Kaaz, "Final Statement of the Leaders's meeting September 17, 1998," Turkish Daily News, 5 
October 1998. 
137
 Compiled by Janet McMahon, "Facts for Your File: A Chronology of U.S.-Middle East Relations," 
Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, November/December 1996, pages 117-118. Available 
[Online]: www.washingtonreport.org/backissues/1196/9611117.htm 
138
 American President George W. Bush's special advisor on Caspian Energy Policies, Elizabeth Jones, 
stated the Bush Administration supported the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project. Aksam, 2 February 2001. The 
US oil company Chevron stated they were interested in participation of engineering studies of the Baku- 
Ceyhan pipeline project. "Chevron Interested in Baku-Ceyhan Line," Reuters, 9 February 2001. 
61 
C.       ANKARA, THE KDP, THE PUK, AND THE FIGHT AGAINST THE PKK 
Turkey's policy toward northern Iraqi Kurds is quite interesting in that Turkey has 
to balance its policy of protecting Kurds in northern Iraq with its policy of preserving 
Iraq's territorial and national unity. On one hand, Ankara has taken an active role in the 
international effort to protect the Kurds and other minorities living in northern Iraq. The 
planes of Operation Northern Watch, which patrol the no-fly zone, are based at Incirlik, 
Turkey. On the other hand, the Ankara government, which fears the de facto creation of a 
Kurdish state in the safe haven, has always been uneasy about the power vacuum in 
northern Iraq and has therefore done its best to ensure that the Kurdish regional 
authorities never gain too much strength. 
In addition, Turkey, while openly illustrating its opposition to a Kurdish state in 
northern Iraq and even encouraging Barzani and Talabani to engage in dialogue with the 
Baghdad regime, sought their cooperation in its fight against the PKK. The relations 
reached the point of providing representative offices in Ankara for these Kurdish 
factions. The aims of the Turkish government's "contact policy," as mentioned earlier, 
were to obtain first-hand information about the developments in northern Iraq; to exert 
some influence over the developments there through inducements to the Kurds not to 
attempt to establish an independent Kurdish state; and to isolate the PKK among other 
Kurdish groups with the aim to neutralize its operations from its bases in northern Iraq. 
Turkey has accomplished these goals for the most part either binding the Kurdish leaders 
to its interests by various means (ONW provides protection for Kurds, and Turkey is the 
lifeline of the Kurdish area to the outside world), or by eradicating the PKK presence in 
northern Iraq through intense fighting. 
The joint government established just after the Gulf War in northern Iraq did not 
last long and collapsed soon after the 1992 elections because of the never-ending rivalry 
between KDP leader Barzani and PUK leader Talabani. Before the collapse of their 
treaty, the Turkish government tried to enlist their help. In 1992, both groups cooperated 
with the Turkish military in a sweep of the area. However, the rivalry between them 
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erupted in military clashes that finally ended in partitioning the region among the parties 
in 1993.139 Barzani and his KDP controlled the northwestern part of the region, including 
the border with Turkey. The more southern and eastern parts, including Erbil and the 
border with Iran, came under the PUK control. The situation deteriorated after the 
outbreak of fighting between Barzani and Talabani factions in 1994 because of the 
differences over power sharing and dividing oil revenues. As a result, the PKK, using the 
mountainous area of northern Iraq along the Turkish border as bases for their operations 
in Turkey since the loss of Baghdad's authority in the area, took almost unhindered 
advantage of border areas to conduct maneuvers. 
Turkey, in turn, had to rely increasingly on its forces to fight the PKK. In March 
1995, for instance, Ankara conducted a large six-week long military operation with 
35,000 troops.140 (This type of large incursion continued until spring 2000.) Still, 
geography and Masud Barzani's more traditional and less nationalistic outlook allowed 
Ankara to work more closely with the KDP. Most PKK terrorists tended to be holed up in 
the mountains controlled by the KDP, which also meant that Turkey needed the KDP 
more than the PUK, whose territory bordered Iran. 
Because PUK leader Jalal Talabani refused for more than a decade to 
unequivocally denounce the PKK, Ankara mistrusted the PUK. Ankara suspected that the 
PUK was providing safe passage to Iranian land and even basing rights on its territory in 
collaboration with Iran. Talabani used the PKK as an instrument against the increasing 
influence of the KDP—as the KDP controlled revenues of the Habur border gate—and 
sought the Iranian support to balance the KDP-Ankara cooperation. 
In summer 1996, Barzani invited Iraqi troops to help him drive Talabani forces 
from Erbil and most of northern Iraq. Barzani felt threatened by an Iranian military 
presence that Talabani allegedly called into the area under PUK control to fight against 
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the Kurdistan Democrat Party of Iran (KDP-I).141 He saw no alternative to asking 
support from Saddam Hussein to hold his position against the perceived Talabani-Tehran 
coalition. However, under pressure from the US, which employed cruise missile attacks 
on Iraqi military installations in southern Iraq, Saddam Hussein withdrew his troops from 
the area, and in October 1996 Talabani was able to recapture his lost territory.142 A 
preliminary cease-fire was established under the guidance of the US, Turkey and Britain 
that was turned into the "Ankara Process" aimed at brokering peace between the two 
Kurdish groups.143 These events further demonstrated the inability of Iraq's Kurdish 
leaders to control the area effectively by themselves. This meant both good and bad news 
for Turkey: good news because it reassured Turkey that the Kurds would not reach their 
aim of a Kurdish federate state rapidly; bad news because the authority vacuum and 
PUK's reluctance to reject the PKK existence in its territory provided the PKK a vast 
space to maneuver in northern Iraq. 
This inability was confirmed once more by the slow progress of the Ankara 
Process. Despite some headway on procedures and organizational structures, only a 
control regime for monitoring the cease-fire with representatives of non-Kurdish northern 
Iraq people, the Turkoman and Assyrians, was in place by 1997 when Turkey started 
another large spring incursion to destroy PKK bases in northern Iraq.144 This time, KDP 
fighters were involved in activities against PKK targets because of the latent KDP-PKK 
differences that had flared up again.145 Despite the criticism from the Iraqi government 
and various Arab countries as well as from its main European partners, Turkey continued 
the operation with about 50,000 troops and strong air support for more then six weeks. It 
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can be assumed that since then a small number of Turkish troops stayed in Iraqi territory 
and from time to time have been reinforced in operations against PKK bases. 
(Reportedly, Turkey signed an agreement with the KDP in May 1997 to use its forces as 
a border police.)146 
In any case, the Turkish military staged large operations in northern Iraq in 
September 1997, December 1997, May 1998, February 1999, April 2000, and December 
2000.147 In these operations the military often cooperated with KDP forces, which had 
come under attack by the PKK and sometimes by the PUK, which sought to regain the 
position stipulated by the ceasefire agreement of October 1996. Because the PUK 
seemingly cooperated with PKK forces that had established a stronghold in PUK 
controlled territory, the Turkish military believed that supporting KDP counterattacks 
was legitimate. 
In September 1998, the US administration succeeded in ending the feud between 
the KDP and the PUK. Meeting in Washington for the first time in four years, Barzani 
and Talabani reached an agreement to end the fighting and again tried to establish a 
functioning common Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. The so-called Washington 
Agreement called for a commitment to a federative Kurdish political entity within a 
"united, pluralistic, and democratic Iraq" that "would maintain the nation's unity and 
territorial integrity." It contained the elements present in previous pacts: revenue sharing, 
power sharing (including elections), and security arrangements (including a pledge to 
deny use of northern Iraq to the anti-Turkish PKK). The Kurds agreed on the 
organization of "free and fair elections for a new regional assembly" that were to take 
place by July 1999. In this assembly the Kurdish, Turkoman, Assyrians, and Chaldean 
populations would be represented.148 
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This agreement caused some irritation in Ankara, although the US administration 
and the Kurdish leaders were quick to declare it had to be regarded as a further result of 
the Ankara Process.149 Turkish political leaders were embarrassed that Turkey had been 
excluded from the final rounds of negotiation as well as from the signing of the 
agreement. They had the barely concealed suspicion that the agreement would open the 
way to an eventual establishment of a separate Kurdish state and would complicate future 
Turkish military incursions across the border.150 To demonstrate its opposotion and its 
political independence, Ankara announced relations with Baghdad would be upgraded to 
the ambassadorial level and received the visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarik Aziz.151 
Turkish concerns about northern Iraq relaxed somewhat as it became clear, 
especially after a meeting of Talabani and Barzani in Ankara in early November 1998,152 
that nobody really wanted to dissociate Turkey from northern Iraq lastingly and that 
implementing the Washington Agreement did not go as smoothly as foreseen on paper. 
Indeed, it paved the way for an Ankara-PUK rapprochement in the following years. 
However, in the immediate future, successfully implementing the agreement could not be 
totally excluded, and if a functioning Kurdish administration in the three northern Iraqi 
provinces of Erbil, Dohuk, and Suleymaniye could be established, a spillover into 
Turkey's Kurdish question cannot be excluded. Such a development could encourage 
Turkey's Kurds to increase their efforts to reach some political autonomy within the 
Turkey.153    ' 
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As there has been no return to the pre-Gulf War status quo, Ankara's second-best 
option in northern Iraq has been to weaken and to contain signs of consolidating the 
northern autonomous government. In this respect, the Kurdish elections of 1992 and the 
1998 Washington Agreement were unwelcome events. On the other hand, the division of 
northern Iraq between the two factions has clearly set back the ambitions of these Kurds. 
In addition, Ankara, as evidenced so far, has been inclined to play one Kurdish faction 
against the other in order to weaken their consolidation efforts for a Kurdish federated 
state. However, although Turkey benefits from continued divisions among the Kurds, a 
unified Kurdish leadership beholden to Ankara might provide it with a greater say in 
future Iraqi developments. 
Currently, Ankara has control over much of the developments in northern Iraq by 
its close cooperation with both Kurdish factions and Turcomans in northern Iraq. 
Talabani's reluctance to take arms against the PKK ended in mid-2000. Just after his visit 
in Ankara in July 2000, fierce clashes erupted between the PUK and the PKK in the 
eastern part of the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq where PKK terrorists had retreated 
after the capture of their leader Abdullah Ocalan in early 1999. This change in PUK's 
behavior can be attributed to the points agreed on in Washington in 1998 as understood in 
PUK Ankara Representative Shazad Saib's statements: 
We informed the PKK two years ago. We do not want their fighters to 
enter our areas. Turkey threatened Syria, and Syria forced PKK out. We 
cannot resist Turkey. We have faced many problems. . . . We gave our 
word to Ankara that we will not allow the PKK in our territory.154 
On 10 January 2001, when the PUK-PKK fight was continuing with more 
intensity, and days after the Turkish military sent troops to the southern part of northern 
Iraq upon the call of the KDP, the PUK leader Talabani visited Turkey once more after 
meeting with Barzani at KDP headquarters in Selahaddine for the first time in three 
years.155 Three days before the visit, Ecevit confirmed that Turkish troops had led an 
154 "puK Representative: We Promised Ankara," Kurdish Observer, 1 October 2000. Available [Online]: 
http://www.kurdishobserver.com/2000/10/01/hab01.html 
155 "Riva] Kurdish Factions Hold Peace Talks After 3 Years," Times of India Online, 10 January 2001. 
67 
incursion into northern Iraq to provide technical help for the PUK and KDP in their 
efforts to fight PKK terrorists. Reportedly, when retreating from the area in March 2001, 
Turkish troops left 40 howitzers, 300 soldiers to be stationed in the PUK controlled areas 
of Suleymaniye and Cankurna for firepower and technical assistance and 200 MIT 
(National Intelligence Service) members in the Soran area for intelligence facilities.156 
During the visit, Prime Minister Ecevit and other Turkish officials received Talabani—a 
sure sign that relations between the Turkish government and the PUK have greatly 
improved. For years, Ankara had sought to convince the PUK to cooperate against the 
PKK, but unlike his rival Barzani, Talabani had shown great reluctance to confront the 
PKK. Now, about the PKK, Talabani said, "They claimed they stopped fighting in 
Turkey but they started in northern Iraq. We will oblige them to leave by all means."157 
On the other hand, Ankara's relationship with the KDP has shown signs of strain, 
especially since Ocalan's arrest and the end of the PKK-led insurgency. With the violence 
abating in the southeast and subsequent decline in the need to cooperate with Barzani's 
forces, the Turkish leadership has tried to demonstrate the limits of its tolerance for 
Kurdish activity. In March 2000, at the instigation of the military high command, a furor 
erupted over the KDP Ankara representative's Nevruz (Kurdish New Year) reception, 
which European Union representatives attended. In July 2000, the Turkish establishment 
viewed the KDP representative's invitation as a ruse to pass itself off as a diplomatic 
mission.158 The Turkish government's invitation to Talabani to visit Ankara and treating 
him with a warm reception was interpreted by many as another slap at the KDP.159 In 
April 2001, just before the prearranged visit of Barzani to Ankara, there was news in the 
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Turkish press that a new anti-Turkish separatist movement called Kurdistan Revolution 
Party (Partia Sorejan Kurdistan or PSK) was sponsored by Barzani.160 
To blunt arguments about Kurdish exceptionalism, Ankara has also trumpeted the 
rights of Turcomans in northern Iraq. Ironically, Ecevit has been at the forefront of the 
quest for recognition of the Turcomans as a separate ethnic group in Iraq, even though he 
does not envisage a separate area for them. In Ankara, as a result of attempts to interfere 
in the politics of the Turcomans in Iraq, more than one "representative" organization 
exists today. Turcomans were employed by the international community as cease-fire 
observers. For Turkey, the Turcomans represent a card which, if well played, can give 
Ankara some say in post-Saddam Hussein arrangements, especially should the Kurds 
decide to ignore them.161 
While both Kurdish factions have maintained contact with the regime in Baghdad 
for good measure, Barzani has had the closest links. Ironically, as much as the Turks 
would like to see the two Kurdish factions cooperate with Saddam Hussein, the very 
existence of a Turkish-KDP tie has enabled the latter to keep Baghdad at arm's length and 
keep its options somewhat open. Iran plays a similar role with the PUK. 
Turkey's greatest challenge is the fact that after almost ten years of not living 
under Saddam Hussein's tutelage, the Kurdish population in northern Iraq is likely to 
resist strongly any effort aimed at bringing back total Iraqi control. Despite the hardships 
caused by intra-group fighting, Kurds in northern Iraq have not previously experienced as 
long a period of "independence" as this one. This situation has served to strengthen their 
consciousness and deepen their ethnic ties. Moreover, the oil-for-food resolutions 
(favored by Turkey), by allocating 13 percent of all Iraqi income to the north, have given 
rise to an unprecedented level of prosperity there. The Iraqi regime had always avoided 
non-oil investments in the north. Perhaps the greatest irony is that the separation of the 
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north has even injected an element of competition between the two Kurdish parties, each 
trying to show its residents that it is better at providing vital service. 
In general, however, Ankara has so far called the shots in the region precisely 
because it controls the Habur crossing and access to the United States. Ankara has 
correctly calculated that, irrespective of Washington's efforts with regards to the PUK 
and the KDP, these two factions must eventually pay a great deal of attention to Turkish 
wishes. 
D.       RELATIONS WITH BAGHDAD 
Despite US criticism, Turkey facing the political and economic repercussions of 
the Iraqi situation every day has been continuing its intense diplomacy to normalize 
relations with Baghdad regardless of its regime type. Preservaing Iraq's territorial 
integrity and national unity is crucial for Turkey before any economic considerations. 
Turkey's insistence on developing diplomatic relations, which were recently fully 
established, and its insistence on using economic areas to bolster ties with Iraq can be 
easily understood in this sense. Ankara perceives Saddam's hegemonic aspirations and 
his regime as being dangerous enough to destabilize the region, but Ankara does not care 
about Baghdad's regime type when removing from power would risk dismembering Iraq 
and therefore would jeopardize Turkish national unity and territorial integrity. The only 
formula feasible and acceptable to Ankara for now is rehabilitating the Baghdad regime 
through dialogues on regional security while integrating Iraq into the international 
community through economic cooperation. However zealous Ankara seems in 
reestablishing its overall relations with Iraq, Ankara, in accordance with its foreign policy 
principles, in fact, urges Baghdad's conformance to the UN resolutions. 
Turkey and Iraq indeed have various areas of economic and political cooperation. 
Iraq's dependence on Turkey for access to Europe, Turkey's dependence on Iraq for 
cheap oil, the benefit in trade relationship, the common desire to subdue Kurdish ethnic 
separatism, and even the similarity in regime types as far as the approach to religion is 
concerned are the factors that inevitably bond them. But the existence of the Poised 
Hammer in Turkey, the concern about a new Kurdish refugee crisis, Baghdad's WMD 
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facilities incompliance with UN resolutions, and Saddam Hussein's feeling of "over- 
dependency" on Turkey, which originated from the Iran-Iraq War, are the main obstacles 
that hinder the progress for normal relations. However, the two countries are seeking 
ways to skirt these obstacles in improving economic and diplomatic relations, perhaps for 
different reasons. 
While Turkey sees the normalization of relations with Iraq benefiting it 
economically and politically, Saddam Hussein's regime sees any attempt to normalize 
relations as a way of eroding the US imposed sanctions and thereby embarrassing 
Washington considering. This is particularly true when one considers Ankara's position 
as a main US ally in the region. Yet, Turkey will not abandon its relations with the US for 
the sake of good neighborly relations with Iraq. The Ankara government certainly makes 
rational calculations not to be on the losing side in case of new developments. That is 
why it employs intense diplomatic efforts to demonstrate its legitimate concerns in its 
balance policy to both sides. 
Turkey and Iraq are engaged in gradual economic relations as far as UN 
resolutions allowed. Recent developments illustrated an increase in the pace of economic 
relations and Turkey's initiatives at the UN to lift the sanctions as they started to crumble. 
Turkey like France and Russia sent "aid flights" to Baghdad. In addition, Baghdad and 
Ankara have discussing opening a second border gate and resuming the operation of the 
Baghdad-Turkey railway, through which Turkey pan import petroleum from Iraq to 
increase the volume of border trade.162 In addition, they have embarked on realizing a $2 
billion natural gas pipeline project, which will transportat of northeastern Iraq natural gas 
to Ceyhan.163 In April 2001, a delegation from Turkey's state run pipeline company, 
BOT AS, went to Iraq to discuss the contracts for this pipeline.164 
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From Baghdad's perspective, the evolution of the Kurdish entity in northern Iraq 
preoccupied Baghdad as much as Turkey. Given limited capabilities of Saddam Hussein 
administration to influence events in the north, Hussein probably sees Turkey's 
involvement as a counterbalance to this evolution and Iran's ambitions in northern Iraq, 
his rhetoric criticism against Turkish involvement and incursions notwithstanding. 
Baghdad has no patron as Turkey has, representing the forward line of US power, but it 
can be satisfied with the fact that, if not deserting the US, Ankara has had a measured 
approach to Iraq by not siding with US "overthrow strategy," and even by continuously 
encouraging the Kurdish factions to make their peace with the regime. Ankara's 
November 1998 declaration, as a reaction to the Washington Protocol, and by 
subsequently bringing the northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders to Turkey and having them 
emphasize "the cooperation with central government" is an example of Turkey's firm 
approach. In addition, Turkey is still an important outlet for Iraqi exports and a source of 
imports and will remain so, no matter what happens to the regime in Baghdad. Thus, 
Hussein is unlikely to do anything at this stage, which would enrage Ankara to further 
embrace the US and to deny himself the profits. Nevertheless, he had upgraded its 
support for the PKK by allowing it to open offices in Baghdad-controlled southern Iraq in 
1997. This stance posed a threat to Turkey, raising questions in Turkey about the 
relations with Iraq after a possible consolidation of power of the Baghdad regime. 
Regarding the problem of water,165 recently Syria and Iraq, the traditionally two 
rival regimes of the region, jointly criticized Turkey for not sharing the water. 
Marginalized during the last decade through either war or strategic alliances, the 
rapprochement of these two traditionally rival regimes was normal but not enough to 
dictate Turkey on the water issue. They both complained that Ankara's ambitious 
program of dam building within the framework of the GAP on the Euphrates and the 
Tigris is a threat to their water supply. Ankara's reply was very simple: Downstream 
countries would receive only 50 cubic meters per second if there were no dams on the 
rivers. Turkey's dams allow the flow of more than 500 cubic meters per second but Syria 
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and Iraq use water inefficiently.166 Neither Syria nor Iraq, at present, seem to have the 
means to dictate Turkey on its water policies. 
E.       CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Turkey's mixed and somewhat contradictory policies and the 
dilemma it faced as a result of the Gulf War can be summarized as follows: 
The establishment of a Kurdish state as a result of the weakening 
of Saddam Hussein's regime has to be prevented because of its possible 
consequences of Turkey's own Kurdish population. But major Iraqi 
assaults on the Kurds to restore Iraqi rule in the area are also not welcome 
because of the likelihood of invoking large refugee movements toward 
Turkey. Kurdish autonomous political authority in northern Iraq also had 
to be kept weak enough to prevent the creation of a Kurdish state but 
strong enough to be able to prevent the PKK from getting a lasting 
foothold south of the Turkish border. American interests in keeping 
Saddam ineffective by enforcing the UN sanctions and UN led elimination 
of Iraq's potential of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) also had to be 
duly taken into account by Ankara. In addition, Turkish economic interests 
demanded that Ankara keep relatively continuous and harmonious 
relations with Baghdad. Finally, all elements could not hinder Turkey's 
maneuverability in following its security interests in its fight against the 
PKK terror in the southeast.167 
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IV.    TURKEY AND SYRIA 
In any given problem between states, there are at least two simultaneous games at 
work, one at the inter-state level and the other at the level of a state's domestic 
constituencies.168 In the case of the water dispute among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, 
satisfiying the agricultural sectors (domestic level) of these riparian countries, very much 
depended on the waters of Euphrates and Tigris, are undeniably important because of the 
following considerations: 
• To secure the loyalty of ethnic groups who live in the Euphrates and Tigris basins 
and who generally oppose the regimes they live under. 
• To be self-sufficient in food production not to depend on neigbor countries, which 
are traditionally perceived as hostile. 
In other words, a high level of dependency on Euphrates and Tigris water in solving 
crucial domestic concerns or sustaining the status quo has been the key factor that shapes 
the foreign policies of these countries. 
This chapter explores the factors that have shaped Turkish-Syrian relations to 
date. The main argument will be that the convergence of prospective solutions of crucial 
domestic concerns, either ethnic or economic, of these two neighbors on the water supply 
of the Euphrates has caused the water problem on the Euphrates basin. While Turkey has 
control of the water, Syria tried to counter Turkey's advantage by resorting to PKK 
terrorism. The chapter focuses on the technical issues of the water usage in the Euphrates 
basin and on how it became a political issue. It argues that Syria's over-demand and 
inefficient use of water due to political reasons belie the claims that the GAP aimed to cut 
the water of downstream riparian states. The underlying problem is Syria's desire to 
preserve the domestic status quo. If the GAP did not exist, the downstream riparian 
countries would get only 50 cubic meters per second compared to 800-900 m3/s of water 
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flow they recieved during the 1998-1999 period, well above the previously-agreed 
500m3/s.169 Second, the Syria-PKK linkage, which cost Turkey 30,000 lives and $85 
billion, will be discussed. Syria's intransigence on using the PKK card to control Turkey 
over water-sharing failed and produced no results except international humiliation of the 
Ba'ath regime in Damascus. This resulted from Turkey's assertiveness derived from post- 
Cold War conditions and the "strategic cooperation" with Israel to the extent that it 
threatened Syria with a military invasion. Finally, the post-October 1998 crisis relations 
will be discussed. The argument will be that Turkey is skeptic and wary because of Syria 
has not observed previous agreements between the two states. Turkey is eager to 
cooperate economically while still holding security issues as a priority. 
A.       THE WATER PROBLEM 
Turkey's original hydro-power producing damming projects were transformed 
into huge irrigation projects to elevate the economically deprived Kurdish population in 
the east and the southeast. Syria's authoritarian regime, which were previously satisfied 
with the hydro-electric dams, which regulated the flow and prevented the loss of the 
water, was suddenly alarmed. The reason for this concern was the anticipated reduction 
in the flow and quality of the water, which is immensely important for Syria's 
economically inefficient but politically lifesaving agricultural projects. 
The Southeast Anatolia Project is the largest and the most comprehensive regional 
development project ever implemented in Turkey. This project covers 9 provinces and 
approximately 10 percent of Turkey's land area, and will comprise 22 dams, 19 
hydroelectric power plants, and 2 huge irrigation tunnels on the Euphrates and the Tigris 
Rivers and their tributaries. When completed, it will increase the ratio of the total GAP 
area from 2.9 percent to 22.8 percent, accounting for 19 percent of all the economically 
irrigable area in Turkey. It will also increase Turkey's capacity for electric power 
169
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generation 70 to 80 percent, accounting for 22 percent of the country's economically 
viable hydroelectric power potential.170 
There are two reasons for the Turkish government's to design and to implement of 
such a large project in the Southeast Anatolia. First, Turkey's major water and land 
resources are located in Southeast Anatolia and Turkey aims to use these resources 
optimally for the local region as well as for Turkey as a whole. Second, Southeast 
Anatolia is the most backward region of Turkey. There are huge economic and social 
differences between this region and the rest of Turkey. To ease the social unrest of the 
Kurdish population of Turkey, the improvement of economic life and thereby integration 
of this region to the rest of Turkey has become the key state policy an indispensable tool 
for political parties. For these crucial reasons, the Southeast Anatolia Project is being 
developed on the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers and their tributaries, which originate in 
Turkey. 
The technical explanations of the water problem of Turkey-Syria and Iraq are 
enlightening. First of all, Turkey, contrary to popular belief, is not a "water-rich" country, 
rather it is a "water-stressed" country. Insufficient water availability, rapid population 
growth, and industrialization coupled with pollution have brought water scarcity to the 
forefront in the Middle East. Turkey is not an exception. However, in many studies, 
Turkey, with its snowy mountains and climate characterized by relatively abundant 
precipitation, is perceived as holding the key to the solution for the Middle East water 
shortages. Many observers consider the Euphrates as a regional water resource capable of 
overcoming water shortages in other Middle Eastern countries. This misperception makes 
assessing Turkey's water policy realistically in international forums difficult. 
In the water related theoretical literature there are commonly accepted limits, 
which were designated by hydrologists and experts, for water richness and water 
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shortages.171 If we assess Turkey's water resources according to these limits classifying 
Turkey as a "water-rich" country is unrealistic. 
According to experts, to be rich in water resources a country must have more than 
10,000 cubic meters (m3) per capita per year. Water supplies between 1,000-2,000 m3 per 
person/year make a country "water-stressed." When the figure drops below 1,000 m3, 
nations are considered "water-scarce." When a country becomes water-scarce, it means 
that the country experiences a severe constraint on food production, economic 
development, and ecological systems. 
With a population of 65 million, Turkey has an average annual renewable water 
potential of 205 billion m3, or approximately 3150 m3 per capita per year which is far 
below the 10,000 m3 mark necessary to make a country "water-rich." If we consider the 
economically usable water potential of the country (110 billion m3) the available per 
capita water per year goes down further and becomes equal to approximately 1700 m3, 
which makes Turkey "water-stressed."172 Furthermore, rapid population growth, 
industrialization and rising living standards were expected to decrease the renewable 
water potential per capita per year to 2500 m3 by the year 2000, and to 2000 m3 by 2010. 
If we look at the economically usable water potential per capita per year we see a more 
severe situation whereby the available water decreases to 1580 m3, or even less by the 
year 2000.173 As the data reveal, Turkey's water resources are far from abundant. Turkey 
has only about a fifth or sixth of the water available in water-rich regions such as North 
America, Latin America, the Caribbean and even western Europe. 
Out of 26 hydrologic basins in Turkey, the Euphrates and Tigris contain the 
largest volume of flow, with 28 percent of the nation's total surface flow. This 
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dependency explains Turkey desire to build more dams, hydroelectric power plants and 
other water-related construction to harness water both to produce energy and to irrigate 
lands on the Euphrates and Tigris basins than other river basins. 
However, this does not mean that Turkey has fully exploited these resources. 
Approximately 37 billion m3 of 110-billion m3 usable water is actually used. In other 
words, almost 33 percent of economically usable water is presently used. The remaining 
67 percent of economically usable water is what Turkey has not yet exploited owing to 
the financial constraints in allocation. Thus, what Turkey fails to use for the time being 
cannot truly be called excess water. 
Therefore, two inescapable consequences emerge: first, it appears unrealistic to 
classify Turkey as a water-rich country, second: the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers are 
the major water resources of Turkey which must be harnessed for the benefit of the 
region as well as for the entire country. Experts make another valid point regarding 
Turkey's water problem. This point involves the comparison of the water supply and the 
water usage of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Syria and Iraq emerge as over-demanding water 
users whereas Turkey conserves its water resources more efficiently (Table l).174 
174 "Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria and Iraq," Perceptions, Journal of International Affairs, 1:2 















































Table 1. Comparison of the Water Contribution from the Territories of the 
Riparian Countries to the Flow of Euphrates-Tigris Rivers with the Demands of the 
Riparian States' from These Basins. 
When we look at the demand side, we see that the demand of Syria and Iraq 
exceed their contribution to the water of the rivers. Syria wants 32 percent and Iraq wants 
65 percent of the Euphrates. Turkey plans to use about 52 percent of the Euphrates to 
which it contributes 89 percent. On the other hand, Syria and Iraq's demands on the Tigris 
are 5.4 percent and 92.5 percent respectively. Turkey plans to use 14.1 percent of the 
Tigris. The combined demands of the riparian countries thus amount to 148 percent of the 
total flow capacity of the Euphrates and 112 percent of that of the Tigris. When we look 
at these figures, seeing Syria and Iraq's argument as valid is quite difficult. The demands 
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of Iraq and Syria tacitly assume that Turkey releases all of the flow of the rivers without 
using any of it.175 
In fact, Turkey is more dependent on the waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates 
than Iraq and Syria. The other two countries can rely on their petroleum for energy 
production whereas Turkey, as an oil poor country, must rely on its water resources for 
energy. In addition, Turkey's dependence on these two rivers for irrigation is greater than 
that of Syria and Iraq. The area of land that Turkey can irrigate by using the waters of the 
Euphrates is far greater than comparable Syrian land; therefore, the proportionate need 
for water is larger. 
Comparing the quality and the area of lands to be irrigated by the riparians will 
clarify the issue. Irrigation is the largest water-consuming sector. Therefore, identifying 
the quality and the quantity of land to be irrigated becomes important. Land has been 
classified according to six land-use capability groups, of which Classes 1 through 3 are 
efficiently irrigable; Class 4 land is of marginal value. Yield can be obtained from Class 5 
land only with a considerable amount of investment. Class 6 lands are those that are 
impractical for agriculture.176 
The area that can be irrigated from the Euphrates in Syria is officially 640,000 
hectare (ha), of which merely 307,000 ha, or 48 percent, is designated class 1, class 2, or 
class 3 land. According to the general director of the Syrian Public Establishment for 
Utilization of the Euphrates River, 345,000 ha area can be irrigated.177 The area to be 
irrigated in the basin of the Khabur River, a major tributary of the Euphrates in the Syrian 
territory, is 137,000 ha. Thus the total area that can be irrigated in Syria from the 
Euphrates is 482,900 ha. However, the figures declared by Syria in official meetings are 
higher than these figures. Although the data from different sources reveals discrepancies 
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ranging from 320,000 to 800,000 hectares, it is still not comparable with the size of 
irrigable land of Turkey from the Euphrates. 
Comparable data from Iraq shows that it has a larger irrigable area than Syria. 
However, by means of the canals like Thartar Canal, which link the Euphrates and the 
Tigris, Iraq has the option of using the waters of the Tigris for irrigation, which would 
otherwise flow unused, instead of those of the Euphrates. Consequently, a transfer of 
water from the Tigris to the Euphrates can alleviate the water shortage of the latter. 
Furthermore, as is the case with Syria, most of the Iraq's land is low-lying and afflicted 
by deposits of gypsum and salt. A large portion of Iraqi territory rarely exceeds 300 m 
elevation; only 15 percent is as high as 450 m. This topography limits Iraq's ability to 
impound the waters of the Euphrates behind high dams; consequently, the water empties 
into the Gulf without being put to use.178 
In the Turkish territory, an area of nearly 2.5 million ha of Class 1, 2, and 3 land 
can be efficiently irrigated from the Euphrates and the Tigris within the scope of the 
Southeast Anatolia Project.179 The area Turkey plans to irrigate from the Euphrates and 
the Tigris within the scope of GAP is 1,693,027 ha.180 Thus the GAP schemes will 
irrigate only 61 percent of good quality land that would benefit from efficient irrigation. 
If we consider the land, which can be irrigated from the Euphrates, the percent decrease 
to 60. An area of 1,796,568 ha of Class 1, 2, and 3 land can be efficiently irrigated from 
the Euphrates, and not from the Tigris, within the scope of GAP. The area Turkey plans 
to irrigate from the Euphrates within the scope of GAP is 1,091,203 ha.181 
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Given these facts, comparing the surface areas to be irrigated by Syria and 
Turkey from the Euphrates would be useful. The good quality land, which, though 
irrigable from the Euphrates, is not included within the scope of GAP irrigation schemes, 
is 705,365 ha. In Syria, as indicated, the total area irrigable from the Euphrates is 482,000 
ha of which a good part is already under irrigation. As can be seen from these figures, 
Turkey's claim on water for irrigation is a strong and valid claim. Turkey has 
approximately four times more irrigable land than Syria, which can be irrigated from the 
Euphrates. If we take into account the entire basin (the Euphrates and the Tigris), we see 
that Turkey has almost seven times more irrigable land than Syria does. 
Even these very general data provide some bases for rational, reasonable, and 
optimal use of the Euphrates by the three countries. Ankara believes that Syria and Iraq 
do not use the proper technology to make the optional use of the available water, and 
consequently place exaggerated water demands on the flow. Syria, for the sake of barren 
land, which is not irrigable, wants to see the waters of the Euphrates flow through its 
territory, uselessly. Iraq demands a flow, which, for topographical reasons, it would be 
unable to control, and, wants to have Euphrates waters for areas that can be irrigated by 
the Tigris. A review of political motives behind these technically irrational approaches 
will explain why "water" is a problem among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. 
Syria's water supply almost solely depends on the Euphrates. Paradoxically, the 
users of the Euphrates water consist of small landowners who have been traditionally a 
source of unrest against the Alawi-dominated Syrian regime.182 The Syrian government 
has made efforts not only to provide cheap and abundant water to these small landowners 
but also to secure their loyalty through land reclamation policies. The support of these 
groups is crucial for sustaining and consolidating the new Bashar regime. Moreover, 
owing primarily to faulty technology chosen at the Taqba dam, any drop in the river flow, 
which is characteristic of the Euphrates River, especially during the summer months 
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results in cut-offs in irrigation water as well as energy production.183 Hence, every extra 
drop of Euphrates water Syria can get means more patronage to sustain the survival of the 
Damascus regime, without caring about the efficiency of water usage techniques. 
Iraq has similar domestic concerns in the usage of water, too. Securing the loyalty 
of the Shiites—60 percent of total Iraqi population—living in the Euphrates basin 
through policies, which develop their living standards, has long been a priority of the 
Iraqi administration.184 That is why it is not difficult to understand Saddam's enthusiasm 
to launch the complex Tigris-Euphrates diversion scheme. The Thartar Canal, which 
diverts the water of Tigris to Euphrates, is also a "double-edged flood weapon." While 
deliberately flooding large areas of agricultural land in the Amara region, the Thartar 
Canal dries the marshes of the south, thereby making the Marsh Arabs an easy target for 
Saddam Hussein's forces.185 Thus, manipulating the flow of the water, Saddam Hussein, 
like Syria, paying no attention to the rational use of water, intends to both buy the loyalty 
of the country's majority and to subdue the domestic opposition. 
In addition, the tendency of all these downstream riparian states to use water as a 
domestic ideological tool also exacerbates the problem. 
Water disputes may be handy to politicians in personifying real or 
perceived outside threats in the domestic context, and in this way serve to 
unite the society against "foreign enemies" and mobilize support for the 
government.186 
Indeed, the water issue has been effectively used in projecting the developmental needs in 
each country as an indispensable part of independent, autonomous development. 
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Therefore, given the data and the political considerations, which inflict 
maximalist positions on autocratic Syrian and Iraq regimes about the water usage, of the 
riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, the regime types of Turkey's southern neighbors 
appear as the source of the problem. Whereas Turkey aims to integrate its not only 
economically underdeveloped but also mostly Kurdish populated southeast region by its 
efficient GAP project targeting to use only 44 percent of its contribution to this basin, 
Iraqi and Syrian regimes consider their survival as their priority no matter what it takes: 
irrational and inefficient irrigation projects that over-demand the waters of the basin. 
Hence, it is not difficult to understand why these regimes oppose Turkey's purely 
technical and rational "Three-Staged Plan," which suggests the allocation of water 
resources based on systematic assessment of water needs for irrigation of all parties, 
perceiving it as an infringement in their domestic affairs. Indeed, except for Syria's and 
Iraq's ideological make-ups, there is no reason why food self-sufficiency policies, which 
essentially lead to ineffective allocation of resources, cannot be replaced by policies of 
food interdependence and food trade. However, this is perceived by Damascus and 
Baghdad as a Turkish straitjacket because, as one Turkish official said, "in this region 
interdependence is understood as the opposite of independence."187 Considering it will 
take a long time until these regimes are replaced with better ones, Turkey is trying to 
install some confidence building measures that may help remove the ideological aspects 
of the dispute, carrying the issue from the rhetoric of national unity and national security 
to one of cooperation and the effective use of water. 
To solve the water scarcity problem, Turkey has offered the "Three-Staged Plan 
for Optimum, Equitable, and Reasonable Utilization of the Transboundary Watercources 
of the Euphrates Basin."188 The first stage involved the inventory studies for water 
resources where all sides exchange data on gauging stations, flows, and quality of water. 
The second stage referred to the inventory studies for land sources where data on land 
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classification, soil conditions for projects planned or under construction and operation, 
and drainage conditions are all exchanged among the three riparian states. The final stage 
is the evaluation of water and land resources, which includes activities that range from 
determining optimal irrigation types to determining water consumption and evaluating 
the economic viability of the planned project. In other words, the plan foresees 
establishing a purely technical water management regime that will rely on scientific data 
in order to prevent the waste of already scarce water resources. 
Nevertheless, the downstream riparian states' different approach to the issue of 
sovereignty over water, their resort to power politics and subversive means have blocked 
any reconciliatory attempts to negotiate on this plan. They do not want the emergence of 
Turkey as a regional power, which controls the water, which is very decisive for their 
regime's survival, and which will export an increasing amount of agricultural products 
and hydro-energy to the Arabs, and thereby make them dependent on Turkey by 
developing huge economic and energy potential in the GAP area. 
Whereas Ankara defines the Euphrates-Tigris river system and even the Orontes 
river as "transboundary system," rejecting co-sovereignty, Baghdad and Damascus call it 
"international water," thus claiming their share. While Turkey claims sovereign rights 
over the Euphrates and Tigris on the basis of being the upstream country, according to the 
Harmon Doctrine, Syria and Iraq argue that all riparian states should have equal rights 
over international water, according to Prior Appropriation Doctrine.189 However, Syria 
contradicts itself by not applying the same doctrine in its other water disputes with Israel, 
with Iraq and with Turkey (about the Orontos [Asi] River which flows from Syria to 
Mediterranean through Turkey's Hatay province). For example, when Syria completes 
the building of two dams on the Asi River, the available portion of 1.2 billion m3 Asi 
water for Hatay's farmers will decrease from 120 million m3 to 25 million m3 (from 10 
percent to 2 percent), a figure incomparable with Turkey's release of 50 billion of the 75 
billion m3 of Euphrates-Tigris water to downstream countries. This picture portrays how 
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Syria contradicts its own water-sharing formula. Turkey also argues that both rivers 
should be seen as a single water system since both rivers join before reaching the Persian 
Gulf and since Iraq has developed the Thartar Canal project transferring the waters of the 
Tigris to the Euphrates. Syria and Iraq, however, object to such interpretation, arguing 
that each river should be discussed separately. 
B.        SYRIA-PKK LINKAGE 
While there is no law binding Turkey internationally on the water issue, Turkey 
granted an annual flow of a minimum 500 m3/s water into Syria in a 1987 protocol. But, 
there are internationally accepted laws and norms about state-sponsored terrorism and the 
observance of bilateral agreements, especially on security issues. That brings us to the 
connection between the Syrian regime and its measures to pressure Turkey: to play the 
terrorism card. Syria, sponsoring international terrorism—against either Israel or 
Turkey—deliberately fits the definition of what is called a "rogue state." As mentioned 
early, Syria, as a rogue state, justifies any method that will sustain the domestic status 
quo—the regime survival. Thus, previously the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation 
of Armenia (ASALA) terrorism,190 later PKK terrorism, in this consideration, have been 
a strong leverage for Syrian Ba'ath regime to force Turkey to accept the Syrian terms on 
the water issue. 
However, Turkey, in response, has reflected its traditional foreign policy 
approach and rejected basing its cooperation of the Euphrates water on an exchange of 
water concessions and halting of support for the PKK. Submitting such a pressure would 
mean the acceptance of the use of international terrorism in the bilateral disputes of the 
states and cast a shadow on the legitimacy of the Turkish state. Turkey, thus, has 
conditioned a security agreement that would stop PKK terrorism before any negotiations 
for the water. Such agreements, which bind Syria to cease any kind of support for the 
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PKK and to extradite the PKK and its leader, were signed by Damascus four times—in 
1983, 1987, 1992, and again in 1993. Nevertheless, Syrian leadership did not abandon 
resorting to the PKK, and even increased its support for it when the northern Iraq power 
vacuum provided the PKK with moreroom to maneuver in the post-Gulf War era. 
The PKK has threatened Turkey's national unity and territorial integrity in a more 
direct and dangerous way than the Soviet Union did in the course of more than 40 years 
of the Cold War. The PKK has its roots both inside and outside the country. Inside it 
exploited Turkey's economically underdeveloped southeast region in an effort to carve 
out an independent Kurdish state. It was not supported by the bulk of the Kurdish 
population, most of which was concentrated in the big cities of Turkey's west. Outside 
Turkey, the PKK was supported by regional neighbors in various degrees to extract 
various concessions from the Turkish state. Turkish civilian and military officials 
believed that coping with the domestic economic reasons for the PKK's existence would 
be easier once it was forced to abandon the armed struggle against the government. The 
Turkish Armed Forces had demonstrated growing effectiveness in the 1990s in reducing 
the fighting ability of the PKK and in restoring order in the southeastern cities, but this 
success had come at a high cost: 30,000 military and civilian casualties (including the 
elderly and children) and $86 billion, which approximated Turkey's entire external 
debt.191 The government could not achieve lasting success unless the PKK's outside 
support was curtailed. 
Syria, as the primary supporter of the PKK, has always been the focal point in 
Turkish post-Cold War strategy. Syria's support for the PKK differed from that provided 
by the other regional states. From the time that Abdullah Ocalan first settled there in 
1979192 Syria provided financial, military, and logistical support to the PKK, hosting its 
headquarters and training camps. It helped recruit personnel and exerted influence on 
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PKK strategy and tactics.193 According to Turkish intelligence officials, Damascus also 
provided 80 percent of the basic necessities of the PKK camps functioning in northern 
Iraq. 194 
In 1987, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal himself went to Damascus to conduct 
negotiations for a security and water protocol. The 1987 protocol however resulted in 
only a temporary assuaging of differences. The Syrians sent terrorist leader Abdullah 
Ocalan temporarily to the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon and soon after the protocol was 
signed allowed him to meet with Soviet officials in Damascus.195 Ankara and Damascus 
were allied temporarily in the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq. Both countries benefited 
from the alliance, although it did nothing to resolve the differences between them 
concerning the PKK and water. But the Gulf War provided the environment for the first 
significant security protocol between the two capitals. In April 1992, top Turkish officials 
headed by Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin made their way south to negotiate with 
President Hafiz al-Asad, Foreign Minister Faruk Sharaa and top Syrian military officials. 
The security agreement of April 1992 is worthy of detailed examination: 1) both 
countries would cooperate against terrorism, "including its international form," and 
prevent terrorists from crossing from one country to the other; 2) neither country would 
permit any organization outlawed by the other to organize, train or make propaganda, and 
any captured member of an outlawed organization would be returned; 3) both would 
exchange information regarding outlawed organizations; 4) both would undertake 
measures to prevent infiltration and smuggling; and 5) both would take measures to 
prevent "unnecessary" armed incidents on their borders.196 However, this security 
agreement defused the tension between the two countries but was short-lived. After a 
193
 "Special Report" on Syria's support for the PKK prepared and submitted for the consideration of the 
Turkish National Security Council by Turkish intelligence units, Hurriyet, 8 October 1998. 
194
 Cumhuriyet, 2 November 1998. 
195
 Ismet G. Imset, The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (1973-1992) (Ankara: The 
Turkish Daily News Publications, 1992), p. 174. 
196
 Robert Olson, "Turkey-Syria Relations since the Gulf War: Kurds and Water," Middle East Policy, 5:2 
(May 1997), p. 171. 
89 
brief respite, PKK activities emanating from Syria resumed with attacks on targets in 
Turkey. On November 1993, the two countries signed another security protocol, 
regarding the PKK and other "terrorists," and Syrian high ranking officials and Syrian 
media made statements such as, "Syria would not be a thoroughfare for those who are 
against Turkey's interests," and "Syria had begun to ban the PKK on President Asad's 
orders." This rhetoric delighted Turkey for a short time, but Syrian's reluctance to fulfill 
these promises further infuriated Turkish authorities in Ankara.197 
In the security meetings that followed between Turkey, Syria, and Iran, which 
aimed to illustrate the determination of these states on the preservation of Iraq's territorial 
integrity, Syria, as well as Iran, did not show the same enthusiasm in withdrawing their 
support from the PKK. Turkish officials emphasized they would not pursue earnest 
negotiations on the water question until Syria assured them that they would no longer 
support PKK activities or shelter Abdullah Ocalan. Until an agreement was reached, 
Ankara stressed that it would be difficult to move forward on other problems such as the 
distribution of the Asi (Orontes) River (al-Asi in Arabic), which flows through Syria 
before entering Turkey's Hatay province. The Turks wanted an agreement that would 
prohibit the Syrians from severely restricting the Asi's flow before it enters Hatay. 
Ankara also indicated that it sought indemnification for property in Syria belonging to 
Turkish citizens, some cases of which date prior to World War I.198 
On December 1994, Turkey showed its eagerness for friendly relations and 
economic cooperation one more time by sending a 100-person delegation to Damascus to 
engage in trade discussions. Syria's response was absurd: Syrian's foreign minister stated 
that Syria was interested in improving trade relations if Syria's $300 million trade deficit 
with Turkey could be reduced. Ankara's motive for such an attempt was to prepare itself 
for a post-Syrian-Israeli peace agreement environment in which Syria would cease its 
support for the PKK in an effort to remove its name from the list of "terrorist states." 
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Nevertheless, not only did Syria continue supporting the PKK, but it also tried to tempt 
the US and Israel to assert concessions from Turkish water for Syria in exchange of 
Golan waters Israel had confiscated. Ankara bluntly rejected such a formula that would 
encroach on Turkish sovereignty. 
By mid-summer of 1995, reports that the PKK was attempting to establish an 
organizational structure in Hatay, a Turkish province, which borders Syria, and which 
Damascus has irredentist claims, once again soured what seemed to be improving 
relations. In 1939, with Syria under French mandate, Paris granted then northern Syrian 
Alexandretta independence as a prelude to a referendum in which—as expected— 
Alexandrettans opted to join Turkey. France took the action as enticement to Turkish 
neutrality in its brewing war with Germany.199 To this day, Syria claims sovereignty over 
Hatay. 
The PKK tried to infiltrate the Cukurova Plain by using the road from Lataqiya in 
Syria to Samadag, a village in the Amanus mountains in Hatay.200 Relations were further 
strained when Damascus hosted high-ranking German intelligence officers who met with 
Ocalan to discuss the PKK demonstrations in Germany, which caused intolerable 
disorder, and PPK involvement in drug trafficking.201 For his part, Ocalan stressed his 
desire for Germany to recognize the PKK as a legitimate entity and to stop characterizing 
it as a terrorist organization. Thus, Damascus was the site of negotiations which, if 
implemented, would prove detrimental to Turkey's policy of delegitimizing the PKK by 
referring to it as a terrorist organization. 
Syria also put pressure on Turkey by bringing the water issue into the 
international sphere, using historical Arab solidarity against Turkey (and the Ottomans), 
international law, and the special position of Syria in the peace process. The Arab League 
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and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have called upon Turkey to be more 
cooperative toward Syria and Iraq on the water issue. For example, the late 1995 
Damascus Declaration by six GCC countries plus Syria and Egypt strongly criticized 
Ankara's intention to build another dam at Biricik on the Turkish-Syrian border as a part 
of the GAP and complained that water coming from Turkey was heavily polluted.202 
Ankara denied these charges, and again pointed to PKK terrorism to which Syria 
resorted. This tactic of Syria's had also been the reason why Turkey could not get World 
Bank credit for the GAP development project and had had to use its own resources. Still 
another component of Syrian policy was strategic cooperation with neighbors who had 
similar motivations. In 1995, Syria agreed to permit the Greek Air Force to land at Syrian 
air bases.203 
These developments consumed Turkish patience and contributed to the 
toughening of the Turkish stance toward the Arab world in general and Syria in 
particular. In a memorandum issued on January 23, 1996, Turkey charged Syria with 
having engaged in de facto aggression by supporting the PKK and stressed that, 
according to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, Turkey was entitled to adopt self-defense 
measures against Syria.204 Ankara demanded that Syria extradite Abdullah Ocalan. 
While Turkey had previously clerified its unhappiness with Damascus' sheltering of the 
PKK leader, this marked the first time that it publicly announced its demand. Syria's 
irresponsive stance to the Turkish calls became the straw that broke the camel's back and 
Turkey suspended all relations with Syria in 1996. 
Ankara made this demand at a time when Syria and Israel were about to cut a 
peace deal, which would have an adverse impact on Turkish national security. If 
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succeeded, the deal would free Syria from its debacle in the south and allow it to focus on 
the north more by deploying its forces along its border with Turkey, thereby posing an 
additional threat to Turkey. Its implication on Turkish national security, however, would 
be far worse, when a possible negative US and Europe attitude toward Turkey about the 
water issue in a post-peace era was considered. Also, that would mean Turkey would be 
left with unfair human rights criticism in its dealing with PKK terrorism, while Syria 
would still enjoy supporting the PKK, and would succeed in removing its name from the 
US "terrorist states" list in exchange for its signature on the peace deal.205 This posture 
prompted Turkey to distract Israel from the peace negotiations with Syria by offering Tel 
Aviv an irrefutable military cooperation. 
The signing of the February 1996 "Military Training and Cooperation 
Agreement" and later "Military Defense Industry Agreements" between Turkey and 
Israel was a huge blow to Syria's strategic position as well as Iraq's and Iran's positions 
in the Middle East. Ankara, securing this cooperation, ranging from exchange of military 
personnel and air spaces for training to intelligence cooperation and co-production or 
upgrade of strategically important weapons system, changed the balance structure of the 
Middle East in its favor. In so doing, it raised the pressure on Syria by raising Turkey's 
geo-strategic significance to the West, especially to the US. The support of the United 
States and the pro-Israeli lobby in the US to this new "strategic cooperation" meant the 
tide turned favoring and making Ankara the strongest capital of the Middle East. Hence, 
the strategic cooperation heightened Ankara's assertiveness, which already demonstrated 
itself in the cross-border operations in northern Iraq against the PKK bases, and in its 
connections with the Kurdish leaders of northern Iraq. Regionally, this cooperation 
served to enhance Turkey's defense posture, to deter Syria from supporting the PKK and 
the Arab countries from supporting Syria, and to enable Ankara to contribute more to the 
Palestinian-Israel peace process through enhanced relations with Israel and continuing 
support for the Palestinian cause.206 
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Despite strained relations with Syria and the Arab world in the wake of Turkish- 
Israeli military cooperation, Turkey made a last attempt to use diplomacy to mitigate the 
tension. In early 1998, Turkey posed a peace initiative for the Middle East aimed at 
regional cooperation for stability. The head of the Middle East Department at the Turkish 
Foreign Affairs Ministry, Ambassador Aykut Cetirge, visited Damascus in February 1998 
in an attempt to re-start the dialogue that had been cut off since early 1996.207 This move 
was reciprocated by the visit of Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Adnan Omran to Ankara 
in July of the same year. These contacts came to nothing.208 The Turkish side later 
pointed to this diplomatic failure as justifying Turkey's resort to gunboat diplomacy, 
which lasted with the October 1998 crisis successfully.209 
There are significant factors that led to Turkey's "flexible response" strategy that 
would gradually escalate the crisis so long as Syria declined to respond to Turkey's 
demands.210 First is the frustration Turkish authorities feel with Syrians' indifference to 
the Turkish call for the end of Syrian support for the PKK, as previously mentioned. This 
frustration swelled into the public sector in 1998 when Sirri Sakik, a well-known PKK 
leader, revealed the Syrian connection with the PKK in the official interrogations.211 
A second factor that frustrated Turkey was , the September 1998 Washington 
Protocol. This protocol prompted Turkish military and civilian elites to take action 
because this protocol deliberately designed the realization of Turkish fears: a blue print 
for a viable Kurdish state and prevention of Turkish cross-border military operations into 
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northern Iraq to destroy the PKK camps.212 This meant that previous Turkish efforts to 
control the situation in northern Iraq were now jeopardized by the Washington 
agreement. According to statements made by Turkish intelligence officers at the time, 
forcing Syria to cease support to the PKK became a perceived necessity to neutralize the 
militants there before they became more active thanks to the help provided by the 
Washington accord.213 
A third element deepened Turkish frustration. If the Washington agreement was 
the trigger, the increasing disappointment among the Turkish military with the perceived 
failure of the Turkish Foreign Ministry to launch an effective international campaign 
against Syria was the finger that pulled it.214 The Turkish military's active role in foreign 
policy became much more pronounced during the REFAHYOL (Welfare Party-True Path 
Party Coalition) government, in 1996-97, under the Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin 
Erbakan. During this period a National Security Council Memorandum of February 28, 
1997, warned the Erbakan government of "sanctions" if it failed to take effective 
measures against "separatist and fundamentalist" activities in Turkey.215 At the time, the 
Turkish Armed Forces felt that the Foreign Ministry was not active enough in initiating 
an international campaign to deny supporters of the PKK a free hand.216 
The "flexible strategy" was about military coercion without the direct application 
of force. The crisis that it started was perceived with equal apprehension both within the 
region and outside. It was feared that if Turkey resorted to military force against Syria, 
the bilateral crisis could turn into an Arab-Turkish one, further exacerbating tensions 
caused by the stalling of the Arab-Israeli peace process. It was precisely for this reason 
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that Turkey had restrained itself for more than ten years. However, Turkey's strategy in 
its initial stage involved explaining its case before international bodies such as the U.N. 
Security Council, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the 
Arab League. If this move did not generate international pressure on Syria to stop 
supporting the PKK, then diplomacy would give way to military escalation ranging from 
the harassing of Syrian ships in the Mediterranean to the aerial bombing of key targets in 
Syria.217 The fact that the Turkish government did not go before the Grand National 
Assembly (GNA) to ask permission to use force against Syria suggests that it still 
preferred other options. While quite threatening, Turkish public statements 
simultaneously emphasized Turkey's willingness to establish normal relations as soon as 
Syria agreed to cease support of the PKK.218 
In what appeared to be a calculated move, strong verbal warnings to Syria from 
high-ranking Turkish military and civilian officials to the effect that Turkey was running 
out of patience concerning the support for the PKK suddenly escalated the tension 
between the two countries. A crisis ensued when Turkey began massing troops along the 
border and Syria retaliated, following the blunt statement made by Turkish Chief of Staff 
General Huseyin Kivrikoglu to the effect that Turkey was engaged in an "undeclared 
war" with Syria over its support of PKK terrorism.219 
This policy was successful in gradually influencing the Syrian leadership. 
Divisions within the Syrian cabinet and among different sectors of the Syrian military 
became public knowledge. Assad apparently decided that he could not take on the Turks. 
As Turkish threats intensified, Syria's rhetoric suddenly cooled off. Damascus 
emphasized the need for "discussions." With its troops overwhelmingly based in Lebanon 
and the Golan, Syria never even reinforced its lightly policed Turkish border. It is likely 
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that Egyptian President Husni Mubarak—who visited Damascus and Ankara to mediate, 
and hosted Assad in Cairo shortly thereafter—helped convince the Syrian president that 
the Turks were serious about resorting to military action. Hafiz al-Asad soon sent Turkey 
an unwritten message via Iranian Foreign Minister Kemal Kharrazi to the effect that 
Syria had already begun arresting PKK militants and would expel them along with 
Ocalan without publicizing the event.220 
The senior bureaucrats of the two sides met in Adana, Turkey, on October 19 and 
20. On October 20, Premier Yilmaz announced that Ocalan was no longer in 
Damascus.221 Turkey insisted that the only topic on the agenda would be Syrian support 
for terrorism, and the October 20 agreement reflected that viewpoint.222 Contrary to the 
conventional expectation that Turkey would decrease the flow of water into Syria during 
the crisis, Syria was receiving 850 m3 of water per second on average, which was 150m3 
more than what Syria had preciously claimed: 700m3.223 In the agreement Damascus 
specifically pledged to prevent, on Syrian territory, PKK propaganda activities, the 
supply of weapons and logistical and financial support to the PKK, PKK commercial 
activities, the establishment of PKK camps and "other PKK facilities for training and 
shelter, entry of PKK members or their transit to third countries, and the presence of PKK 
leader Ocalan.224 
The agreement included a clause, which said that the parties "agreed to establish 
certain mechanisms so that the measures (that are supposed to be taken by Syria against 
the PKK)  will  be  implemented in  an  effective  and  transparent  way."225  These 
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"mechanisms," which included establishing a hotline between the two countries and the 
appointment of two (later to be increased to four) special officials to each other's 
diplomatic representations, were in place within ten days of the conclusion of the 
agreement.226 The mechanisms also included the holding of a tripartite security meeting 
with Lebanon to cooperate against the PKK and to establish a system for evaluating the 
effectiveness of confidence-building measures proposed by the Turkish side. According 
to the Adana agreement, the Syrian negotiating team pledged to submit this Turkish 
proposal for the approval of Syrian authorities. The agreement reportedly concerned an 
on-site inspection by the Turks. The Syrians had been sensitive about this on-site 
inspection from the beginning.227 
Though it seemed to many observers that Syria surrendered and was fulfilling its 
commitments, Turkish authorities reacted cautiously to the agreement, saying Ankara 
would monitor compliance and respond accordingly. Not surprisingly, Syria tried to 
achieve a reciprocal victory over the water issue by defying the international community. 
Shortly after the Syrian concessions during the October crisis, the Syrian side requested 
that joint committee meetings be renewed (suspended by Turkey on the grounds that 
Syria must first cooperate on the terrorism question) and that experts from Turkey and 
Syria broach "security, water, and other political issues."228 Until the end of 1998, 
Turkey has not answered these Syrian calls on the grounds that since expelling Ocalan, 
the Syrian side has evaded its general responsibilities under the Adana protocol 
(reportedly in implementing the "technical details.") The Turkish side remained skeptical 
on the implementation since Syria had signed a very similar protocol in 1993. So much 
similar that the same Ambassador who had signed the 1993 protocol, signed the 1998 
protocol.229 If the Turkish leaders were to conclude that Syria, having expelled Ocalan to 
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avert Turkish military intervention, is inclined to backslide, possibly on the grounds that 
Turkey is not reciprocating on water, the crisis could reignite. 
Though Turkey was satisfied with the expulsion of Ocalan from Syria, its 
relations with West European countries have become particularly tense in the wake of the 
capture of Ocalan in Italy. After their meeting on November 27, 1998, the prime 
ministers of Italy and Germany announced that they had decided to lead an all-European 
initiative to "find a political settlement" to Turkey's Kurdish problem.230 Their 
announcement created an uproar in Turkey. Later, the U.S. Ambassador to Rome 
declared that the United States was in favor of solving the Kurdish issue in the 
international arena.231 Turkish leaders stated that these announcements amounted to 
gross interference in Turkey's internal affairs, touching on a life-and-death question for 
Turkey. These developments came as no surprise since the differences of approach and 
solution to the Kurdish issue between Turkey and the West have been a continuing source 
of tension.232 
Despite the crisis and the lingering skepticism, Turkish-Syrian relations have 
largely stabilized since 1998. In March 1999, for instance, the two sides agreed to open 
borders to allow the families on both sides to unite during the religious festivities.233 In 
May 2000 Turkish Ministry of State, Recep Onal, was joined by some 100 businessmen 
and state officials on his visit to Damascus to restart the Fourth Joint Economic Council, 
which had been completely inactive for the prior 12 years.234 Ironically, despite the 
tensions, Turkish-Syrian profits from trade, though low for neighboring countries, had 
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still been around $600 million per year.235 In 2000, Syria was the second largest market 
of GAP exported goods with $33.3 million.236 On May 9, 2001, Syrian Transportation 
Minister Makram Obeid visited Turkey on an official invitation made by Turkish 
Transportation Minister Enis Oksuz to develop cooperation on the land, air, and railway 
transportation between the two countries.237 
The two sides are seeking a partnership, initially began by Turkish insistence, 
with security issues as exemplified in the developments of 2001. Early in 2001, Turkish 
Interior Minister Saadettin Tantan and his Syrian counterpart signed agreements to 
cooperate against terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, and counterfeiting.238 
On 20 April 2001, in the visit of General Resart Turgutlu to Damascus, the two states 
held preparation meetings for the first time for a military cooperation agreement, which 
envisions mutual visits by commanders, joint training and invitations to exercises.239 
Officials said Turkey has even proposed to Syria projects to develop defensive systems 
jointly to increase border surveillance. 
Its PKK advantage gone, Syria, is no more a significant threat to Turkey. Though 
Syria has the largest ballistic missile arsenal, most of them chemical, in the Middle 
East,240 Turkish military planning does not perceive this as a serious threat at the 
moment considering Syrian Ba'ath regime's prudence to preserve the status quo, its more 
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serious dispute against the "Arab enemy" Israel, and the obvious imbalance of powers 
created by Turkish-Israeli military cooperation against Syria since the mid-1990s. Still, 
though mostly against Iraq, the anti-ballistic missile system program Turkey has been 
developing is a counter-measure to ward off this possible threat. 
C.       CONCLUSION 
Convergence of prospective solutions of crucial domestic concerns, either ethnic 
or economic, of Syria and Turkey on the Euphrates water has generated the so-called 
water problem on the Euphrates basin. While Turkey has control of the water, Syria has 
tried to counter Turkey's advantage by resorting to PKK terrorism. 
Over-demand and inefficient use of water by Syria due to political reasons, belie 
the claims that the GAP aimed to cut the water of downstream riparian states and reveal 
that the underlying problem is Syria's hope to preserve their domestic status quo. If the 
GAP did not exist, the downstream riparian countries would get only 50 cubic meters of 
water per second compared to 800-900 m3/s of water flow they recieved during 1998- 
1999 period, well above the previously-agreed 500m3/s. Indeed, except for Syria's and 
Iraq's ideology, no reason exist why food self-sufficiency policies, which essentially lead 
to ineffective allocation of resources, cannot be replaced by policies of food 
interdependence and food trade. However, this is perceived by Damascus as a Turkish 
straitjacket because, as one Turkish official said, "in this region interdependence is 
understood as the opposite of independence."241 
The Syria-PKK linkage cost Turkey 30,000 lives and $85 billion. Syria's 
intransigence on using the PKK card to dictate Turkey's actions regarding the water- 
sharing issue failed and produced no results except international humiliation of the Ba'ath 
regime in Damascus. This resulted from Turkey's assertiveness derived from the post- 
Cold War conditions and the "strategic cooperation" with Israel to the extent that Turkey 
threatened Syria with a military invasion. Turkey's flexible strategy achieved their 
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needed results by escalating the tension between Turkey and Syria to October 1998 crisis 
where Hafiz Asad could not risk further. Though satisfied, the Turkish side was still 
skeptical about the implementation of the October 20 agreement. There Syria was forced 
to give the same promises it did in the 1992 and 1993 security agreements. Turkey 
demonstrated this skepticism by holding security issues as priority before any 
cooperation since the signing of the 1998 agreement. 
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V.      TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS 
The Turkish-Israeli cooperation has been one of the most important factors that 
changed the political landscape of the Middle East in the post-Cold War era. The two 
military agreements concluded in 1996 profoundly transformed the regional balances. 
Surely, as stated in the "alliance theory," the cooperation between Turkey and Israel was 
born out of the mutual need to balance external threats due to these two countries' 
geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions.242 That is why we 
can call it a "strategic cooperation," without missing the significant volume of its 
economic and cultural aspects. However, it would not be wrong to claim that global 
factors played a more important role than regional parameters in determining the pattern 
Turkey would pursue to achieve its national interests in the Middle East. The changing 
Western perception of Turkey following the end of the Cold War created Turkish fears of 
marginalization and consequently prompted Turkey to follow a more active and assertive 
policy in the Middle East. As a result, to counter the challenges from the Middle East and 
the decline of its Western image, which left Turkey alone in dealing with its regional 
security problems, Turkey appealed to the Israeli option. 
This paper will explore the factors that brought Turkey and Israel under a 
military, as well as economic, strategic partnership. The main argument will be that 
behind the emergence of close ties between the two states in the 1990s are Turkey's deep 
strategic concerns regarding its Middle Eastern security and the Western attitude toward 
these concerns as the main motives. Israel's benefits are also significant but are 
responsive outcomes of Turkish calls for cooperation, which at one point enticed Israel to 
gain more political leverage, reducing the importance of a deal with Syria to secondary. 
The first section—History of Relations—of this chapter reveals that the cooperation 
between Turkey and Israel is not surprising given the history of their relationship and 
their socio-political similarities. In the second section, I discuss Turkey's global 
considerations—attitude of the West toward Turkey—that forced Turkey to initiate a 
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"Strategie cooperation" in the post-Gulf War era. An analysis of Turkey's regional 
concerns in initiating such cooperation and the changes in both Israel and Turkey's 
military doctrines resulting from the 1996 military cooperation is the focus of the third 
section. The benefits offered by civilian aspect of the cooperation since the beginning of 
1990s will be the subsequent issue to discuss. The final contention will be that Turkey 
was the main reason for such cooperation and the two military agreements in 1996 are the 
backbones of this cooperation, despite almost 20 other economic, cultural, trade, 
agriculture agreements, in that they unprecedentedly transformed the regional balance 
structure in favor of Turkey and Israel. 
A.       HISTORY OF RELATIONS 
The history of Turkish-Israeli relations differs from the European-Jewish 
community and Arab-Jewish (Israel) relations with one distinct feature: "Jews never 
suffered persecution in Turkey, no Jewish blood has ever been spilled by the Turks."243 
Historical relations between Turks and Jews date back to 15th century. In 1492, Sultan 
Beyazid II welcomed the Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain. On that occasion, Sultan 
Beyazid II stated: "The Catholic monarch Ferdinand was considered as wise since he 
impoverished his country with the expulsion of the Jews and enriched ours."244 The Jews 
in the Ottoman State enjoyed special recognition as the third millet along with Armenians 
and Orthodox Christians, and this permitted them to preserve and to continue their culture 
to the present. Ataturk, in the new Turkish Republic, strongly opposed any manifestation 
of racism or anti-Semitism and Turkey has been treating its Jews on an equal footing with 
other citizens. Ataturk's fierce and determined reaction in the face of an attempt by an 
anti-Semitic group, in the summer of 1934, to force Jews out of several places in Thrace 
was acknowledged with praise by the Turkish Jewish community.245 He welcomed 
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thirty-five Jewish professors from Nazi Germany and offered them the opportunity to 
resume their academic work at Turkish universities. Later, the Istanbul offices of the 
Jewish Agency were allowed to organize the emigration to Palestine-both the local 
community and those in transit from Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Bulgaria. Today, there is an 
estimated 120,000 Turkish Jews in the coastal city of Bat Yam as a result of this 
emigration and this community is quite active as a lobby on Turkey's behalf because their 
sense of Turkish identity is very important to them.246 There are approximately 24,000 
Jewish Turks predominantly concentrated in Istanbul and very influential thanks to their 
wealth and historically prominent position in commercial life. More interesting, 
politicians like "the president, Yitzhak Ben Zvi, the prime minister, David Ben Gurion, 
and the foreign minister, Moshe Share«,"247 studied in Turkey and within the Israeli elite 
Ataturk is admired as an important historical figure.248 
Both Turkey and Israel have a pro-Western foreign policy orientation and 
commitment to democracy and secularism and similar economic interests. In addition, the 
"common sense of otherness"249 in a region dominated by Arabs and non-democratic 
regimes, and where "they (Turkey and Israel) feel profoundly ill at ease,"250 naturally 
helps these countries maintain friendly relations. However, responsive to regional and 
global developments, the relations between Turkey and Israel fluctuated historically 
between intense cooperation and almost imperceptible interaction, but never ended. 
Relations between the two countries could be divided into two periods. The first, from 
1948 to the early 1980s, comprised generally covert links, fluctuating in volume, military 
and intelligence oriented in nature. The second era, since the early 1980s, has included an 
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astounding expansion of connections-military, economic, and civilian. These ties then 
reached to unknown heights in 1996. 
It was mainly due to US pressure that Ankara granted, in March 1949, de facto 
recognition to the state of Israel. Also, it would be plausible to discern that Turkish elites' 
perception of Israel as an example of a modern and Western state and their admiration for 
the strength demonstrated during the 1948 War positively influenced Ankara.251 In short, 
the Turkish policymakers saw the recognition of Israel as further demonstration of 
Turkey's Westernness and in clear opposition to the ostensibly neutralist position adopted 
by the Arab states in the East-West conflict. 
Israelis, on their part, immediately showed their enthusiasm, especially to 
convince Turks that Israel was not "red (communist),"252 in further developing bilateral 
ties with Turkey as part of the "periphery strategy"—devised by David Ben Gurion—in 
an effort to develop friends beyond the "Arab fence." However, Ankara met the Israeli 
attempts with substantial ambivalence throughout most of the 1950s because of the task 
of compelleing the Arab countries to adhere to regional defense pacts against the Soviet 
Union, given by the US and Great Britain in exchange for Turkey's membership in 
NATO. 253 Ankara did not hesitate to stress repeatedly the limitations of its ties with 
Israel and its refusal to issue a declaration of support for Israel's territorial integrity and 
sovereignty. Turkey acted in accordance with the US during and after the Suez war and 
reduced its diplomatic relations to the lowest level to save the image of the Baghdad Pact 
(1955) in the eyes of the Arab world. 
In 1958 when Turkey and Israel really embarked on the beginning of a fluctuating 
but never-ending alliance. Although what had been envisioned could not be realized then, 
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it prepared the groundwork for a strategic cooperation of twenty-eight years later. The 
increasing evidence of Soviet-backed Communist and Nasserist subversion, the fall of the 
pro-Western Hashemite regime in Iraq, the Soviet '"war of nerves" and the 
contemporaneous emergence of the US as the dominant Western power in the region 
pushed Turkey to hasten to join Israel in a secret "peripheral alliance." 
According to this "peripheral strategy" doctrine, still prevalent, Israel should seek 
to offset the diplomatic and economic boycott of the Arab world by forging close ties 
with non-Arab, Muslim states, and nations on the periphery of the region, including 
countries, which opposed the establishment of the state of Israel but had no conflict with 
it. Accordingly, Turkey, Iran, Ethiopia, Sudan, Lebanon, and Kurds were potential allies 
for Israel. The aim was to create the image, in the region and in the world at large, that 
the Middle East is not exclusively Arab or even Islamic but rather a multi-religious, 
ethnic, cultural, and national area.254 
The cooperation included a wide range of areas but only the military intelligence 
part of it, which actually started in 1954 with the residency of an Israeli military attache 
in Ankara,255 survived because the disappearance of the confluence of regional and 
international developments, which acted as a catalyst for the alliance, soon removed the 
importance of other areas. Intelligence cooperation survived because of their common 
denominator, counter intelligence against the Soviet Union. Trident, a secret trilateral 
agreement between the intelligent services of Israel (MOSSAD), Turkey (MIT), and Iran 
(SAVAK),256 formed the mutual base of security cooperation for these countries, 
bringing officials together to discuss the regional developments each three or six months 
during the Cold War (with the absence of Iran after the revolution). 
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The two events in the early 1960s—Ithe Cuban and the Cyprus crises— 
precipitated a search for a foreign policy approach less dependent on the US and NATO. 
Because of the Turkish resentment toward the US after these events and of the improved 
commercial opportunities in the Arab countries, Ankara adopted a "multi-faceted foreign 
policy,"257 which diminished cooperation with the US in the region, efforts to strengthen 
the ties with the Arab states and a more balanced attitude toward the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
This inevitably led to the steady reduction of ties with Israel. 
Turkish neutrality, more aligned to the Arab side, in the Arab-Israel dispute 
allowed Turkey on the one hand to express its solidarity to the Arab cause, while on the 
other hand allowed it to maintain its relations with Israel. To secure the Arab support 
against its isolation on the Cyprus issue and to expand economic ties with the oil-rich 
countries, Ankara had to downgrade its relations with Israel and show sympathy to the 
Arab countries at war with Israel. Starting from end of the Six Day War, Turkish 
diplomacy generally supported the Arab resolutions at the UN General Assembly, 
including the 1975 resolution labeling Zionism as a form of racism. 
The increase of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism in Turkish domestic politics 
was felt conspicuously when Israeli Knesset decided to enact a law declaring Jerusalem 
as the permanent capital of Israel. In addition, diplomatic representatives from fifteen 
Islamic countries and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) pressured the 
Turkish Prime Minister to severe all ties with Israel. The Prime Minister refused it. 
However, by condemning the decision and declaring the closure of its Jerusalem 
consulate on 28 August 1980, and by recalling the Turkish charge d'affaires,258 the 
Turkish government adopted the minimum move necessary to alleviate domestic 
criticisms and to maintain friendly relations with the Arab states, a skillful action that 
subsequently harmed its relations with the US. 
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On December 2, 1980, the military regime of Turkey formally downgraded the 
relations with Israel at the second secretary level. The official reason was Israel's 
intransigent policies and the fait accompli it wished to create about the status of 
Jerusalem. Despite this official explanation, the real reason behind this move was 
Turkey's budgetary crisis. In 1980 Turkish exports was about $2.2 billion, while Turkish 
oil import expenditure was itself $2.6 billion.259 Thus, Turkish authorities had to seek 
assistance from Arab countries in order to obtain the necessary oil for the upcoming 
winter. On the same day Turkey downgraded diplomatic relations, Saudi Arabia 
delivered to Turkey a check of $250 million. Turkey's political and economic interests, 
rather than its ideological orientation, were of high importance for the military regime in 
this period. The structural economic reforms undertaken by the military regime and 
forwarded by the Ozal government five-folded Turkey's trade with the Middle East 
countries. The above picture illustrates the correlation between Turkey's economic 
expansion in the Arab Middle East and downgrading its economic and political relations 
with Israel. 
Nevertheless, the 1980s also demonstrated the resumption of security, politics, 
and economy-based relations between Turkey and Israel as Turkey's hopes for the Arab 
support on the Cyprus issue proved wrong (most of the Arab world, especially the PLO, 
sided with Greece). The falling oil prices also reduced the significance of Arab markets 
in Turkey's trade profile. Furthermore, former Turkish Prime Minister Ozal's desire to 
improve relations with the US added other reasons to swing back to Israel. He openly 
relied on the sympathy of the influential pro-Israeli lobby in the US to reach his aim. This 
desire appeared as the principle motive behind Turkey's rapprochement to Israel at the 
end of the Cold War when Turkish fears of marginalization increased as it lost 
significance to the West. 
In February 1982, Ankara declined voting on the UN's resolution that condemned 
Israel's annexation of the Golan Height. This Turkish abstention from the UN voting was 
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reciprocity for the useful information that Israelis provided for the Turks about the 
Armenian terrorists who killed several Turkish diplomats abroad.260 Moreover, the two 
cooperated with the US during its notorious Iran-Contra affair. The Turkish and Israeli 
airports served as intermediaries for the transportation of illegally sold weapons to the 
Iranian rebels from 1980 to 1985.261 
By the late 1980s, relations between Israel and Turkey were growing again. 
Diplomatic relations were officially restored to the rank of charge d'affaires in 1985. 
Economic cooperation especially in agricultural sectors started in 1986. In August 1987, 
American pro-Israeli lobby helped to convince the US Congress to vote against a 
resolution declaring April 24 as "the day of the (so-called) Armenian genocide." In 
addition, the Turkish and Israeli foreign ministers, V. Halefoglu and S. Peres, met 
officially in New York after a UN General Assembly meeting in September 1987. After 
that meeting Peres stated publicly to the reporter, "Israel and the Jewish lobby in the 
United States support Turkey."262 
During the Intifida (1987-1993), Turkey simply condemned the cruel actions by 
the Israeli military and did nothing else diplomatically. In 1988, Turkey recognized the 
State of Palestine declared by the Palestine National Council for domestic reasons 
(Turkey's population is 99 percent Muslim and its natural that a good portion of it 
sympathizes with the Palestinian struggle) and to preserve its diplomatic consistency (its 
vote for UN Security Council Resolution 242, "asserting the right of all regional states to 
live within secured and recognized boundaries," and its neutrality in the conflict entailed 
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such a move). The Israeli reaction was mild and cautious so as not to harm the good 
relations with Turkey. In 1989, Turkey for the first time voted in the UN against a 
proposed resolution to reject Israel's credentials. 
In the early 1990's, the period in which Israel and Turkey started to declare 
overtly their relationship and the cooperation began. Turkey, not to show inconsistency in 
its diplomacy,263 abstained from voting for the repealing of the 1975 UN resolution 
equating Zionism with racism. With the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference and the 1993 
Oslo "Declaration of Principles" Turkey saw no use in "being more Arab than Arabs"264 
as the Arab states and the PLO were eager to develop relations with Israel. The Israeli 
Palestinian agreement released Turkey from the difficulty of balancing between its 
commitments to maintain diplomatic and political ties with Israel and to show solidarity 
with the Arab world in the Arab-Israeli conflict. One month after the Madrid Peace 
Conference, Turkey upgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel to the level of 
ambassador (it did the same for the PLO to show neutrality in the conflict or in the peace 
process, and that it could be a mediator in the negotiations if proposed). Furthermore, 
Arab-Turk tensions on the use of the Incirlik Air Base by the US, Turkish incursions in 
northern Iraq to pursue and destroy the terrorist organization, the Kurdistan Workers' 
Party (Partiya Karkeran-I Kurdistan or the PKK),265 Arab support to the PKK and Syria 
in its water dispute with Turkey, and the general lack of Arab support for Turkey's 
international position greatly diminished Turkish support for Arabs, simultaneously 
creating cooperation with Israel and the US. 
More important, the end of the Cold War engendered fears of marginalization for 
the Turkish elite as Turkey lost its significance in the Western security system. Turkish 
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suspicions about the intensions of the US and Israel toward the future of northern Iraq. 
Thus, to compensate for the loss of Western support and to succeed in adding its security 
concerns to the regional policy calculations of the US and Israel, Turkey, ignoring the 
Arab critisism, started to pursue an active and independent policy to seek ways to engage 
Israel in cooperation. 
In 1992, the commemoration of the 500th anniversary of the admission of the 
expelled Sephardim by the Sultan Beyazit II to the Ottoman Empire illustrated the full 
restoration of the Turkish-Israeli relations at the international level. A year later in 1993, 
for the first time a high-ranking Turkish official, the Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet 
Cetin visited Israel. It was the beginning of a budding relationship for the restructuring of 
the Middle East. A memorandum of understanding between Turky and Israel established 
the framework for wide bilateral negotiations on issues regarding trade, investment, and 
cooperation in scientific, military, and other fields. Military attaches, withdrawn in 1981, 
were assigned back to the embassies in Tel Aviv and Ankara.266 Top level visits gained 
intensity in 1994. In January, Israeli President Weizman, in April, then-Foreign Minister 
Shimon Peres went to Ankara. In June, for the first time, Turkey and Israel conducted a 
joint midair refueling exercise with a variety of Turkish planes.267 In response to official 
visits from Israel, then-Prime Minister Tansu Ciller went to Israel in November. 
Ciller's visit was politically important because for the first time Turkey openly 
showed its tilt toward Israel and that symbolized a political change in the region. Ciller 
met a Palestinian delegation at Orient House of East Jerusalem to demonstrate that 
Turkey was neutral in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the peace process. Meanwhile, 
at the dinner in her honor by Israelis, she openly praised Zionism, mentioned Israel as 
"promised lands," compared Ataturk and Ben Gurion and called for cooperation against 
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Islamic terrorism.268 In this visit, several agreements including cooperation in the fields 
of trade, telecommunications and postal services were signed. Moreover, negotiations for 
cooperation on intelligence and on the fight against terrorism and drug dealing began 
with this initiative.269 
Turkish and Israeli officials negotiated on the two military agreements of 1996 in 
the 1994-1995 period. The landmark agreements on military training cooperation in 
February and on military industrial cooperation in August 1996 profoundly affected the 
power structure of the Middle East by emphasizing five principle areas: armament 
upgrades; arms sales; joint production and the exchange of technical expertise and 
knowledge; training issues; intelligence sharing and security forum for semi-annual 
strategic dialogue. In the years that followed, top level military and civilian visits were 
exchanged and this particular dose of cooperation provide Turkey with the endowment 
for a more assertive and active role in the Middle East than ever. 
In short, the Turks and the Jewish community have never had problems that 
would create long-term or traditional resentments for each other and the vacillation in the 
history of relationship between Israel and Turkey up to 1980s was due to Turkey's 
political and economic interests with the Arab world. As these interests, which served as 
obstacles in front of a rapprochement, disappeared in the early and mid 1980s, it has not 
been surprising to see the rapid development of Turkish-Israeli relations with the 
following rationale:270 
• Both states are Western-oriented and pro-US with military inventories based 
mainly on US equipment. 
• Both are deeply concerned about terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. 
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Both are Non-Arab and largely secular and are generally mistrusted in the 
region that is dominated by Arabs and conservative Islam. 
Both are also the most democratic and militarily powerful states in the region. 
B.       POST-COLD WAR WESTERN ATTITUDE TOWARD TURKEY 
Between 1989 and 1991 the global geopolitical mold broke. The revolutionary 
transformation of East-West security relations meant that the military importance of 
Turkey for the West as a key NATO front-line state bordering a hostile Soviet Union was 
undermined. Turkey, as a "geo-strategic rent-seeking country,"271 was worried that the 
West and especially its main ally, the US would no longer be willing to extend its 
unconditional protection, its political support, and its financial contribution to Turkey's 
security. At the advent of accommodation between the Super Powers, Turkey's defense 
requirements constituted a marginal concern for Washington and the practical 
consequence of this situation was that Turkey had to shoulder its own defense costs as a 
member of the NATO-US alliance and had to assume the defense risks associated with 
being geographically isolated.272 
Moreover, the end of the Cold War revealed the political and social tensions and 
incompatibilities between Turkey and its Western partners, which were hidden, but never 
cancelled, under the fight against Communism. Ambiguities and differences were 
accentuated by two main developments: 1) questions of human rights and democracy 
were brought to the forefront of the Western agenda; 2) the West was forced to give 
urgent priority to the task of assisting the economic and political transformation of the 
former Eastern European Communist Countries.273 
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To Ankara, Turkish exclusion from full participation in both the European Union 
(the EU) and the Western European Union (WEU) demonstrated Europe's unwillingness 
to grant Turkey a legitimate security and political role in Europe. The EU's decision to 
exclude Ankara from the membership list while it extended invitations to several 
formerly communist European Communist countries and Greek-Cyprus at the December 
1997 summit in Luxemburg demonstrated that Europe gave priority to the Eastern 
European states over Turkey for cultural reasons. (Though the EU accepted Turkey as a 
candidate to the Union two years later, participation negotiations revealed that the EU's 
unwillingness to accept Turkey as an equal partner continues.) 
Turkey's fear of being marginalized by its Western partners were swept away by 
two developments—namely, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991—that temporarily reversed the geo- 
strategic balance in favor of Turkey. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait provided Ankara with a 
new trump card to reconfirm its strategic value to its Western allies. By supporting the 
US-led coalition against Baghdad, Turkey managed to transform itself into an 
indispensable partner in a particularly sensitive region, the Middle East, and in particular 
in the Gulf area. 
However, while these events in the Gulf returned Turkey to the front rank of 
strategic attention, they did not yield tangible political, military, and economic benefits. 
The reassertion of Turkey's strategic importance, after the Gulf War focused on the 
country's role in the Middle East rather than its role European security.274 This sparked a 
growing tension between Turkish political aspirations and traditional Western foreign 
policy orientation, and Western images of and interests in Turkey. Ankara's essential role 
in the Gulf War reinforced the widespread European perception that Turkey is a part of 
the Middle East, thus Turkey was, and still is, increasingly perceived by the European 
countries as a strategic liability because of the additional burden imposed by its exposure 
in the Middle East. In response, Ankara felt it had to become more assertive in pursuing 
274
 Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," Foreign Affairs 70:2 (1991), p. 34. 
115 
security policies in its Middle Eastern neighborhood and, at the same time, it had to 
develop a "new strategic cooperation" with the US. President Ozal's strategy of closely 
cooperating with the Bush administration was primarily "designed to reaffirm Ankara's 
commitment to US-Turkish bilateral relations and to highlight Turkey's importance for 
US strategic interests and concerns in the Middle East."275 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of newly independent Turkic 
states in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia provided Ankara with the hope of boosting 
Turkey's international image, enhancing the prospects of its admission to the EU, and 
improving its Turkish-American relations. Turkish authorities thought that Turkey would 
serve as a gate for the West to these new countries and as a model for their political 
orientation. But these expectations could not be achieved because the US persisted in a 
"Russian-first" policy. 
Attempts to gain the US as a "strategic partner" in the region were hampered by 
the conflicting Turkish and US approaches to the Kurdish issue. The pro-human rights, 
pro-Greek, and pro-Armenian lobbies in the US Congress politicized arms sales and 
blocked economic aids to Turkey. On one hand, Ankara suspected the US's intensions in 
northern Iraq. On the other hand, it found the US an increasingly less reliable source of 
arms as Congress blocked a shipment of ten Super Cobra helicopters and froze the 
transfer of three frigates to Turkey. Furthermore, the US security and economic 
assistance decreased steadily (and ended completely in the 1999 fiscal year budget.) 
These circumstances forced Turkey to follow a more active, yet still Western 
oriented foreign policy in solving its problems in the surrounding regions. It was in this 
context that Turkey, left alone by the West with its regional security problems, appealed 
to the "always there" Israeli option both to regain its Western image and to solve its 
security problems in the Middle East. 
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The Israeli lobby in the US is far superior to all other ethnic lobbies combined. 
Ankara deeply believes that its alignment with Israel would ease Turkey's way to the US 
legislature and seduce the US Congress on its behalf. 
This has not been a futile belief as evidence proved. For example, in 1987 the pro- 
Israeli lobby secured a negative vote against the resolution declaring 24 April as a 
commemoration of the Armenian massacre. During the last decade, the lobby also helped 
to unfreeze Congressional blocking of the two frigates purchased by Turkey, placed high 
pressure on oil companies to build a major pipeline for Caspian crude through Turkey,276 
and to withdraw the same Armenian resolution from a vote in the Congress. Israelis do 
not seem bothered by this phenomenon; rather they openly express their support for 
Ankara's goal of strengthening ties with the US. 
Through the two military agreements with Israel, which was discussed earlier, 
Turkey achieved US support for Turkey's regional policies in the Middle East. The 
strategic cooperation established by these agreements attracted US support to create a 
stable environment in a region where the US has hostile countries along Turkey's 
borders-namely Iraq and Iran. By enhancing the US position in the Persian Gulf through 
the Turkish corridor, this alliance ensured US approval of Turkish Middle Eastern 
policies and impelled the US to consider Turkish national security concerns in its 
regional calculations. Thus, "The strategic alliance Turkey really wants, then, is not with 
a regional power, even if the name is Israel, but with the US."277 
In conclusion, Ankara sees its alliance with Israel as a part of its 
triangular relationship with the US that may well compensate for Turkey's 
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weakening ties with the European Union. ... It is certain that Turkey's 
cooperation with Israel has fundamentally a Western rather than a Middle 
Eastern "target."278 
While this alliance has served to counter anti-Turkish lobbies in the US Congress 
through the American pro-Israeli lobby and to strengthen Turkey's relations with the US, 
the Israeli defense industry—the world's fifth largest arms exporter279—also reduced 
Turkey's dependence on conditional and politicized Western arms selling. In addition to 
arms selling, sharing the military technology with Turkey, Israel defense industry 
presented Turkey with an ainvaluable substitute for Western arms sources. Israel's 
comfort with Turkish demands to transfer technology incorporated in the particular 
weapon systems has enticed Turkey to purchase arms from Israel. 
In short, Turkey's perennial insistence on staying within the Western political and 
security circle was the main motive behind its initiatives to secure cooperation with Israel 
in the post-Cold War era. Turkey aimed to both save its declining Western image and to 
have the US on its side in Middle Eastern politics. While Ankara's Westernization goal 
was largely the reason to propose a military cooperation with Israel, the regional factors 
that caused the Turkish-Israeli "strategic cooperation" were more complex and security 
oriented as we will discuss in the next section. 
C.       THE REGIONAL FACTORS BEHIND TURKISH-ISRAELI 
RAPPROCHEMENT 
Contrary to the general Arab view that Israel was the driving force behind the 
Turkish-Israeli military cooperation, it was the Turkish military establishment which 
insisted on such a military cooperation.280 While Israel's periphery strategy was the main 
reason for the cooperation in 1958, acceleration of regional threats to Turkey in the post- 
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Cold War era and Ankara's isolation to encounter them were the main motives for 
Turkey to attract Israel to the cooperation. 
The Syria-northern Iraq-and the PKK triangle occupied the Turkish agenda 
intensely after the 1991 Gulf War. The power vacuum in northern Iraq after the defeat of 
Saddam Hussein had serious domestic repercussions in Turkey. The prospect of a 
possible Kurdish state and provision of new sanctuaries for the PKK in northern Iraq put 
Ankara in a dilemma and aroused Turkish fears of Iraq and Turkey's dismemberment. 
Syria, providing shelter, and military support for the PKK since the early 1980s, stood as 
the central figure that Turkish national security planners had to eliminate. 
Of the three contentious states—Iran, Iraq, and Syria—Syria is considered by the 
Turks to be most efficient contiguous state for causing serious troubles in Turkey. Iran 
has been isolated internationally after the Islamic revolution, and Iraq lost a vast amount 
of its military capabilities after the Gulf War. Damascus, like Tehran and Baghdad, does 
not have the capability to threaten Turkey militarily. Ironically, Turkey and Syria 
relations were warming in 1993 when they signed a new security protocol (renewing the 
one in 1987). In various bilateral meetings, Turkish authorities repeatedly expressed a 
desire to improve relations with Syria in every field and commended Syria for increasing 
cooperation on the PKK issue. More important, together with Turkey and Iraq, Syria 
shared a common perspective on opposing an independent Kurdish homeland in northern 
Iraq that would divide Iraq and inspire other Kurdish populations in Iran. Syria, and 
Turkey. Furthermore, Syria and Turkey have secular regimes and perceive Islamic 
fundamentalism and political Islam as internal threats to be thwarted. 
Syria with traditional claims over Turkey's Hatay province and Euphrates water 
used the PKK card against Turkey to achieve these claims for a long time. Especially the 
Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi (the Southeastern Anatolia Project or the GAP) of Turkey is 
a grave concern for Syria in that when it is completed around 2010, Turkey will not have 
the flexibility on the flow of Euphrates water to Syria as it has presently. Ankara signed a 
protocol guaranteeing Syria a flow of 500 cubic meters per second in 1987. So far, 
Turkey has strictly honored this agreement. However, since the mid-1990s, Syria, to 
develop its inefficient but domestically important irrigation and agriculture projects, has 
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been demanding an increase in the flow and even further, demanding an equal share of 
water among three riparian countries—Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, because of 
the historical animosities with Turkey and of the need to preserve its significance in the 
Arab world, Damascus is inclined to explain the GAP, which envisiones increased 
prosperity in Kurdish populated Southeast Anatolia, and Turkish military incursions to 
northern Iraq, which is solely for pursuing and destroying the PKK and its bases, as a 
Turkish conspiracy over the Arab world. According to this interpretation, Turkey will use 
the GAP as the "water weapon" against Syria and Iraq, and Ankara has not given up its 
ambitions to control the oil-rich Mosul and Kirkuk provinces in northern Iraq. 
In 1994 and 1995, when Turkey was really concerned about an imminent Kurdish 
state in northern Iraq and was suspicious about the US and Israeli intentions on the 
matter, Syria heightened tensions with Turkey suddenly by bringing the water dispute to 
the attention of the Arab world and the West and by increasing its support for the PKK. 
Furthermore, the beginning of PKK's efforts to establish a footing in the Hatay province 
(Syria was provoked when Hatay was incorporated to Turkey in 1939) further alerted 
Ankara. Consequently, Ankara, frustrated by Damascus' irreconcilable stance, and by the 
death toll of 30,000 because of PKK terrorism, made Syria's aid to the PKK the primary 
criterion on which to base their bilateral relations. 
At the October 1995 security and cooperation meeting between Syria and Turkey, 
Turkey harshly demanded that Syria immediately extradite the PKK leader, Abdullah 
Ocalan, and suspend all PKK facilities in Syrian controlled Lebanon territories. The 
agreement between Syria and Greece, which provided Syrian air space and airbases for 
the use Greek military planes,281 and Syria's irresponsive stance to the Turkish demands 
forced Turkey to suspend all relations with Syria in 1996. Syria-Israel peace negotiations, 
did not consider Turkey's regional concerns and even factored assumptions about 
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Turkish water into the deal without consulting Turkey.282 Thus, Ankara had no choice 
but to gain Israeli support by offering an irrefutable military cooperation, which would 
immeasurably strengthen Israel's security while reducing its perceived need to negotiate 
a settlement with Syria. Otherwise, without Israel's cooperation Turkey would have been 
encircled by in antagonists: Syria-Iran, Iran-Armenia, Armenia-Greece flanking 
cooperations and by Syrian, Iranian, and Greek support for the PKK terrorist actions. 
While Ankara felt free to improve relations with Israel overtly after the 1991 
Madrid Conference and the 1993 Oslo Accords, the same occasions prompted Syria to 
embark on peace negotiations with Israel, which might have resulted in an imminent 
settlement. A peace agreement between Israel and Syria would pose an extra threat to 
Turkey because Syria, by moving its troops from the Israeli borders in th south to the 
Turkish borders in the north, could become more assertive in pursuing its Hatay and 
water policies. If such a peace agreement occurred, Damascus would press to remove its 
name from the US's "terrorist states" list after clamping down on the anti-Israel, but not 
anti-Turkish, terrorist groups based in Syrian or in Syrian-controlled Lebanon territories. 
In addition, the international community might have forced Turkey to concede its 
water rights to compensate for Syrian loss of the Golan water to Israel if a peace deal 
between Syria and Israel could be finalized. Furthermore, by losing significance due to a 
Syrian-Israeli peace agreement, Israel's periphery strategy would not require cooperation 
with Turkey. Consequently, Turkey would lose its "back door," the pro-Israeli lobby, to 
Washington while Syria would enjoy close ties with the US, as Egypt and Jordan did 
after making peace with Israel. Such a situation would isolate Turkey in the region. 
Additionally, while emerging as a militarily and economically stronger state than 
its neighbors in the post-Cold War Middle East, Turkey would have to drain its energy to 
solve its security concerns rather than using that energy in its Westernization efforts. 
Therefore, Turkey was reluctant to see a peace settlement between Israel and Syria before 
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Ankara itself cooperated with Israel and eased Turkish security problems in the Middle 
East. 
Thus, Ankara's regional aims in the cooperation were first to stregnhten its niche 
in the region, and second to isolate Syria by revealing its support for international 
terrorism including the PKK. 
In the early 1990s, despite the fact that Israel and Turkey shared a similar 
approach to terrorism, Israel rejected Ankara's pleas for cooperation against the PKK and 
Syria. The Turkish position presented by Foreign Minister Cetin during his visit to Israel 
(13-14 November 1993) that several terrorist factions, which Syria protected and 
sponsored equally threatened Ankara and Tel Aviv, did not entirely convince the Israelis. 
Israel stayed neutral on Kurdish terrorism, resulting principally from the fears of opening 
a new terrorist front with the PKK and from pro-Kurdish sentiments in Israel, as 
demonstrated by the extensive support for the Kurdish struggle in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Realizing that Israeli military help against the PKK was impossible, Ankara sought 
Israeli assistance against Syria, the main sponsor of the PKK. However, the Rabin and 
the Peres governments of Israel were clearly ambivalent about opposing Syria. "They 
believed that good relations with Turkey might interfere with Israelis' plans to make 
peace with Syria."283 
Ankara, by offering enticing strategic opportunities, tried intensely to convince 
Israel that Syria was a terrorist supporter. Likewise, it pressured Syria by demanding that 
Syria extradite Abdullah Ocalan.284 "As no positive reply came from Syrian leader Hafiz 
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Asad, the subsequent step was to leak to the press the news regarding the (already 
secured) Turkish-Israeli military agreement."285 
A peace settlement between Syria and Israel could not be reached. Israeli leader 
Peres and Syrian leader Asad blamed each other for slowing the process as they could not 
agree on the security and water issues of the Golan Height. Peres wanted to accelerate the 
process with the forthcoming election in mind, but Asad refused that suggestion.286 
Ironically, Turkish-Israeli military relations began in late February just as Syrian-Israeli 
talks was breaking down. 
Fortunately, Turkey was able to attract Israel into a strategic cooperation with the 
February 1996 military training agreement. For Israel, the agreement was irrefutable 
since it provided Israel with a significant strategic depth against Iraq and Iran. In 
addition, "it was a positive factor for Israel that Syria has an enemy on its northern 
frontiers. . ."287 (Such a scenario came very close to reality during the Turkish-Syrian 
crisis September-October 1998.) 
Moreover, with Netanyahu in power in 1996, Israel did not hesitate to emphasize 
the anti-Syrian nature of the cooperation nor did it abstain from supporting Turkey in its 
fight against separatist terrorism. In fact, a few days after Turkish Defense Minister 
Turhan Tayan's visit to Israeli occupied Golan Heights, Netanyahu publicly rejected the 
idea of a Kurdish state and condemned the PKK for the first time saying, "Turkey has 
suffered from terrorist attacks from the PKK and we see no difference between terrorism 
of the PKK and (terrorism) that Israel suffers."288 
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This first military agreement enabled the exchange of military information, 
experience, and personnel for training between Israel and Turkey. It also envisioned joint 
training exercises, exchange of military observers at each other's exercises, and 
reciprocal port access for naval vessels. Each country's planes have exercised in the 
other's airspace for one week four times a year and since April 1996 these exercises have 
occurred regularly. Such visits are beneficial. These exercises have enabled the Israeli 
pilots to gain experience flying long-range missions over mountainous areas, a skill that 
would be necessary for a mission over Iran, and provide greater opportunities for 
overland training than are available in a small country like Israel. In exchange, Turkish 
pilots benefited form Israel's systems of training in advanced technology warfare, in 
particular, the air combat maneuvering instrumentation range in the Negev. Such 
exercises have also enabled both air forces to become familiar with procedures and 
tactics used by their counterparts. This familiarity could facilitate cooperation in 
wartime.289 Turkey could also give Israeli Air Force planes sanctuary and could allow 
Israel electronic surveillance flights along Turkish borders with Syria, Iraq and Iran. 
In January 1998, the navies of Israel, Turkey and the US held joint naval search 
and rescue exercises—the Reliant Mermaid—similar to naval operations aimed at 
localizing and intercepting an enemy vessel, in the Eastern Mediterranean. This trilateral 
exercise has been held every year, with the participation of a Jordanian military observer, 
and has become the symbol of the US support for the Turkish-Israeli cooperation. 
Intelligence sharing and the institutionalized joint forum for strategic research and 
assessment, which meets every six months, "probably are the heart of the relationship"290 
between Turkey and Israel. 
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It is well known that Turkey and Israel have cooperated and shared 
information on the activities of the Kurdish separatist movement, Kurdish 
nationalist organizations, and the PLO for decades.291 
Turkey and Israel, since the 1950s have had a tacit and frequent intelligence sharing. The 
main reason for that was that the shared information was primarily concentrated on the 
two common threats to both countries' national security: terrorism and the neighbors. 
Since 1996, Turkey has benefited from intelligence gathered by Israel's Mossad 
on terrorism and narcotics trafficking. During Turhan Tayan's visit in April of 1997, 
Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai promised his counterpart that he would assist 
Turkey in gathering information with the purpose of fighting terrorist groups in the 
region. He stated that "both our states are victims of terrorism. Israel is prepared to assist 
Turkey with know-how and other means in the fight against terrorism."292 Given the fact 
that Israel has had secret ties with Kurds and an extensive intelligence net in northern 
Iraq, Turkey has been able to intensify intelligence gathering in areas of conflict— 
southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq—in order to downplay the influence of the PKK. 
Therefore, it was not ironic to see that PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured in 
Nairobi, where Israeli Intelligence Service's (MOSSAD) African headquarters is located . 
During Mordechai's visit to Turkey in December 1997, Turkish and Israeli 
officials developed plans for Turkey to establish a border security and monitoring system 
similar to the one on Israel's border with Lebanon.293 It seems likely that—despite the 
denials by the Turkish and Israeli authorities—Israeli military advisors have been 
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involved in the planning of the Turkish military offensive in northern Iraq and in the 
laying of mines and trip-wire sensors along the Turkish Iraqi border.294 
A semi-annual strategic dialogue has been in place since 1996. The exchanges of 
high-level military and civilian visits were so frequent that during the early part of 1997 
nearly all high-ranking flag officers of both militaries visited each other. The talks were 
aimed at evaluating threats against both nations in an effort to prepare for and to initiate 
joint measures in the event of future instability in the region. 
The "Military Defense Industry Agreement," signed on August 26, 1996, enabled 
the transfer of military technology and know-how from Israel to Turkey. This has 
allowed Turkey to obtain weapons and technology that Turkey could not purchase from 
Europe and the US because of human right criticism and Turkey's dispute with Greece. 
For Israel, Turkey, with its large military modernization budget, serves as a good arms 
export market for the giant Israeli defense industry, which is in dire need of new markets. 
The list of Turkish-Israeli arms deal is as follows: 
• An upgrading program composed of $632 million for 54 F-4 fighter jets and 
$80 million for 48 F-5 jets (this project was started in Israel and will be 
finished at Eskisehir, which means considerable technology transfer), 
• The purchase of 200 Popeye I standoff missiles, which equip the transformed 
F-4 Phantom 2000, 
• Common production of hundreds of Popeye II missiles with a range of 
150kms, which can be used in F-16s, 
• Memorandum of understanding concerning jointly developing and producing 
a medium-range antitactical ballistic missile system. 
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Also, Turkey is interested in Israel's early warning, radar control, unmanned air vehicles, 
special fences systems to seal off the borders with Iraq and Syria, and the Galil infantry 
rifle to replace Turkish G-3 infantry rifles. In addition, the Israeli military industry, with 
its Merkava III battle tank, is among the bidders of Turkey's $4.5 billion project of co- 
producing modern battle tanks to replace the aging ones. 
The implications of these agreements in the region have been tremendous. Facing 
the long-range missile threats that have made the home front more vulnerable, Israel is 
now focusing more on "over-the-horizon capabilities" that would allow its Air Force to 
hit a distant enemy, possibly with a preemptive strike. Turkey allowing Israel to use its 
air base and naval port facilities could play an important role without directly 
participating in a war. (During the February 1998 Iraqi crisis, Saddam threatened to hit 
Israel. Turkish Ambassador to Washington openly stated that Turkey would consider 
allowing Israel to use Turkish airspace to retaliate for a possible missile attack on 
Israel.295) To counter Iran's support to Hizbullah terrorism against Israel in south 
Lebanon, Israel reportedly established intelligence listening posts along Iranian borders 
and could use the "over-the-horizon capability" to launch air strikes on Iran's WMD 
production facilities. 
For Iran and Iraq, Turkish-Israeli military cooperation has brought Israel to their 
borders. Israel now has a "window" on the territories of the both "rogue states" through 
which it can undertake monitoring and electronic listening operations and stage air strikes 
on Iran's non-conventional weapons infrastructure. What is certain is that Syria, Iran, and 
Iraq now have to consider the new strategic reality by the Turkish-Israeli axis when 
developing their military-strategic plans: "element of uncertainty."296 
Syria has become the most directly affected country from the Israeli-Turkish 
military cooperation. Damascus is particularly concerned about the problems this alliance 
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could pose in the event of a war with Israel. Asad had to consider the possibility of 
waging a war on two fronts. Syria will never attack Turkey, but it cannot exclude the 
reverse. The crisis in September-October 1998 brought this scenario very close to reality 
when Turkish government sent troops to the Syrian border and strongly hinted that 
Turkey would attack Syria if it did not comply with Turkish demands—the expulsion of 
Ocalan from Syria and the cessation of Syrian support for the PKK. 
In late October, Syrian leader Asad signed the Adana agreement in which Syria 
would end its support for the PKK and would expel its leader. Doing that, Syria, after 
Iran and Iraq, was marginalized in the region, too. On one hand, the Turkish-Israeli 
military cooperation has had a psychological effect over Syria's will to wage a war 
against Israel. On the other hand, entrapped by the alliance, Syria had to abandon its 
"terrorism card," which offset Turkey's "water weapon." 
Though Syria-Iran, and even Syria-Iraq, the two historical hostile regimes, tried to 
make counter-alliances, the total of their capabilities did not match the scale of Turkish- 
Israeli strategic cooperation. Hence, Syria and those other rogue countries are still likely 
to appeal to the subversive terrorism and the procurement of WMD in order to elevate 
their regional stance quickly. 
Turkey, enhancing its power in many ways by this alliance, emerged as the 
strongest country of the Middle East. Ankara has been playing a more assertive and 
active role in regional policies by the confidence the strategic cooperation with Israel and 
US provided. Two incidents exemplified this position: the October 1998 tension with 
Syria and Turkey's dispute with Greece about the deployment of Russian air-defense 
missiles, S-300, in Greek Cyprus. 
As mentioned above, Turkey threatened Syria by invasion if it did not comply 
with its demands. This was a very important sign of the regional imbalance created by the 
military cooperation. Syria did not have any choice but to oblige. At the end, Damascus 
extradited PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, and ended its support for the PKK. 
Subsequently, with its leader arrested and its main supporter eliminated, the PKK fell into 
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Strategie defeat. Hence, Turkey achieved its main aim in the cooperation and focused 
more on northern Iraqi politics to curtail the emergence a Kurdish state. 
In the S-300 missile crisis, Turkey voiced its opposition to the deployment of S- 
300 missiles to the Greek part of Cyprus since they had a range of 150 kilometers and 
could reach areas in the Turkish heartland. Ankara stated that it would accept such a 
move as a "war cause" and warned that it would take all measures possible to stop the 
island from deploying the missiles, even to bomb them. Greece, in December 1999, 
agreed to divert the missiles to a remote island in the Agean Sea after the Turkish threats 
"and after the pressure from the US and the EU, which hinted that the row was hurting 
Cyprus's chances of joining the EU."297 This outcome can be attributed to Turkish- 
Israeli cooperation since it stregthen Turkey's regional position and provided the support 
of the pro-Israeli lobby for Turkey in the US. 
In short, the two military agreements between Turkey and Israel changed the 
power structure of the Middle East. While Turkey eradicated the PKK and marginalized 
Syria, Israel sent harsh messages to hostile Iran and Iraq by having the "over-the-horizon 
capability" through Turkey. More important, the US support for this collaboration 
enhanced the positions of Turkey and Israel both in the Middle East and in the West. The 
stability provided by this strategic cooperation might entice Europe and NATO to 
consider these countries' importance in their East Mediterranean security calculations. 
D.       OTHER DIMENSIONS OF TURKISH-ISRAELI CLOSE RELATIONSHIP 
Turkish-Israeli relations have developed unprecedentedly in the domains of 
culture, education, and science; mail and telecommunications; efforts to stop smuggling 
of drugs and narcotic substances; health and agriculture; regulation of free customs of 
duties; encouragement and protection of financial investments; avoidance of dual 
taxation; and technical and economic cooperation.298 The 19 agreements concluded, 
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since 1990, by Turkey and Israel clearly manifest the importance attached by both sides 
to their bilateral relations. In short, alongside military ties, Turkey and Israel have 
cooperated extensively in civilian sectors. 
In July 1997, the Turkish government approved the decree that put into force the 
free-trade area agreement between Israel and Turkey. The two sides mutually eliminated 
custom duties for more than 90 percent of goods. The agreement was originally signed 
during Turkish President Suleyman Demirel's visit to Israel (March 1996), and ratified 
by the Turkish Parliament in April 1997, but the necessary final approval by the 
government had been postponed several times by the Islamist Refahyol government, 
which carried anti-Israel sentiments.299 
The decree opened new possibilities for economic relations between the two 
countries, in commerce, in investments, and in industrial and agricultural cooperation. 
The aim of both sides was to reach $2 billion bilateral trade volume in 2000, an ambitious 
target but not unachieveble: in 1998, bilateral trade amounted to more than $700 million, 
whereas only eleven years earlier it was approximately $18 million. 
Israel has also opened the US market to Turkish products. Turks sell textiles and 
other commodities duty-free to Israel, which adds its labor to the product and re-exports 
them to the US duty-free.300 This trade boosts the Turkish economy, which in turn hires 
Israeli companies to develop irrigation and agricultural projects in the GAP (the 
Southeastern Anatolian Project) region. Israeli firms have shown a considerable interest 
in the GAP. Several textile firms attracted by the lower labor costs moved from Israel to 
Turkey's Southeast. Many opportunities to use Israeli technology to transport and 
distribute water are also foreseen. The economic cooperation also includes training 
activities: Turkish officials involved in the GAP project are regularly attending training 
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courses   at  the   International   Training   Center  for  Agricultural  Development  and 
Cooperation (CINADCO), Israel's large agriculture research and training center. 
Tourism is a prominent part of non-military relations: 300,000 to 400,000 Israeli 
tourists visit Turkey each year, spending more than $400 million,301 an impressive 
growth in comparison with just 7,000 Israelis who visited Turkey in 1986. 
Moreover, Turkey has been showing a marked interest in selling water to Israel 
since 1990. Water was, once again, a major topic of discussion during the July 1999 visit 
of President Demirel in Israel. Turkey's latest offer to sell 180 million cubic meters of its 
Manavgat water per year to Israel, which had repeatedly refused in the past similar 
Turkish proposals, attracted the interest of Ehud Barak's government of Israel. Israel and 
Turkey decided to create a joint committee to discuss the commercial aspects of the 
project as well as its feasibility.302 In April 2001, after finalizing the details of the 
process, transportation of water via super-tankers (this was a historic event for water 
never have been transferred in this way before), Ankara and Tel Aviv sealed an 
agreement to transport Turkish water from the Manavgat River to the Israeli port of 
Ashkelon.303 
Economic relations are highly important due to the existing opportunities for 
further developments in Turkey and Israel and in Central Asia and in the Transcaucasus, 
where a Turkish "entrance card" may facilitate Israel's desire to expand exchanges.304 
The Israeli Trade Minister Micha Harish, during Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet 
Cetin's visit in November 1993, indicated that Ankara was a cardinal partner in the 
Israeli plan to increase Israeli commercial ties with the countries of Central Asia and the 
Transcaucasus. The Israeli minister openly stated that 'Turkey can play an essential role 
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as an intermediary between Israel and the Muslim Republics of the former Soviet 
Union."305 Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres attracted the interest of the Turks 
when he proposed the possibility of a collective partnership between the US, Israel and 
Turkey aimed at launching economic projects in the Central Asian Republics of the 
former Soviet Union. Following Washington's approach, Peres declared that "any person 
of common sense should pray for the success of the secular and democratic Turkish 
model over the Iranian in the competition to achieve influence over the Central Asian 
Muslim Republics."306 A few months later, an agreement was signed between Turkey, 
Israel and the US to launch a common agricultural program in Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan.307 Recently, Israel has manifested its interest in gaining access to oil and 
gas from Turkey should Turkey's ambition to become a major pipeline route for energy 
resources from the Caucasus and Central Asia be realized.308 
E.        CONCLUSION 
Behind the emergence of close ties between the two states in the 1990s were 
Turkey's deep strategic concerns regarding the Middle East and the Western attitude 
toward these concerns. Israel's benefits were also significant but were responsive 
outcomes of Turkish calls for cooperation, which at one point enticed Israel to gain more 
political leverage reducing the importance of a deal with Syria to secondary. 
Global factors played a more important role than regional factors in determining 
the pattern Turkey would pursue to achieve its national interests in the Middle East. The 
changing Western perception of Turkey following the end of the Cold War raised Turkish 
fears of marginalization and prompted Turkey to follow a more active and assertive 
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policy in the Middle East. Feeling isolated in the region, Turkey appealed to the Israeli 
option to counter the challenges from the Middle East and the declining Turkish image in 
the West. 
Syria-northern Iraq-the PKK triangle occupied the agenda of the Turkish civilian 
and military decision-makers intensely after the 1991 Gulf War. Syria, providing shelter 
and military support since the early 1980s, stood as the central figure that Turkey had to 
eliminate. The Syria-Israel peace negotiations did not seem to consider Turkey's regional 
concerns and even factored assumptions about Turkish water into the deal without 
consulting Turkey. Ankara, in turn, had no choice but to turn Israel's attention to 
Turkey's concerns by offering irrefutable military cooperation, which would 
immeasurably strengthen Israel's security and would reduce its need to negotiate a 
settlement with Syria. 
Fortunately, Turkey was able to attract Israel to a strategic cooperation by the 
February 1996 "Military Training Agreement." For Israel, the agreement was irrefutable 
since it provided Israel with a significant strategic depth against hostile Iraq and Iran. In 
addition, it was a positive factor for Israel that Syria had an enemy on its northern 
frontiers. The August 1996 "Military Defense Industry Agreement" futher benefited 
Turkey and Israel. While Turkey found an invaluable substitute for politicized Western 
arms, Israel, whose defense industry was in dire need of a market, enjoyed Turkish arms 
market. 
The two military agreements between Turkey and Israel changed the power 
structure of the Middle East. While Turkey eradicated the PKK and marginalized Syria, 
Israel sent harsh messages to hostile Iran and Iraq by having the "over-the-horizon 
capability" through Turkey. More important, the US support for this collaboration 
enhanced the positions of Turkey and Israel both in the Middle East and in the West. 
Turkish-Israeli relations have developed unprecedentedly in civilian domains, too. 
The 19 agreements concluded, since 1990, by Turkey and Israel clearly manifest the 
importance attached by both sides to their bilateral relations. 
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the region since the strategic cooperation with Israel. Turkey demonstrated this stance in 
the October 1998 tension with Syria and in the S-300 missile crisis with Greece. 
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VI.    TURKEY AND IRAN 
Turkish-Iranian relations have been characterized by mutual 
distrust since the Islamic revolution in Tehran because the two countries 
have differing world views and ideologies that are probably impossible to 
reconcile fully. However, both also have traditions of pragmatic foreign 
policies that enable them to strive for neighborly relations from which 
they may derive mutual advantages as long as neither feels threatened by 
the moves of the other. Consequently, depending on which element of the 
relationship has prevailed, Turkish-Iranian relations have experienced ups 
and downs in the past twenty years.309 
This chapter will explore the determinants of the Turkish-Iranian relations in the 
post-Gulf War era. The main argument will be that ideological differences between 
Turkey and Iran create a rift and strain their relations frequently, but the pragmatism 
deriving from their identical foreign policy principles retract them from a serious 
confrontation. In the following paragraphs, after giving the historical background of 
Turkish-Iranian relations, I will focus on the contemporary elements that strain the 
relations between Turkey and Iran in the post-Cold War era. Doing so, I will detail the 
problem areas in their relations. These areas constitute power politics in northern Iraq, 
terrorism (ethnic and fundamentalist), and rivalry in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The 
analysis will reveal that while both countries desire stability in their surrounding areas 
and direct their efforts to that aim, the revisionist aspect of the Iranian regime, which has 
often associated itself with subversive means—namely the PKK and Turkish Hizbullah— 
and which even the reformist President of Iran, Khatemi has not been able to control 
effectively, has perpetuated the tension in bilateral relations. This analysis will also reveal 
that despite this tension, which is not unnatural considering the contiguousness of two 
incompatible regimes, the geopolitical and economic considerations Turkey and Iraq 
coupled with their realist and pragmatic foreign policy principles have compelled Turkey 
and Iran to accommodate rather than to confront each other in their dealings. 
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A.       HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1.        Before the Revolution 
The visit of Reza Shah, the founder of modern Iran and a great admirer of 
Ataturk, to Turkey in 1934 with a delegation of high-ranking and mostly "Turkish 
speaking"310 political and military officials became the symbol of modern Turkish- 
Iranian relations. This visit was when both countries were struggling to overcome 
constraining historical traditions and to establish modern institutions to gain access to the 
West. At the time of this visit, Turkey and Iran had several common goals.311 They were 
both working to separate the state from tradition and religion. Both countries also 
perceived a common threat from the spread of communism from abroad as well as 
internally. In addition the principles of their foreign policies were identical: 1) resistance 
to territorial demands by outside powers; 2) disavowal of irredentist adventures; 3) 
friendship with the West; and 4) active support of efforts designed to achieve 
international cooperation. This pragmatic feature of the foreign policies of Turkey and 
Iran still prevails even though the revolutionary aspect of the new Iranian regime creates 
some inevitable friction between Turkey and Iran.312 
Between 1926 and 1937, a set of tariff, border, trade, and security agreement were 
signed between Turkey and Iran.313 The April 1926 friendship and security agreement 
became a significant focus in Turkish-Iranian relations. This agreement was signed a 
little after the unsuccessful Kurdish Sheik Said revolt against the Turkish government and 
during the midst of actions by the Kurdish tribal chief Ismail Simqu against the authority 
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of the Iranian government.314 Turkey and Iran agreed "not to allow in their territory the 
formation or presence of organizations or groups of persons whose object is to disturb the 
peace and security of the other country or to change its government, or the presence of 
persons or groups of persons planning to attack the other country by propaganda or by 
any other means."315 Thus, signing security agreements to prevent encouraging domestic 
opposition by the counterpartner dates back to the 1920s and is not a new feature of 
Turkish-Iranian relations. 
Despite this treaty of friendship, further Kurdish unrest in eastern Turkey, as a 
result of the process of Turkification, created a situation in which at times the conflict 
spilled over the border into Iran. While the Iranians implemented similar policies in their 
process of "Persianization," the Turks felt that Iran was neglecting its responsibilities on 
the frontier as insurgents in Turkey were supplied and launched attacks on Turkey from 
Iranian territory. Turkish cross-border operations and the increasing number of Kurds 
fleeing from Turkey convinced Iran of the need to clearly define its boundaries with its 
western neighbor.316 The two countries reached an agreement on that issue by signing 
the Turkish-Iranian Frontier Treaty in Tehran in January 1932. According to this treaty, 
Iran received the portion of territory around Qotur, a city 40 miles south of the triangle 
where the borders of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq meet, in exchange for granting the right to 
Turkey to the eastern slopes the "strategic" hill, Mountain Ararat, from which Kurds had 
staged a rebellion in 1930.317 At the same time, a treaty of arbitration, judicial settlement, 
and conciliation was signed. This was followed in November by a further treaty of 
friendship. The agreements of 1932 laid the bases for warmer relations between Turkey 
and Iran. 
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The Saadabad Pact, named for its venue: the Shah's palace in northern Tehran, 
was signed between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan on July 4, 1937. The agreement 
basically reiterated points accepted in many bilateral treaties that Turkey and Iran had 
concluded with their respective neighbors since the early 1920s: 1) non-interference in 
other's internal affairs; 2) respect for common frontiers; 3) consultation on issues of 
common interest; and 4) non-aggression. Moreover, Article 7 of this pact was very 
similar to the wording of Article 5 of the 1926 treaty of friendship and security between 
Turkey and Iran.318 This stance against the Kurdish separatism also prevailed on 1955 
Baghdad Pact. 
Implicit in ...[both the Saadabat and Baghdad] pacts was an understanding 
that Iraq, Iran, and Turkey would cooperate in suppressing any Kurdish 
nationalist movement intent on altering the political status quo in the 
region.319 
Thus, the common understanding between Turkey and Iran on the Kurdish separatism has 
become a striking feature in modern Turkish-Iranian relations. 
After World War II, Turkey and Iran's strategic significance carried particular 
importance in Western strategy against the Soviet communism. The Baghdad Pact 
(1955), the Central Treaty Organization (1959), and the Regional Cooperation for 
Development (1964) were all designed to contain Soviet penetration to the Middle East. 
Turkey and Iran allied with the US, and the Trident, a secret trilateral security agreement 
between the intelligent services of Israel (Mossad), Turkey (MIT), and Iran (SAVAK), 
provided the base to cope with mutual threats and to maintain the regional power of the 
US against possible Soviet penetration.320 
318
 The treaty is reprinted in Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, p. 510. 
319
 Recited in Bishku, "Turkey and Iran during the Cold War," p. 20 from J.M. Abdulghani, Iran and 
Iraq: The Years of Crisis (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 131-132. 
320
 Spyridon Mimikos, Strategic Implications of Expanded Turkish-Israeli Military Relations, Master's 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1999, pp. 50-52. 
138 
Concerning regional politics, Turkey and Iran pursued similar policies toward the 
US and Israel. Turkey and Iran both had declines in their relations with Israel and the US 
when their regional geopolitic, economic, and domestic interests gained priority, but they 
never abandon their security alliance with the US and Israel against the Soviet Union and 
its Arab clients. 
During the Shah Muhammad Reza's reign, the son of Reza Shah, Iran's economic, 
as well as political relations with Turkey flactuated. When the U.S. imposed an arms 
embargo on the Turks in 1975 following their invasion of Cyprus a year earlier, Iran 
signed a five-year economic agreement with Turkey designed to establish a joint defense 
industry.321 In an interview with U.S. News & World Report in June 1978, the Shah said: 
"One thing the U.S. could do to help Iran and improve security in the [Middle East] area 
would be to remove the arms embargo against Turkey immediately."322 However, six 
years earlier when Turkey was selling medicinal opium (used as morphine or codeine) 
under a United Nations program at $10 a kilogram, Iran began to sell it at half the price 
trying to get the Turks to stop their production. Iranian officials had estimated that there 
were 400,000 opium addicts and an additional 10,000 heroin addicts in their country and 
that half of their supply came illegally from Turkey.323 In November 1964, when the 
Shah sent the Ayatollah Khomeini into exile for attacking his policies, Turkey accepted 
the cleric, who remained in Bursa for a year under the watchful eye of Turkish 
authorities.324 Yet, despite some cooperation, the Iranian leader "preferred to bypass 
Turkey in his dealings with the West."325 Each country has felt the urge to cooperate 
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with its neighbor only when it suited its particular interests. Thus, when the Shah was 
overthrown and an Islamic regime was established in 1979, Turkey quickly adapted to the 
changed political situation with its main concern being preserving Iran's unity. 
Although historical skepticism between the two non-Arab juxtaposing state has 
never disappeared, especially in the post-Ataturk and Reza Shah period, as seen in 
frequent minor incidents until the Iranian revolution,326 historical pragmatism coupled 
with their common stance against the Soviet Union helped them to ease tensions through 
negotiation and encouraged their peaceful coexistence. 
Thus, one may describe modern Turkish-Iranian relations before the Iranian 
revolution as a series of "marriages of convenience." The treaties between 1926 and 
1937, the Saadabad Pact of 1937, the Cold War's Central Treaty Alliance (CENTO) and 
its economic offshoot, the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) organization 
reflect this reality. 
Of all the Republic of Turkey's borders, the only one that approximates a pre- 
nineteenth-century boundary of the Ottoman Empire, its predecessor state, is the one with 
Iran. While there was a long history of competition between the Ottomans and the Iranian 
state, the latter, unlike the Arabs who were subjugated, maintained its independence. 
Thus, as one observer astutely points out: "Both Persians and Turks feel a sense of 
superiority in the area, which inevitably places them in a competitive mode. . . . 
[However,] the balanced nature of the historical relationship provides the basis for a 
balanced contemporary relationship as long as each side consider the other's self- 
interest."327 
2.        After the Revolution 
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 transformed the nature of relations between 
Turkey and Iran from a pro-West camp to an anti-West-pro-West polarization. Iran's 
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adoption of a new, revolutionary anti-Western and Islamic vocabulary and orientation 
aiming to influence and sway the Islamic world (though the exact definition of the 
Islamic world was not made clear) posed a threat to the secular Turkish Republic. Turkey 
tried to restrain such polarization. Escalating tension along this line would not only create 
regional problems but also could negatively affect Turkey's Westernization attempts. 
Such an Islamic-secular polarization would made Turkey potentially vulnerable to 
Iranian-led efforts to radicalize non-Westernizers within Turkey thereby polarizing the 
country internally.328 Religious fundamentalism in Turkey is a product Turkey's internal 
problems.329 As a result of industralization, people from rural areas migrated to cities for 
better living. However, they were dissatisfied with the economic conditions and were still 
attached to traditional life style. Unable to adapt to the city life, these people turned to 
extreme religious tendencies, which formed the basis of Islamic fundamentalism in 
Turkey. Yet, this situation made Turkey domestically vulnerable to the Iranian Islamic 
regime's revisionist face, which divines the export of Islamic revolution and thus create 
inevitable frictions between Turkey and Iran. Iran does hold a natural attraction for 
Turkey's fundamentalist religious elements to undermine Turkey's emergence as a 
regional superpower, which is an existential client of the "evil" US. 
While the new Islamic regime was willing to export its regime under the 
leadership of Khomeini, Saddam Hussein's timely attack on Iran did not allow this to 
happen. The Islamic revolution of Iran threatened the global security by challenging the 
domestic stability of Muslim Arab states in the Persian Gulf, an important source of 
energy—oil, natural gas—for all developed and developing countries. Thus, Iran felt 
internationally isolated during their eight year war, while Iraq enjoyed the support of its 
Arab brethren and the West. 
Turkey, if not supporting Iraq explicitly, favored the containment of Iranian 
Islamic revolution, and adopted an attitude of "active neutrality." This meant that 
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contrary to the overall US policies, the Turkish government did not pursue a policy that 
Iran would consider hostile.330 During the Iran-Iraq War, both Iran and Iraq were forced 
to rely on Turkey as a major source of needed commodities imported from Turkey or 
from the West. Turkey's trade with Iraq surpassed that the trade with Iran especially 
when Baghdad became dependent on Turkish routes to export Iraqi oil upon the closure 
of its Persian Gulf outlet. Subsequently, Turkey purchased 60 percent of its oil from Iraq 
and secured Baghdad's permission in 1984 for Turkish cross-border military operations 
to pursue the PKK terrorists based in northern Iraq. This stance bothered Iran considering 
its international isolation and its support for the northern Iraqi Kurds to undermine 
Saddam Hussein's power. 
Nevertheless, during the mid-1980s, Turkey and Iran made efforts to improve 
relations. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal believed that trade links were the backbone of 
Turkey's relations with Iran and the Middle East in general. Thus, a number of economic 
agreements were signed between Iran and Turkey. Ozal felt that building economic links 
and networks would eventually resolve political problems. Moreover, his success of 
integrating Islamic identity with Western modernity helped Turkey act as a role model 
and as a broker for Western interests in the region and soften the anti-Islam, anti-Arab 
perceptions about Turkey in the region.331 This posture to some degree impelled Iran to 
show a level of restraint in exporting its Islamic revolution to Turkey that it did not show 
toward other countries in the region. Turkish trade from Iran reached $1.3 billion in 1985 
including exports and transition fees. In 1985, Tehran's and Ankara's interests in 
increased trade showed itself in the revival of RCD renamed as the Economic 
Cooperation Organization (ECO). Subsequently, improving economic relations led to 
improving security relations. On November 28, 1984, Tehran signed a security 
agreement, similar to 1926 and 1937 agreements, designed to allay Turkish anxieties on 
the use of KDP camps in Iran by the PKK. In this period, apparently the importance of 
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economic relations with Turkey compelled Iran to restrict, if not completely halt, the 
PKK activities in Iran. 
In short, Ozal's foreign economic and consolidating domestic policy restrained 
the Islamic regime of Iran from undermining the secular regime of Turkey from the 
Iranian revolution to the end of the Cold War. 
3.        The End of the Cold War 
With the end of the Iran-Iraq War in July 1988, trade relations between Turkey 
and Iran decreased as Iran and Iraq began to diversify its trade relations and increasingly 
focused on Western European countries, particularly Germany. It seemed that Iran's 
interest in trade with Ankara had been mainly due to the exigencies of the war. Thus, as 
the decade ended, economic links between Turkey and Iran were not as vigorous as 
previously. Iran was trying to lessen its dependence on Turkey while Turkish 
entrepreneurs were turning to European markets realizing the instability of the Middle 
Eastern markets. 
The Gulf War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union left Turkish and Iranian 
decision-makers uncertain on what to pursue as a policy in the new environment. 
Beduffled, with similar concerns, the two countries initially engaged in conflicting 
policies in the areas—northern Iraq, the Caucasus, and Central Asia—where their 
geostrategic and economic interests coincided. Thus, Turkey and Iran biletaral relations 
were strained from 1990 to 2000. The underlying factors were their skeptism on each 
other's intentions and their ideological differences in the new environment. 
B.        PROBLEM AREAS 
1.        Northern Iraq and the PKK 
The first problem area that has most occupied Turkish and Iranian foreign 
policymakers is their concerns about each other's policies in northern Iraq. In principle 
both Turkey and Iran agreed on preserving Iraq's territorial integrity and welcomed 
restoring Baghdad's control over all Iraq. However, the northern Iraq power vacuum 
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created a conflict between Turkey and Iran when the Kurdish factions of northern Iraq 
sought patrons in their rivalry. Because of their geographic locations and political 
orientations Turkey cooperated with the KDP against the PKK and Iran cooperated with 
the PUK, which then was frequently collaborating with the PKK against the KDP.332 
These balancing policies were the natural consequence of the "realist" approach 
common in relations between nations. Tehran suspected that Ankara would gain either 
direct or indirect control of Iraq's Mosul and Kirkuk oil fields through large scale Turkish 
military incursions in northern Iraq, which in essence was to eliminate the PKK. Ankara 
suspected Iran's efforts to influence Iraq's Shi'a population and to undermine Turkish 
secularism and nationalism by using PKK terrorism. Not surprising, in 1989 Iran had 
made an agreement with Osman Ocalan, brother of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, which 
provided the PKK with 20 camps along the Iranian side of the Turkish-Iranian border.333 
What bonded the two states was the US's different approach to the Kurdish issue 
in northern Iraq, which risked dismembering Iraq by favoring the creation of a separate 
Kurdish entity. Ironically, the two supporters of the PKK in the Middle East, Syria and 
Iran, agreed to act with Turkey in November 1992 to show their determination to the US 
and the West on preserving Iraq's territorial integrity. The risk of Iraq's dismemberment 
also raised Turkey and Iran's fear of increased Kurdish national aspirations within their 
own countries. 
Since Turkey and Iraq agreed to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and restore 
Baghdad's authority, what remained as the real problem was Iran's PKK affiliation, 
which had been far more devastating than Turkey's reported support for Mojahedin-i 
Khalq and the KDP-I.334 When Turkey began to clean the other side of the Iraqi border 
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area from the PKK existence by large incursions and by cooperation with the KDP, PKK 
militants found enclaves first in the PUK controlled territories and later in Iran's 
Kurdistan province, where Iranian central authorities have never been able to control the 
boundaries with Turkey. 
Iran tried to balance Turkey-KDP alliance by cooperating with the PUK and its 
ally the PKK.335 Iran's motivations behind this action was multifaceted in the early 
1990s: 1) to counter Turkish designs in northern Iraq; 2) to deflect US/Western influence 
in the region; 3) to counter Turkish support of Azerbaijan; 4) to ensure an independent 
Kurdish state went unrealized to preempt Kurdish-Iranian irredentism;336 5) to have a 
word in northern Iraqi politics in case of Iraq's dismemberment. However, Iran hit two 
birds with one stone with the PKK issue: while serving as a means for the above 
objectives of Iran, the PKK card was also a precious tool to undermine the domestic 
stability of Turkey. 
Iran-PKK linkage was also related to Iran-Turkey rivalry in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia Turkish influence in these areas was threatening Iran's domestic stability. 
For example, the then pan-Turkist Azeri President Elcibey expressed his desire for unity 
with Turkey and Iranian Azerbaijan.337 Elcibey's stance at the time raised Iranian 
concerns about its national unity though Iranian Azeris were well-integrated into Iranian 
society. In addition, Ozal was trying to bridge Central Asia to the West area by offering a 
"Turkish Model" which envisioned reconciling Muslim culture with Western democracy. 
This risked further isolation of Iran with the possible US encroaching in Iran's 
surrounding regions via Turkey. Already discontent with the US existence in the Gulf and 
in northern Iraq, such a development was not acceptable for Iran. Hence, it was not 
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surprising  to  see  Iran  countering  these  threats  by  using  PKK  terrorism,  which 
significantly threatened Turkish national unity and territorial integrity.338 
The end of competition Iran's support for the PKK decreased in parallel to its 
decreasing concerns when Elcibey was ousted and replaced by Haydar Aliyev in 1993. 
Aliyev's rejection of pan-Turkist ideologies alleviated Iran's serious concerns. Since 
1993, Turkey and Iran signed a series of security protocols, which stipulated neither 
country would permit any terrorist organization to exist on its territory. This 
understanding went so far that Iran gave permission to bomb PKK bases located in and 
near Iranian territory when Ankara requested this in June 1994.339 
The flaring up of rivalry between the KDP and the PUK in 1994 and 1995 once 
again increased Iran's support for the PKK. When the fight between the KDP and the 
PUK escalated during the, each faction turned to its patron for help. In 1996, during the 
intensified fight between the KDP and the PUK, Iran reportedly deployed troops in 
northern Iraq, helped the PUK and the PKK to contain the Turkish-KDP alliance.340 
When Turkey secured a military cooperation with Israel, this was an immense 
strategic shock to Iran since Israel gained the capability of striking and surveillance over 
Iran by using Turkish air space.341 This created a regional imbalance by marginalizing 
Iran as well as Syria and became another reason behind Iranian desire to use the PKK 
card. However, improving economic relations encouraged by the foreign ministries of the 
two countries led Iran to follow a more conciliatory line about the PKK issue. In 1998, 
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for example, the foreign ministers of Turkey and Iran agreed to take allied actions against 
the PKK when they met during the Islamic Conference in Doha.342 
This warm period did not last long. After the expulsion of the PKK leader Ocalan 
from Syria in October 1998 and his capture in February 1999, Turkey turned to Iran and 
pressured it to end its support for the PKK. External support for the PKK has been more 
influential than the domestic support, and Iran, by many, was seen as the largest outside 
supporter of the PKK after Syria. Thus, for Ankara it was essential to make this second 
step in order to bring down PKK terrorism. Ankara's timing for this move was perfect 
when Iran's domestic problems were considered. (In 1999, Iranian domestic turmoil 
reached its peak by the street demonstrations of 100,000 people.343) Turkey alleged that 
despite the recent border security agreements, Iran was unwilling to abandon the PKK 
card as evidence demonstrated: Iran permitted the PKK to hold its Sixth Annual Congress 
in Urmiya in February 1999 and provided sanctuary to Osman Ocalan and other PKK 
commanders in Iranian territory.344 Abdullah Ocalan's explanations from prison 
confirming the PKK-Iran linkage increased pressure on Tehran. He stated that Iran 
supplied the PKK with weapons and bases and allowed weapons to be transferred via 
Armenia and Russia and that Tehran pressed Jalal Talabani, the leader of the PUK, to 
allow his territory to be used by the PKK to stage raids into northern Iraq.345 
Despite denials by Iranian authorities that they were providing support to the PKK 
by saying it is the game of the US and Israel to sabotage the friendly relations between 
Turkey and Iran, Turkish intelligence reports, as recent as in 1999, demonstrated the 
opposite. There were approximately 50 PKK camps in Iran, in which 1200 terrorists were 
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being trained every year, transported to the Turkish border by Iranian military planes.346 
In addition, Iranian Pasdaran (Iran's Revolutionary Guard Command) officers trained 
PKK terrorists in these camps as well as in northern Iraq. According to these reports, Iran 
also provided financial support to the PKK from 1995 to 1999 in exchange for PKK 
killings of leading figures and members of Iranian Kurdish opposition group, the KDP- 
I.347 
Ankara exploited Iran's domestic turmoil by explicitly siding with the Iranian 
reformists in the political struggle between the reformists, symbolized by President 
Khatemi and his followers, and the hardliners, the Mullahs and their affiliations. In 
several remarks, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit praised Iranian people indicating 
that the demonstrations were a natural reaction of the Iranian people to an oppressive 
regime and Iranians are a people with rich historical and cultural background who could 
not be expected to bear the outdated regime of oppression for a long time.348 He also 
distinguished between the Iranian supporters of terrorism and the Khatemi government 
indicating Khatemi's difficulties to control them due to the Iranian constitution.349 
A Turkish bombing of an Iranian border town suspected to be a PKK enclave on 
July 18, 1999350 was enough to make Tehran realize that, amid the turmoil of the 
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demonstrations, as well as the Jewish spy case,351 Turkey was trying to assert pressure 
on Iran to sever its ties with the PKK and any lack of a strong response on its part would 
have weakened its position in northern Iraq, and hence, its entire geopolitical position in 
the Gulf region, with eventual repercussions in the Caucasus.352 In addition, an 
indifferent response to Turkish calls would cause international humiliation of Iran, as had 
happened to Syria, and consequently would hamper reformist President Khatemi's efforts 
to save the "terrorist" image of Iran. On August 11, 1999, Turkey and Iran signed another 
border security cooperation agreement and since then Iranian support for the PKK has 
diminished in great scale. 
2.        Islamic Fundamentalism: Hizbullah-Iran Connection353 
As previously mentioned, Islamic tendencies in Turkey have originated mostly 
from Turkey's internal situation. Yet, the existence fundamentalist inclinations in Turkey 
left it vulnerable to Iranian encroachment on Turkish domestic politics as evidenced 
several times. Iran's charm offensive has alerted Ankara when Iran's need to cooperate 
with Turkey decreased due to the end of Iran-Iraq War and the uncertainty by the end of 
the Cold War. 
Turkish concern about Islamic fundamentalism, or reactionism, increased 
obviously, when the Islamist Refah Party emerged as the first party out of the 1995 
elections with one-fifth of the Turkish votes. The rise of an Islamic party was due to the 
impotence of the Turkish center political parties to satisfy the needs of traditional Turkish 
people living in the suburbs of major cities. However, the rise of concerns about 
reactionism was not because of the election results but because of the untraditional 
policies of Refah leader Erbakan after he formed the coalition government as the Prime 
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Minister. His catering approach to Syria and Iran in the face of their deliberate support 
for anti-Turkish terrorism and his accommodating attitude toward domestic sources 
reactionism—namely Turkish tariqas, which intend to establish the Sharia in Turkey— 
were seen as policies weakening Turkey's domestic and external security. In this context, 
Iran's sympathy to Erbakan government coupled with remarks criticizing the secular 
regime in Turkey alerted Turkish military establishment to target Iran as the enemy of 
Kemalist regime of the Turkish Republic. 
Ankara, reiterated its claims that Iran was sponsoring Islamic fundamentalism and 
PKK terrorism. These claims came at a very critical time when Syria and Israel was about 
to reach a peace deal, thereby risking the isolation of Turkey in the Middle East.354 For 
Ankara these claims aimed three objectives: 1) to pressure Iran to end providing enclaves 
and supplies for the PKK; 2) to recieve more Western support by indicating that Turkey 
is vulnerable to Iran-sponsored Islamic terrorism as well as Israel and the US; and 3) to 
gain leverage against the domestic reactionism.355 
Turkish security authorities repeatedly stated that they can prove Iranian attempts 
to undermine the secular order of Turkey via furthering Islamist propaganda and even 
training and support of Islamist terrorist organizations in Turkey such as Hizbullah. This 
led to mutual extradition of diplomats. In April 1996 eight Iranian diplomats were 
accused of being involved in terrorist activities after the testimony of a captured Turkish 
Islamist hit man.356 In February 1997, the Iranian ambassador to Turkey was forced to 
leave the country after he had made a public speech during a meeting called "Jerusalem 
Night" in the Sincan suburb of Ankara in which he openly praised antisecular, 
fundamentalist positions.357 During 1999 and 2000, the captured Hizbullah members 
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confessed that they had received political and military training and support from the 
operatives and the agents of the Iranian intelligence in the "Jerusalem Warrior's 
Organization" within Pasdaran.358 The Turkish media reported that the Tevhid Selam 
organization in Malatya, its newspapers Selam, and the Jerusalem Warriors were part of 
an assassination brigade created within Iran's Pasdaran and were behind the 
assassinations of 17 well-known Turkish journalists, politicians, professors, other public 
figures, and around 100 Iranian dissidents living in Turkey.359 The confirming 
declarations by the Super-Governor of the Southeast Under Martial Law, by the Director 
of Security in Ankara, and by the Ministry of Interior Affairs360 coincided with Ankara's 
demand that Tehran halt its support for the PKK and with Iran's domestic turmoil. 
Apparently, Ankara wanted to finish off both the PKK and the Hizbullah-affiliation of 
Iran by using this opportunity to make Tehran come to terms with Turkish security 
requirements. 
However, Ankara did not let these incidents deteriorate the overall relations, 
which consisted of significant economic interests for Turkey. The Turkish Foreign 
Ministry was not as quick as the Ministry of Interior Affairs to accuse Iran of Islamic 
terrorism. The natural gas pipeline project envisioned to transport Iranian and Turkmen 
natural gas to Europe via Turkey, a railroad project that would connect Central Asia to 
Europe, a plan to turn the ECO into a common market by incorporating the Central Asian 
republics and similar interests required Ankara, as well as Tehran, to warm the relations. 
The wariness of Turkey not to harm relations with Iran was obvious when Turkish Prime 
Minister refrained from blaming the Iranian government distinguishing between the 
people responsible for terrorist actions and the reformist Khatemi cabinet. 
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3.        Rivalry in Central Asia and in the Caspian Basin 
The competition in Central Asia and the Caucasus in early 1990s was about the 
Turkish desire to create a Turkish world "from the Balkans to the Great Wall of China" 
and the Iranian attempts to counter it by appealing to anti-Turkish terrorism and by 
exporting the Islamic revolution to the newly independent states. This was basically a 
competition to fill the vacuum created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and 
produced no satisfactory results for either side. Turkey wanted to gain more leverage in 
its relations with the West in the post-Cold War era by presenting a "Turkish Model" 
against the "Iranian Model" for these newly independent Turkic states. Iran became very 
concerned about further international isolation by possible US penetration into Central 
Asia via Turkey and about Elcibey's pan-Turkist propagations aimed at Iranian Azeris. In 
response, Tehran adopted a friendly posture toward Azerbaijan's enemy Armenia and 
cultivated relations with Moscow. In addition, economic expectations of Ankara and 
Tehran from this new market were another reason for this serious competition. 
However, neither Turkey nor Iran could recieve what they expected due to some 
restraining factors. Eventually, both realized the benefits of cooperating instead of being 
rivals in the region. For example, Turkey did not have the economic means to invest in 
rebuilding these newly independent states as imagined. Turkish officials realized that 
their expectations were too high and that Turkey's resources were simply inadequate to 
play out the activist role in the region. Turkey was also frustrated with the level of 
support and commitment it received from the West upon Washington's "Russian-first" 
policy. Thus, it has not been possible for Ankara to progress as much as imagined, except 
for Turkey's sincere efforts in developing linguistic and cultural ties with the Central 
Asian states. 
The Central Asian states did not welcome Iran with its emphasis on Islamic 
unity.361 In the first place, 90 percent of Central Asians are Sunni rather than Shi'a as in 
Iran and Turkey and Saudi Arabia were promoting Islam with an emphasis on a Turkish- 
361 Pahlavan, "Turkish-Iranian Relations: An Iranian View," p. 83. 
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Islam synthesis in order to prevent the spread of "Iranian-type fundamentalist Islam" in 
Central Asia.362 In addition, Iran shares little cultural heritage with the people of Central 
Asia. Even in Tajikistan, where Iran has a linguistic affiliation, Iran is not welcome due 
to its regime.363 Thus, Iran does not have the advantage of basing its relations with 
Central Asia on "ethnic kinship." 
In addition, these former Central Asian clients of the Soviet Union were cautious 
not to disturb the regional interests of their former patron Russia. Thus, this reservation 
was an obstacle to Turkey and Iran in developing relations with the former Central Asian 
clients of Russia. 
The fall of the Elcibey government in Azerbaijan symbolized the end of serious 
competition between Turkey and Iran. They realized the impossibility of developing 
pragmatic relations with these new countries based on a "common" ethnic or religious 
identity. Even among themselves these Central Asian countries lack a sense of unity and 
have several border or ethnic disputes. Pursuing an ethnic or Islamist policy would 
destablize the region, which has precious natural energy sources or economic 
opportunities. Thus, since the mid-1990s, Turkey and Iran, putting their unrealistic and 
dangerous aspirations aside engaged in cooperative policies that would enable them to 
develop separate relations with each Central Asian and Caucasus country. 
There is also rivalry over the Caspian Basin. However, this is not a rivalry only 
between Turkey and Iran. This is a symbol of the US-Russian competition for influence 
in the area. Russia is pressing for the passage of pipelines that will distribute Caspian and 
Kazakh oil from Russian territory, thereby wishing to increase its strategic and economic 
position with Europe and the world market. The US supports policies that would curb the 
acceleration of Russian and Iranian influence in the region. In this context, Washington 
supports the realization of Turkish Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline project that would carry 
362
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Azeri oil to the Mediterranean Sea through Turkish territory.364 However, the moment 
Washington's continuing policy of isolating Tehran internationally ends, which is very 
unlikely to happen in the long term, Ankara's chances of tapping Caspian energy would 
be seriously weakened since Iran has the potential of connecting not only the Caspian oil 
but also the Central Asia trade to the world markets.365 
4.        Iranian WMD Facilities 
Turkey is concerned about Iran's activities on missile technology and weapons of 
mass destruction. The successful test of a medium range of Chebab-3 missile in July 
1998 that could reach large parts of Turkey and the development of longer ranged 
Chebab-4 reminded Turkey of its vulnerability to WMD threats.366 Also, Turkish 
authorities are uneasy with the Russian support for finalizing the Iranian nuclear complex 
near Busheer367 and the recent decision of Russian President Putin to revoke a 1995 
agreement with the US not to sell arms to Iran.368 Although one may assume that 
Tehran's armament endeavors are not directed at Turkey but serve a more general 
strategic purpose in the competition for hegemony in the Persian Gulf, Ankara cannot 
ignore these developments in a neighboring country. 
C.       AREAS OF COOPERATION 
Indeed, Turkey and Iran have more to cooperate on than to dispute. The 
geographies of each country provide advantages to the other. These advantages are 
coupled with their desire to expand the definition of the Middle East to Central Asia and 
the Caucasus against the Arab world. Whereas Turkey serves as a conduit for Iran's 
364 «The Bush Administration Supports the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline Project," Aksam, 2 February 2001. 
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European economic links, Iran provides an invaluable transit route for a Turkey-Central 
Asia link to connect the Turkic world and their precious natural resources to the West. 
Both Ankara and Tehran were not late to realize the benefits of cooperation even during 
the competition phase. The inactive ECO, which attempted to promote trans-regional 
trade, banking, transportation, and telecommunications, was revived in November 1992 
by the incorporation of the newly independent states of Central Asia and Azerbaijan.369 
Under the same organization, in May 2000, Turkey and Iran signed many trade 
agreements, which reduced the customs tax at their border crossings, and pledged to 
cooperate more closely to turn the ECO into a common market.370 
There is also a $23 billion natural gas pipeline project signed in August 1996 that 
will sell Iranian natural gas to Turkey over the subsequent 23 years upon its completion 
by July 2001.371 This will increase the trade volume with Iran more than two-fold, to 
nearly $1.7 billion.372 Turkey is primarily buying petroleum from Iran and selling 
machinery, agricultural products, and chemicals on a barter basis. 
Turkey has also improved its railway connection with Iran since Tehran opened a 
new line to link up with the Turkmen railway network in May 1996. This connection will 
constitute the only functioning railway of the "new Silk Road" until plans for a trans- 
Caspian ferryboat-based railway connection can be realized.373 Consequently, 
transportation regulations are important to Turkish-Iranian official economic relations 
because Turkey is the basic outlet for Iranian overland trade with Europe. In this context, 
the recent meeting of the Joint Transport Commission, which convened prior to Turkish 
Foreign Minister Ismail Cem's visit to Tehran was also promising. The Commission 
369
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decided to reestablish train links between Istanbul-Tehran and Damascus-Tehran (via 
Turkey).374 
In addition to these areas of existing and hoped-for economic cooperation, there 
has been increasing collaboration in preserving Iraq's territorial integrity and in curtailing 
the emergence of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Both states do wish to see stability in 
the volatile Middle East and both want to thwart any phenomenon that would inspire their 
Kurdish population for separatism. However, Iran is unhappy with the support Turkey 
has given to the enforcement of the no-fly zone in northern Iraq. In this regard, Tehran 
has been attempting to convince Ankara to end the US and UK flights out of Turkey and 
find a regional formula to replace the multinational force. Nevertheless, Turkey's 
calculation of regional and international interests concerning northern Iraq impels Turkey 
to extend the mandate of Operation Northern Watch.375 By keeping the force functioning 
and having the only trade outlet for northern Iraqi Kurds, Ankara binds Iraqi Kurdish 
leaders with its own terms, which indeed, also serve the Iranian interests. 
In addition, the recent agreements signed for the border security and cooperation 
against terrorism and smuggling warmed relations between Ankara and Iran. During the 
January 2000 visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Harrazi to Ankara and the February 2001 
visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Cem to Tehran, the cooperation achieved through the 
Turkish-Iranian High Commission for Security and Joint Security Committee was 
satisfactory. Both states also pledged the continuation and further strengthening of this 
cooperation.376 President Khatemi's success in bringing the members of Iranian secret 
service, who were responsible of murdering Iranian opposition politicians, before the 
Iranian courts indicated that the Iranian government could control illegal actions within 
the Iranian state. This development encouraged Ankara to believe the sincerity of Iranian 
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reformists in their pledges to cooperate against terrorism. Ankara in turn wanted to 
remove all suspicions that would create tension between Turkey and Iran. To that end, 
Ankara presented all of its Iran-related security concerns about security to the reformist 
Iranian government. On 8 May 2001, the Turkish Minister of Interior Affairs, Saadettin 
Tantan, visited Tehran with a 163-page file that included allegations that PKK and 
Islamic militants received training at camps in Iran. In short, to further improve relations 
with Tehran, Ankara demands Iran have a "hands off policy regarding Turkey's 
domestic affairs.377 
D.        CONCLUSION 
Turkish-Iranian relations in the post-Cold War era were initially strained due to 
their regional rivalry and ideological differences. The opposing regimes of Iran and 
Turkey have been the source of their skeptism about each other's policies. The revisionist 
aspect of the Iranian Islamic regime has concerned Turkey since this aspect justified 
Iranian support for PKK and Islamic terrorism aimed at Turkey. Turkey presenting a 
secular regime compatible with Muslim society was a challenge to Iran at its door. Iran 
also suspected that the US, the main enemy of Iranian regime, would further encircle Iran 
by supporting the "Turkish Model" in the newly dependent Central Asian states. Thus, 
Iran used its terrorism card to contain Turkey's policies in northern Iraq, Central Asia, 
and the Caucasus. 
However, the initial conflict gave way to cooperation when Iran and Turkey 
realized that pursuing policies based on religious and ethnic kinship would benefit neither 
side. Their mutual geographic advantages enticed Iran and Turkey to cooperate rather 
than to confront each other. In addition, the sincere approach of the Iranian reformists to 
curtail terrorism originating from Iranian territory encouraged Turkey to boost economic 
relations. Currently, Turkey and Iran are engaged in diplomatic efforts to remove all 
suspicions that would hinder the progress in cooperation. 
377
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In short, though ideological differences between Turkey and Iran create a rift, the 
pragmatism deriving from mutual regional interests refrained Iran and Turkey from 
serious confrontration in the post-Cold War environment. 
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